The Ploughshares Monitor
Autumn 2002, volume 23, no. 3
The emerging campaign against cluster bombs and explosive remnants
of war
By Robin Collins
Peter Herby, a legal specialist with the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), was arguing at a workshop in
Ottawa that it might be more useful to prohibit a weapon's "effects"
than a narrowly defined weapon itself. This was in 1996, a year
before the signing of the historic ban on antipersonnel landmines
(APM). Herby was concerned that a single-weapon campaign might mean
that every time a "new" weapon was introduced a new campaign
would need to be launched.
When the Ottawa APM Treaty was signed and delivered,
there was some debate about whether an "effects-based"
definition had been successfully achieved. There is still contention
over this, but for the most part a class of weapon, defined both
by its design and by how it is detonated, has been outlawed by a
majority of countries.
But what about those other weapons that explode unintentionally
– but just like landmines – in a farmer's field, near
a schoolyard, or beside the path to the village water supply?
There was apparent consensus among both the governments
that signed onto the Ottawa Treaty and the Nobel Prize-winning International
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) that faulty cluster bombs were
"not covered by Ottawa." However, an interesting process
that harkens back to some of those concerns expressed by Peter Herby
and others has begun to take shape over the last couple of years.
Cluster bombs
Cluster bombs (CB) have been heavily used in war since
the 1960s, particularly by the US military. According to the Mennonite
Central Committee (MCC) "the U.S. flew more than 580,000 bombing
missions over Laos [during the conflict in Indochina]. This is equal
to one bombing mission every 8 minutes around the clock for 9 full
years." Three hundred million cluster "bombies" –
the bomblets contained in a cluster bomb – were released from
their bomb casings when dropped over Indochina – 90 million
over Laos alone. The number of victims of CBs started to mount at
that point and can equal or outnumber the count for landmine victims
in parts of that region. Mine clearance agencies such as Mines Advisory
Group and humanitarian organizations such as MCC have always made
it known that unexploded ordnance disposal is not only about landmines,
but also a range of other weapons left dangerously explosive long
after war’s end.
The international campaign that was formed to ban
AP mines focussed on one class of weapons, primarily because these
were among the most onerous and, overall, claimed the most victims.
The victims were usually civilians and often children who unintentionally
triggered the explosion themselves.
Cluster bomblets tended to kill rather than maim their
victims, but they were used in fewer conflicts. Typically dropped
from the air, they were dependent on elite militaries which were
equipped with an air force.
In 2000, a new approach to the problem of persistent
weapons was proposed when the Red Cross suggested that any weapon
left unexploded and threatening in post-conflict environments could
be captured by the phrase "explosive remnants of war"
(ERW). They would comprise a broad category of weapons, including
artillery shells, mortars, hand grenades, landmines, submunitions,
and other ordnance. Might it be possible to build into the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) a new protocol restricting
or banning – and clearing – anything whose lingering "effects"
put civilians and communities at risk?
Several nongovernmental organizations, including Mines
Action Canada (MAC), found this approach attractive and are supporting
those governments pressing for this additional protocol to the CCW.
Many of the activist governments, including the Netherlands and
Canada, were leaders in the campaign to ban antipersonnel mines.
Late in 2001, and at the request of a vocal group
of member campaigns, again including MAC, the ICBL itself declared
official support for a cluster bomb moratorium and a new protocol
on explosive remnants of war. The Parliament of the European Union
also supported these efforts. At the CCW conference in December
last year, a nongovernmental statement (authored by Celina Tuttle
of MAC) laid out some of the ground rules, while back here at home,
MAC’s member organizations (including Project Ploughshares)
pressed the Canadian government to declare a national moratorium
on the use of any cluster bombs still held in Canadian inventories.
The Canadian government did not respond, although there was fresh
debate among parliamentarians.
More than 50 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
(including 15 from Canada) have now signed a statement read to the
CCW in Geneva this past July, calling for an urgent resolution of
the outstanding issues, and for "unilateral moratoria on the
use, production and transfer of cluster submunitions until the humanitarian
concerns that arise from their use are addressed."1
The success of this effort, while showing momentum, is far from
certain. However it plays out, most interesting is why the landmine
ban campaign unexpectedly "spilled over" and triggered
a broader humanitarian debate and an obligation to address other
explosive remnants of war.
Suddenly cluster bombs are a problem
Until very recently cluster bombs have been relatively
uncontroversial, avoided even by the ICBL and many of its member
groups. During the Indochina conflict (and in the decades since
the victim count started to accumulate), they were simply one weapon
among many with known but hushed-up post-conflict consequences.
Thirty million cluster bomblets were dropped on Kuwait and Iraq
during the Gulf War, resulting in thousands of untargeted casualties,
but there was no significant public outcry. Suddenly they became
humanitarian abominations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Yet international
humanitarian law has always prohibited the kind of effects on civilians
meted out by mines and failed cluster bomblets. To that extent both
the Ottawa Treaty and any new CCW treaty protocols only reiterate
what international standards have always required of a country's
armed forces.
Why, then, such a dramatic shift in attitude? The
world has changed and, in this respect, for the better. It is now
much harder to portray civilian casualties as collateral damage,
without a public relations penalty. (The phrase "collateral
damage" only entered the popular lexicon a dozen years ago.)
Heightened humanitarian expectations have been added to the crucible
of civil society and civil governments which emerged from the ban
on antipersonnel landmines. The Ottawa Treaty is showing evidence
of its influence beyond antipersonnel mines. Consequently, failed
cluster bombs and a whole range of other battlefield detritus are
newly unacceptable. In the shadow of a ban on one outdated weapon,
said by some to have dubious military utility at best, scrutiny
is being brought to bear more generally on how war is being prosecuted.
Technical fixes
Several approaches exist that address the problem
of weapons with a high rate of ERW such as (and in particular) failing
cluster submunitions (bomblets). One option has been to consider
"technical fixes" to the problem – either by retrofitting
a new component to an existing weapon, or through a complete redesign
and remanufacture of the munition. Replenishing stocks with new
munitions that self-destruct (SD) or self-deactivate (SDA) if their
primary fuses fail significantly reduces the risk of any individual
munition becoming an explosive remnant of war.2 However,
improved primary fusing and added SD/SDA capability are still controversial
and both "fix" options have supporters and detractors.3
(See Sidebar I)
Reliability estimates, for instance, are often disputed,
and therefore all claims for and against SD and SDA need to be scrutinized
and verified. For instance, the overall failure-to-detonate rate
of submunitions used in Laos 30 years ago, 25 per cent, is similar
to the cluster bomb failure rates in such recent conflicts as those
in the Gulf and Kosovo, "in spite of the fact that in these
more recent conflicts many of the submunitions used represented
an entirely new generation [of weapons]" (King 2000, p. 30).4
While some governments support the SD/SDA approach,
many NGOs have opposed the design and development of "more
reliable" weapons, believing that such advocacy condones risking
innocent lives, or compromises the principle of seeking a peaceful
solution to conflict.
The ICBL position on SD/SDA for antipersonnel mines
is that while so-called "smart" mines are designed to
self-destruct or self-deactivate after a designated period of time,
they are still not completely reliable. Some mines that fail to
arm as intended will not self-destruct or self-neutralize as they
normally would during the arming cycle (McGrath 1999). Even smart
mines will require survey and clearance after they are placed, and
cannot discriminate between a soldier and a civilian during the
period in which they are active. Many of these caveats would continue
to apply to redesigned "smart" cluster submunitions and
other weapons that could become ERW.
Cease use
A parallel track to this campaign is to cease use
and production of at least those weapons with a known high failure-to-detonate
rate that cannot or will not be "fixed." (See
Sidebar II)
Colin King, editor of the Jane's publication Mines
and Mines Clearance, prepared a key but not widely circulated
report for the Red Cross in 2000 on ERW and submunitions. He found
that problem weapons included several submunitions of US and UK
manufacture, including the BLU-97, Rockeyes, BLU-61, and Blue-63
(the latter two vintage weapons designed in the 1960s, but still
used in the Gulf War). He also found that while 40 per cent of unexploded
US submunitions were shown to be hazardous overall – 13 per
cent of which may function "on contact" – it is "neither
fair nor accurate to equate all unexploded submunitions with mines."
Just as some fusing designs are inherently unsafe, King argued,
others, like the AO-1SCh fuse are "inherently safe."
NGOs uncomfortable with the development and replacement
of current stocks with newer, "more reliable" weapons
must not be silent during the debate that rages at the CCW over
the question of how best to prevent explosive remnants of war. Some
weapons are so dangerous and so faulty that they must be withdrawn
and destroyed, whether or not governments replace them with something
new.
A list of problem weapons must be quickly agreed to,
publicized, and stigmatized. At a minimum, there is a strong case
being made both for destruction of all submunitions without reliable
secondary self-destruct fusing, and for a continuing moratorium
on the use of all munitions with multi-directional fuses until studies
resolve the question of their reliability. The humanitarian message
cannot be lost in the political debate: these weapons cannot be
allowed to be used (or used up) in the next conflict.
Canadians should press their government to comply
with these minimum standards. The similarity of the current ERW
problem to the humanitarian obligations that caused Canada to lead
in the campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines is compelling.
Robin Collins is a Board Member and Chair
of MAC, and a volunteer with the United Nations Association in Canada.
The views expressed here are his own. This article is an expanded
version of one published in Peace Magazine, July-Sept 2002.
More information on the cluster bomb moratorium
and ERW campaign in Canada can be found by contacting Celina Tuttle
at MAC, macelina@web.ca. The following URLs are also useful sources:
MAC’s call to action, http://www.minesactioncanada.org/documents/261101_CB_bgrnd.htm;
MCC’s cluster bomb website, www.mcc.org/clusterbomb/;
ICBL statement on cluster munitions and ERW, http://www.icbl.org/news/2001/137.php;
images of cluster bombs and damage, http://www.itvs.org/bombies/bombs.html
http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb/.
1 This statement can be found in the Summer 2002 issue
of The Ploughshares Monitor,
p. 12.
2 The failure rate goes from 10 per cent with existing
munitions to 0.1 per cent with "fixed" munitions.
3 Support for the "fix" options can be found,
for instance, in the EU working paper, 21 May 2002 at the CCW, CCW/GGE/I/WP.7;
Swiss working paper, 8 May 2002 (CCW/GGE/I/WP.4 found at http://www.minesactioncanada.org/documents/2002_tech.htm);
and the positions of the UK and France. If available, working papers
can be found at http://www.mineaction.org/.
For the position of the US see http://www.ccwtreaty.com/1212cummings.html.
For discussions within NGO circles, see Vietnam Veterans of America
Foundation’s Global Security Program: www.vvaf.org/security/backgrounder.html
and presentation to the CCW (2001): http://www.icbl.org/index/text/Detailed/1497.html.
See also Dale Copper: http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd47/47regime.htm.
Opposition to the "fix" option can be found
in the 2002 CCW positions of China (CCW/GGE/II/WP.17 on anti-vehicle
mines), Pakistan, Russia (CCW/GGE/II/WP.15; CCW/GGE/I/WP.11), and
Cuba relating to cost and prohibitive aspects of technical complexity.
A joint China-Russian statement (CCW/GGE/II/WP.20) concludes: "[F]or
a number of countries, it makes little sense to equip munitions
with the SD and SDA devices, including munitions in stockpile."
See the ICBL web site: http://www.icbl.org/resources/problem.html;
Antipersonnel Mines: Friend or Foe? ICRC 1996 ; and the Human
Rights Watch web site: http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/gen1/General-04.htm.
4 King (p. 38) also notes, "The Gulf War clearly
demonstrated a major discrepancy between performance during military
‘acceptance tests’ and operational use. … [N]early
2000 electronic mines remained unexploded in the US clearance sector
alone, despite achieving near-perfect results during testing."
References
King, Colin 2000, Explosive Remnants of War: Submunitions
and Other Unexploded Ordnance: A Study, ICRC, Geneva, August.
McGrath, Rae 1999, Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance:
A Resource Book, Pluto Press.
Sidebar I
SD / SDA / SN
Self-destruct mechanisms (SD) are components that
cause failed or live explosive weapons to be automatically triggered
to explode, usually by way of some timing mechanism which can be
mechanical or electronic. Mechanical mechanisms are generally less
reliable. SD mechanism failure is an easily measured specification,
as successful self-destruction is clearly visible! According to
some experts, it is also possible to make a simple pyrotechnic self-destruct
fusing mechanism very cheaply – in the US$8-9 range per explosive
device.
Self-deactivation (SDA) and self-neutralisation (SN)
capability refers to a designed-in means to make an explosive device
incapable of firing by disabling its triggering mechanism (as in
the case where a trigger cannot fire because its battery completely
loses its charge). However, it has been suggested that batteries
can possess a residual charge that may pose a risk. And in a reference
to electronic fuses, which are described as belonging to "a
family of booby traps," Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance
(1998-99) notes that in some cases, "because the detonator
is fired by capacitor discharge, [electronic fuses] may be capable
of functioning for some time after the battery has been removed."
Even when SDA is reliable, deactivated high explosive devices can
still pose a risk. This risk can possibly be minimized by the use
of short-life explosives.
Because deactivated devices cannot be distinguished
from active devices, awareness of the physical presence of ERW will
continue to deny local residents access to land.
Sidebar II
Some known problem submunitions
•BL-755 (MK1), made in the UK, failure rate in
the order of 20 per cent, used by 8 NATO countries
•M118 "Rockeye," made in US; used in
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Kosovo; up to 100 per cent failure rate
in the Gulf War
•BLU-97; made in US; used in Gulf War, Kosovo,
Afghanistan
•Spin-armed BLU-61 and BLU-63, made in US, high
failure rates when used in Laos
•Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (e.g., US DPICMs
and Serbian Orkan submunitions)
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