Nuclear Non-proliferation and Iran,
For Ploughshares Ottawa, on United Nations Day
Robin Collins, October 24, 2006

Since this topic was proposed, North Korea has eclipsed Iran as most nuclear newsworthy -- it's been a heck of a week with all three spokes of the evil axis in the spotlight at once...

I have one amusing anecdote from the memorable days when the Shah of Iran was dethroned. At the University of Ottawa around 1979 there was a large meeting celebrating the imminent collapse of the Shah’s regime. (Photographs of downtown Tehran in those days were stunning in the scale of the mass demonstrations that forced the Shah’s government into exile.) We were a wide range of Iranian students sympathetic to the Fedayeen, the Tudeh Party or Mojahadeen and a few less radical international students, as well as Canadian leftist groups, some with links to one or another Iranian group -- all of us came together for this meeting.  The Iranians were very much divided on specifics: there were Islamist revolutionaries supporting Khomeini, a range of Marxists and Marxists that were Islamists, if you can imagine such a beast.Underneath the veneer of unity, of course, there seethed much disagreement. There was consensus only that it was a good thing that the notorious Shah Reza Pahlavi had been overthrown, and that the revolution in progress was an inspiring and historic event. The room was noisy with the excitement of the times.

All around the auditorium, there were banners and posters of Iranian opposition leaders and mullahs. There was one large one of Ayatollah Khomeini near the front, stuck on the wall with masking tape rolled up at the back. As the room filled up and just before the first speaker took to the podium, the Khomeini portrait came unstuck and fell noisily to the floor. There was a hush at first and then about half the audience of the auditorium applauded and laughed; the other half was silent and solemn. Someone went over and stuck him back up on the wall. Many eyes swung over from then on, and throughout the evening to check if Khomeini was going to stay up. This was the first clear indication to me that, post-Shah, things might not roll along smoothly in Iran.

 That happened about 27 years ago, and I remember it very well because it was both such good symbolism, and a reminder that Iranians hold many different conflicting viewpoints.

 Like many of you I have been watching events unwind in Iran ever since the revolution:  You probably followed the overthrow of the Shah (and remember when referring to someone as “the Shah of Iran” was like hurling the worst epithet possible). Then came the return of Ayatollah Khomeini from Paris, and the establishment of an Islamic Republic. On February 1, 1979, 5 million people took to the streets to welcome the 78-year old Ayatollah; then the seizure of Americans at the US embassy (what was accurately referred to by the Iranian students as the “spies nest”), the public display of “tying yellow ribbons” in the US in support of the hostages [the actual origin I believe of those yellow ribbon “support our troops” bumper stickers], and ultimately the hostage release suspiciously timed to Ronald Reagan’s inauguration as President in January 1981. Reagan entered the ring after his landslide November 1980 electoral result (in terms of seats, not so much popular vote[1]). Jimmy Carter, the outgoing President, had been “humiliated” by a failed attempt to free the hostages and the crashing of a helicopter in the desert. Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980 in an effort to seize the disputed oil-rich Khuzestan province, and to destabilize or even topple the new Islamic government. There began the Iran-Iraq war which lasted eight years, the longest conventional war in the 20^th century, killing one million people and costing almost US$2 trillion.

 In the aftermath of all that turmoil we’ve seen a dramatic increase in the noise about nuclear threats said to be building up to a crisis level in Iran. Since (or better put, because of) the Iranian revolution, the Iranian nuclear program has come under close scrutiny, much more so than Israel’s secret program.

 Iran has had a nuclear energy program since the 1950s. The Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) was supplied by the US with a 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor, which has been in operation from 1967[2] and was fuelled with highly enriched uranium. The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) in 1983 was willing to assist Iran in producing highly enriched uranium to “contribute to the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain an ambitious programme in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology”. Under US pressure, the program was shut down. The USA and France both stopped their supply of enriched uranium. The Russians and Chinese, primarily, have picked up the ball as partners with Iran.

 However the program that is of most interest to us and particularly relevant to peace and security issues is the concealed enrichment program, potentially useful for building nuclear weapons, and made known in 2002 by Iranian dissidents.[2b]

 First question, then is: Does Iran have nuclear weapons/weapons capability?

According to IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, as of September of this  year, “all the nuclear material declared by Iran to the Agency has been accounted for - and, apart from the small quantities previously reported to the Board, there have been no further findings of undeclared nuclear material in Iran.” But the agency has not been able to resolve “outstanding issues relevant to the scope and nature of Iran´s current and past centrifuge enrichment program”. For that reason the IAEA is not certain that there are  not ”undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. This continues to be a matter of serious concern.”[2c]

At the same time Iran, along with the rest of the world, has condemned North Korea for testing a nuclear device. Is this just showmanship on Iran’s part? Maybe. In that the Iranian government enjoys a good game of cat and mouse on a regular basis, we cannot be certain what the regime’s plans are.

Let’s assume that Iran does have intentions to build nuclear weapon. Where do we go from here? Is it acceptable to simply say, as many have, that Iran and other countries will inevitably lurch towards nuclear armament because the current nuclear weapon states have not abolished theirs? I think we can at least say that without a norm being respected by powerful states, there is no credible nor robust norm to speak of. What norm are we referring to? Simply this: the idea that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, including by their possession or implied in any arrangement where they provide “protection”, is unacceptable. Iran is quick, too quick perhaps, to point out that its loudest critics are the ones with more nuclear weapons than anyone else.

Is what Iran is doing justified?

I would say definitely no and without any caveats. But in the absence of consistent practice by the nuclear weapon states (NWS), it is difficult to be surprised that Iran is trying to build its first nuclear weapon. Everyone knows that Israel, Pakistan, India and North Korea are getting away with it, and the permanent 5 members of the UN Security Council continue to retain their arsenals (or build new ones), albeit in some cases the numbers have been reduced. Nonetheless, I think we need to be careful never to appear to be justifying Iran’s apparent nose-thumbing by calling up the double standards and hypocrisies of others.

Why is Iran doing this?

Officially, according to Iran, they are not. But if we discount that claim, and consider that they are actually building nuclear weapon capacity, it is because it brings “glory and prestige”. In theory it brings a military deterrent effect against an attack by others. A nuclear program is a symbol of modernity (whether nuclear power or nuclear weapons), power and independence. All those claims can be challenged, but they reside within belief systems too. Similarly, in the politically-charged Middle East, having nuclear weapon capacity despite the ridicule it generates, is a symbol of dissent, and of speaking "truth" to the powerful even if the repercussions of doing so are dire. So significantly, above all, acquiring nuclear weapons or aspiring to having them is about politics (and not about enhancing security), both domestically and internationally. We should remember that when we are tempted to suggest that states acquire nuclear weapons to "protect" themselves against the nuclear threats of others.

Is what Iran is believed to be doing illegal?

Yes, if Iran is secretly enriching uranium for purposes of building nuclear weapons[3], they are in conflict with the NPT safeguard system, and in violation of the IAEA statute[4]. Iran is in violation of its safeguards agreement which allows inspectors to check for, confirm and report non-compliance. Iran is also violating the spirit of the additional protocol to the NPT that it has signed but not ratified, which requires broad transparency and allows the IAEA to inspect without notice for verification purposes. If Iran is enriching uranium, it is now in violation of Security Council resolution UN 1696, passed on July 31, 2006.[5] Resolution 1696 is significant because it changed suspension of enrichment-related activities from a voluntary confidence-building measure to a mandatory requirement.

Is there an imminent threat?

Not currently. Obviously possession of nuclear weapons in itself cannot be an imminent threat to the peace. We know that simply because the major NW states continue to keep lots of them for themselves. It is also true, however, that some states are more volatile than others and some leaders are scarier than others, and therefore (with “nothing to lose”) they may be more trigger-happy. Many people and governments believe that heavily nuclear-armed USA is less dangerous than North Korea with a lone nuke. “Threats” are determined this way: Under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, the Security Council is obliged to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken [...] to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Under Article 42 the Security Council “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” Typically, the decision to respond with force is activated by the Security Council when the threat is considered imminent. That was the debate in 2003 around the suspicion that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction – was the threat imminent or only a potential one? That is now the similar debate surrounding the North Korean threat. The Security Council omitted (and could not agree on) any reference to a military recourse by the international community to the DPRK’s testing of a nuclear weapon. Clearly that test was not seen as an imminent threat justifying a military response.

Indeed, small numbers of nuclear weapons, while they can result in a devastating humanitarian impact if launched, pose no real military advantage if the result of using them guarantees an immediate and devastating nuclear or conventional response (by someone or some coalition, or even authorized by NATO or by the United Nations Security Council). What kind of deterrence do they really provide? What is being a member of the nuclear club really all about and what are the practical alternatives? These are obviously very important questions that deserve much more elaboration in a separate discussion. That security debate is undeniably at the core of the nuclear weapon problem.

If Iran withdraws from the NPT should something be done, and if so, what?

What options remain if a NPT treaty member decides to withdraw from the treaty? Withdrawal from the treaty is a right of membership. Article X of the treaty permits withdrawal with three months notice if a member “decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this [t]reaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” (We must ask ourselves why would there be any attempt to withdraw unless there was a desire by a non-NW state to develop nuclear weapons? Why bother?)

Debate exists over whether there are obligations beyond waiting 3 months before actual withdrawal. Some will argue, for instance, that any nuclear materials gained (while a treaty signatory) should be handed back, or that the Security Council (which is expected to peruse any withdrawal) can refuse a withdrawal.

There are several problems with this however.

If a state doesn’t wait the mandatory 3 months, does it make any sense for the Security Council to impose a penalty? What good would it do; and in any case, is there any real significance to the 3-month “waiting period” clause? If so, consider NATO's position as noted in Wikipedia: "NATO states argue that when there is a state of "general war" the treaty no longer applies, effectively the states involved leave the treaty with no notice.”

There seems to be some logic to calling for a return of nuclear-related materials acquired by membership in the NPT, if a state withdraws from the treaty. That is because the materials and technology were made available on the assumption and with the condition that they would be used for peaceful nuclear energy purposes. The IAEA statute incorporates a clause stating that violations of the safeguards agreement can result in a “call for the return of materials and equipment” made available.[6] But it isn’t difficult to run into problems here too: Specifically, if a state “gives it back” after leaving the NPT, what prevents development of nuclear weapons from that point onwards outside the NPT (particularly if the country is rich in uranium and has a modern economy, and now also has the know-how)?

When Iraq, a member of the NPT, was suspected of developing nuclear weapon capability, Israel (a non-signatory) preemptively bombed its Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, which on one hand was an illegal response by Israel, and on the other the height of hypocrisy considering Israel also has Illegal nuclear weapon capability. But even more important, and as Shimon Peres (who opposed the strike) argued later, the Israeli strike probably caused Iraq simply to hide its continued (and greatly expanded) WMD program, and to work even harder to develop capability (confirmed later by inspection teams).

The penalties spilling out of this legalistic approach to withdrawal might include Security Council-authorized sanctions – or something more severe – based on an assessment of a “threat against international peace and security”. But what are the repercussions of denying a country access to nuclear energy because it refuses to sign the NPT? Is that sustainable internationally? What would it do to the NPT regime overall?

All of this context and preamble is simply to underline that the technical or legal issues raised by withdrawal, not signing, or violation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty are not as important as the norm that is under seige. Unless the Security Council is committed ultimately to the destruction of all nuclear weapon capability, including and especially their own, there is no real global norm to enforce. The only result in the face of a determined non-NW state wishing to become so armed will be temporary sanctions in the short term and further decay of the non-proliferation regime. That in fact is what happened with India and Pakistan, and now North Korea, and potentially Iran in the future. On the other hand, when Libya decided to destroy its nascent capability, it disappeared from the front page.

The Iran situation is not in isolation. Here are some additional pieces of the puzzle.

The Energy Question

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty permits member states to develop nuclear energy capability; indeed it encourages that development. Article 4 of the treaty, for instance, refers to: "the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination". Without the energy clause, there would be no treaty. Those opposed to all things nuclear think that is a flaw of the NPT. In fact, it was a condition of the treaty, and a crucial part of a deal that was forged in order to reduce the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and any increase in the number of nuclear weapon states. Without the NPT, there would be no baseline restrictions, no prohibition on new nuclear weapon states towards the acquisition of nuclear arms and no shared response to violations. To a large extent, the NPT deal has been successful at least in terms of limiting the number of nuclear weapon states. There are currently a combined 9 (declared and undeclared) NW states. There are another 40 countries that are said to have the capability to become nuclear weapon states in a short timeframe.

On the energy side of the equation, there are 443 nuclear energy reactors. There are 250 new reactors either under construction, planned or proposed, mostly in Asia. Some estimate that there may be a ten-fold increase in the number of reactors over the long range, in other words a 5000+ reactor world. Nuclear energy is not going away. It is on the rise, particularly in the climate of global warming, reduced fossil fuel sources (including dwindling oil supplies).

Hans Blix, a nuclear weapon abolition realist and chief weapons inspector for Iraq prior to the war, believes that nuclear energy has the potential to reduce global tensions because of the increased access it affords developing countries to relatively cheap energy supplies.

One problem, however, is that one nuclear weapon source for fissile material is plutonium generated by some nuclear power reactors. Another source is through the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) by centrifuges used typically in support of power reactors (there are several other ways to do it.)

In September of this year, a significant proposal was again in circulation, this time in IAEA headquarters in Vienna. It was that no nation should be able to enrich uranium for their nuclear power reactors. Instead, multinational fuel banks could be centralized and placed under strict international control. Multi-billionaire Warren Buffet coughed up $50 million for an IAEA-run facility. The Russians like the idea, the Bush administration backs the idea. Hans Blix’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission makes a similar recommendation, and supported the idea of safeguarded regional fuel centres that lease nuclear fuel to states that forego enrichment and reprocessing activities. A just-released Project Ploughshares briefing by Ernie Regehr also refers to the fuel bank proposal.[7]

Can this proposal be sold?

There are critics of the fuel bank proposal. One example:

"The idea that you're going to get everyone to hold hands and internationalize the ownership and operations of what is essentially a process that brings you within days - or at most, weeks - of the bomb, strikes me as fanciful". (Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington.)[8]

The proposal for an international centralized fuel depot has been around for some time. US President Eisenhower proposed it in 1953. We can find a hint of this in Canadian diplomatic correspondence and negotiations at least as early as 1943, and in 1951 when Canadians negotiated phrasing for a U.S. drafted disarmament treaty (the precursor of the NPT) that included wording towards “the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only”.

In 1946 the Americans proposed[9] that

“[a]n international administrative body would own, operate and develop the nuclear industry on behalf of all nations. The international authority would be the owner of nuclear ores and fuels, would carry out research (even in the field of nuclear explosives) and would operate nuclear fuel fabrication plants and nuclear power reactors, while international inspectors would be responsible for discovering any clandestine activities which took place.”

Not a new idea at all! So who would object to it and why?

Nuclear weapon states would have to give up their existing and exclusive capacity for this technology and participate in negotiations along with the rest of the world. Those with large sources of relevant natural resources would also have to comply. Canada, for instance, “is the world's leading uranium producer, accounting for a third of global production and 15% of global reserves. Australia is the next largest producer, with one quarter of global production and 27% of global reserves.”[10] Success would depend on how serious we all are about non-proliferation. Can pressure be brought to bear on nuclear weapon states? Will nuclear abolitionists, the natural defenders of the NPT, call for the sharing of nuclear energy source materials? Can states aspiring to become nuclear-armed be convinced that a centralized system is in their interests?

And can the centres be developed so that there is equitable access to nuclear energy materials? The IAEA proposal is that there would be a “guaranteed supply at below market prices”.[11]

The Security Question

It is less certain that that by resolving “extraneous issues”, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, we will eliminate the contentions that drive many of the crises in the Middle East; crises that allegedly result in the desire to possess nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.

If, for instance, the UN ensured that a two-state solution was established, that Israel removed itself from the Occupied Territories (and the question of Jerusalem and right of return was resolved), would we then have no more Saddam Husseins or Hamas or Hezbollahs financed by Iran, and by extension no more “need” for smaller states to build nuclear weapons capacity? Similarly, it is not assured that the demise of the current North Korean regime (or buying it off with mountains of development aid), or the reunification of the Koreas will end the proliferation risk in that region for all time.

However, some of the reasoning behind the renewed thirst for nuclear weapons capability does point to insecurities, usually insecurity felt by repressive governments bordered by other unstable regimes, but also small states badgered by and vulnerable to larger powerful states. Many of those contentions are complex but until they are addressed, there is even less certainty that the nuclear temptation will be resisted.

I don’t believe that nuclear weapons can be abolished in isolation from development of new international or multilateral security arrangements. As Mark Gwozdecky, director of the nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament division of Foreign Affairs said in September (2006),  “When examining the role of nuclear weapons in defence policies, we should explore non-nuclear alternatives which achieve the same [intended positive] security outcomes.” The best leadership that current nuclear weapon states can offer is their pursuance of the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty and the Test Ban Treaty (both of which indicate an effort to put a cap on the current level of arsenals), and as well by proceeding with their own reductions of nuclear weapons down to zero.

What to do?

• All of this requires a certain kind of climate that enables progress to happen. I believe that the United Nations has a core role in most, if not all of the solutions (what better an endorsement of that institution on UN Day, than that!) Don’t forget that a majority of people alive today have only known a United Nations world. The UN has outlasted earlier failed attempts at global institution building. Few people believe that we are better off in a pre-UN or non-UN world, although there are some.

• We as abolitionists should remain angry, but we need to engage governments and militaries, not isolate them with rhetoric and repetition. Generally speaking government officials know as much, and often more than we do about the subject at hand, and they are just as committed to the long haul, even if they sometimes seem too patient with the slow pace of events.

• We need to separate the nuclear energy question from the nuclear weapon abolition problem; the nuclear energy debate is one that should take place, but it is a separate debate. The cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament regime is the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (the NPT), and access to nuclear energy is guaranteed by a core pillar of that treaty. That is not likely to change in the short to middle timeframe. Whether or not nuclear power plants will be around for some time, we need to revive the idea of international and regional fuel cycle depots to control fissile materials and nuclear wastes.

• We need to resolve intractable international conflicts because that will increase global security and reduce instability. But we should not assume that fanaticism will miraculously disappear as a result. Is there a clear linkage between Iran’s drive for the bomb and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Maybe indirectly, but it is not certain.

• And last point, we need to develop robust and realizable alternative security arrangements to replace those (like nuclear deterrence) that cannot work and which help encourage unstable regimes to do discouraging things.

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Footnotes