"Canada would weaken US security strategy by renouncing nuclear weapons or the strategy of nuclear deterrence. It is inconceivable that the present NORAD agreement could exist were Canada to take such a step." (Conference of Defence Associations, 1998, in its brief to the SCFAIT on nuclear weapons policy)
There are advocates of Canada's existing defence strategy, such as the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA), who are wary of any foreseeable motion towards abolition of nuclear weapons in NATO's arsenal. Yet it is not immediately evident why a policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons (NFU) would be a more significant policy change for Canada in their eyes than would be supporting other components in the process of nuclear weapons disarmament. Some of these other components have already been endorsed by the government or are proposals that the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs has chosen to recommend. It may be that NFU goes right to the heart of the principle of "deterrence" and for that reason alone, and unlike verifiable stockpile reductions, "de-alerting", "de-targetting" and separation of warheads from delivery systems, it requires an even greater strategic and conceptual change in defence policy philosophy.
This paper will briefly look at consequences for Canadian defence policy of Canada adopting and promoting a NFU component within its security portfolio. It will suggest areas of consensus that would have to follow from such a significant policy shift if it is to succeed.
No First Use of Nuclear Weapons (NFU)
A policy of No First Use states that NFU-adhering militaries and governments should guarantee by treaty or statute that they would not be the first to attack another state possessing nuclear weapons. There are variations on the policy. Some believe that NFU applies to a deterrence against all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and that a nuclear response to an attack by biological or chemical weapons constitutes second use, and thus not first use. No First Use policy does not guarantee the removal of the threat of use of nuclear weapons. It does follow from NFU, however, that *only* if all states with nuclear weapons adhered to a NFU policy can the deterrence rationale for possession be refuted. Continued or new possession by even a single hold-out would in effect be justification for new proliferation by other non-nuclear weapons states. The danger, as noted by the Middle Powers Initiative report, "Fast Track to Zero", is that "in times of conflict, adversaries with nuclear arsenals may doubt whether their opponents would keep such a pledge" or they may in error launch on a suspected, but non-existent, enemy first strike. "No first use must therefore be accompanied by de-alerting and followed quickly by dismantling and elimination" (Green,1998, 55).
While the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs report on Canada's position towards nuclear weapons, ("Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century") did not find consensus on the issue of No First Use, it recommended that the Canadian government "argue forcefully within NATO that the present re-examination and update as necessary of the Alliance Strategic Concept *should include its nuclear component*."
Prohibited Weapons of Mass Destruction: Why not nuclear weapons?
Given the existence of international legal Conventions for biological (BW) and chemical (CW) weapons, the shared inhumane characteristics of BW/CW and NW, and the sizable proportionality effects of nuclear detonations (either from a single strategic blast or from possible ensuing retaliation and escalation), one would expect a Convention on nuclear weapons would not be far behind the creation of conventions of other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
To some extent the international community does give the nod to the eventual abolition of NW, and this is evident in the number of signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and General Assembly resolutions on the issue. All of the five declared nuclear powers have at one point stated that nuclear disarmament is their "ultimate goal". There is also commentary by military associations who object to "immediate" or "unilateral" abolition, but offer qualified consideration of abolition "at some future date", while in the interim encouraging that we "make haste slowly" (CDA SCFAIT submission, 1998)(see note1).
Jozef Goldblat of the Geneva International Peace Research Institute reminds us that the very first United Nations General Assembly recommendation in 1946, arriving quickly after the first and second use of nuclear weapons by the United States over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, determined that all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) be eliminated from the arsenals of nations. That resolve has "been implemented only in part." Skeptics emphasize that the Biological Weapons Convention was signed in 1972 but is practically unverifiable. The Chemical Weapons Convention, signed in 1993, has yet to be ratified by all of the militarily important powers. And whereas biological and chemical weapons share the prohibitory benefits of earlier Geneva Protocols (1925) and customary law, the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, a relatively recent phenomenon, does not. Still, "nuclear war cannot be initiated with obedience to the humanitarian law of armed conflict, because nuclear weapons are uncontrollable and indiscriminate in their effects; [and] their employment, even on a small scale, can lead to rapid escalation and cause disaster to all belligerents"(see note2) (Goldblat, 1997, 265-67).
Armaments conventions, while imperfect, and even if not universal, are also significant for their establishment of new norms of international conduct ("taboos") and for stigmatizing practices that are or have become contrary to humanitarian principles. Those principles include restrictions based upon criteria of proportionality, indiscriminancy, and "superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering"(see note3). "Notwithstanding their weaknesses," writes Goldblat, "the norms prohibiting the possession of biological and chemical weapons, as set by the BW and CW conventions, have considerably expanded the international law of disarmament: no nation, whether a party or non-party to the conventions, can circumvent or defy these norms with impunity."
The Politics of No First Use: Deterrence Doctrine
Goldblat helpfully narrows down the NW abolition controversy to two key questions: Should nuclear weaponry continue to be a central component of a few states' arsenals and be used at those states' discretion? or should they be used only as deterrence against use by other states, and thus be deployed in retaliation if deterrent fails to prevent first use (of nuclear weapons) by another state? (Goldblat, 1997, 266)
A No First Use policy, he argues, supports the "deterrence against nuclear attack only" position, and leads in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Significantly, it would also "reinforce the firebreak between conventional and nuclear war", it would work counter to the political effect of threat to first use nuclear weapons , and *require the abolition of tactical nuclear weapons*(see note4). Tactical nuclear weapons are designed for first use deployment and are "likely to be employed very early in armed conflict to avoid destruction by the adversary's conventional weapons."
The Conference of Defence Associations (CDA)(see note5), a Canadian military advisory non-governmental organization, in its brief to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs dealing with Canada's position on nuclear weapons, seems to have supported the historical option of nuclear weapons and their threat to first use as a central component of the military tool kit: "The right to first use policy, especially in NATO, was necessary to offset the overwhelming advantage of Soviet conventional military strength and manpower. Moreover it contributed to another important aspect of deterrence, namely the uncertainty of nuclear use" (CDA, 1998, 1). During the Cold War, possession of nuclear weapons and its First Use option, therefore, was about deterring or responding to both nuclear and conventional enemy forces.
In the contemporary context and despite the absence of a Cold War, according to the CDA, the dangers persist. "Today, nuclear deterrence remains as a necessary guarantee of international security. This follows from the fact that positive changes in the international environment are not demonstrably stable or permanent. The world remains a very dangerous and unsettled place."
This view closely mirrors the position of the 1996 White Paper on Defence, which argued that while "the Cold War is over", it is "impossible to predict what will emerge from the current period of transition, but it is clear that we can expect pockets of chaos and instability that will threaten international peace and security." Canada "faces an unpredictable and fragmented world, one in which conflict, repression and upheaval exist alongside peace, democracy and relative prosperity." And worse, "the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies to so-called "rogue" regimes is of particular concern" (in Bland, 1997, 297-302).
The Conference of Defence Associations concurs: "There is growing concern over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Russia still has a formidable strategic nuclear capability, and large stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons...it is only prudent to retain a hedge against reversal of political reform in Russia." The 1994 Defence White Paper: "There is no immediate direct military threat to Canada and [...] today's conflicts are far from our shores. Even so, we must maintain a prudent level of military force to deal with challenges to our sovereignty in peacetime, and [to contribute to] the defence of our country should the need arise."(see note6) In a speech to the CDA in January of 1999, Minister of National Defence Art Eggleton stated that in the post-Cold War period, "threats are more diverse [...] the world is as unstable as ever", implying that Canada should remain "prudent" as ever (see note7)(Eggleton, 1999).
Tariq Rauf, who has been a member of Canada's NPT delegation, agrees that the "rogue" scenario seems to be a case of "mission creep" for nuclear weapons. "First [nuclear weapons] were to deter the Soviet Union, then they were to maintain uncertainty about a NATO response and now they are there to deter rogue states. Where does this argument end?" (Trickey,1998)
But the CDA strongly agrees with the spectre of hypothetical enemy states, an eternal danger of "Cold War" proxies that extends into the "post-Cold War" period: "There is also the threat of rogue states' possession of weapons of mass destruction. It is now generally accepted that Saddam Hussein was deterred from applying his capability in this area by the fear of nuclear retaliation by the United States and Israel. Thus, although nuclear weapons do not of themselves maintain peace, they continue to place a great premium on caution when one nuclear adversary deals with another when vital interests are at stake."(see note8)(CDA, 1998, 2)
The argument for reliable deterrence based upon
the possession of nuclear weapons is necessarily an argument for possession
in perpetuity. If nuclear weapons are unique in their capacity to
wreak ultimate or complete havoc, the rationale goes, then they hold the
mantle of ultimate deterrent, even if their use is politically "unfathomable".
The Cold War may be over, but the world remains "unstable", Russia may
"revert", "rogues" may appear. If nuclear deterrence is a viable,
legal option to deter enemies, it is also the weapon of last resort
if the "survival of the state" is at stake.
Questioning nuclear deterrence doctrine in the
Alliance, according to the Conference of Defence Associations, may endanger
Canada's "sovereignty", the special relationship with the United States,
including the country's "crucial economic base"(see note9), but particularly
its military dependence upon both the North American (NORAD) and Atlantic
(NATO) Alliances:
"Nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of US national security strategy. Canada, of all US allies, must be particularly alert not to take unilateral steps or make policies that would weaken or compromise that strategy. Because of geography and an integrated North American defence system (NORAD), Canada would weaken US security strategy by renouncing nuclear weapons or the strategy of nuclear deterrence., It is inconceivable that the present NORAD agreement could exist were Canada to take such a step. The consequence for Canada would be either to spend vastly increased resources devoted to an independent non-aligned aero-space defence, or to abdicate responsibility for its own aerospace security to the US; surely not a serious option for a sovereign nation-state." (CDA, 1998, 4)
Robert Green, a former Commander in the Royal Navy, and leader of the UK-based World Court Project, has noted evidence of significant questioning of the doctrine of "deterrence" within discussions around the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on nuclear weapons in November 1998 (see note10). The United Kingdom government delegation to the General Assembly had objected to the proposed resolution (and thus speedier NW abolition) on the basis that it was "incompatible with the maintenance of a credible minimum deterrent". Mexico responded that it was "not intended to be compatible with nuclear deterrence, as the policy of deterrence is outmoded, inconsistent with NPT obligations for nuclear disarmament, and must go." The vote at the General Assembly in favour of the New Agenda resolution was particularly significant by the identity of twelve of the abstainers:
"Despite [the] reiteration of the fundamental role played
by nuclear
deterrence in NATO's strategy, all the non-nuclear members
except Turkey
abstained! This constituted almost unprecedented insubordination;
was
implicit acknowledgement of the force of Mexico's arguments;
and means
that a debate might well now be demanded to review NATO's
nuclear strategy
[...] What it means for us is that we have new, categoric
evidence that a key
aspect of our campaign should be to rubbish deterrence
much more
robustly than hitherto." (Green,1998b)
The Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (CNANW), a coalition of national peace- and disarmament-related non-governmental organizations, dismisses the assumption that nuclear weapons need to be retained in order to "deter" conventional wars. Not only have conventional wars thrived without the use of nuclear weapons (including wars in which nuclear powers have participated), they point out, but "if the argument were true, it would act as an incentive for virtually every country to acquire its own nuclear weapons...Indeed the smaller States could argue that they have a greater need for the equalizing power of nuclear warheads." The Coalition recommends instead adoption of the program suggested by the Canberra Commission including "agreement amongst the nuclear weapon States of reciprocal no first use undertakings, and of a non-use undertaking by them in relation to the non-nuclear weapon States." (CNANW,1996,5)
NFU: How Dramatic a Change for Canada?
The 1994 Defence White Paper makes no mention of nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence nor weapons of mass destruction parity, whereas the previous White Paper (1987) drew heavily on that ideological and strategic repertoire. Even within the section related to NATO membership (which includes support for continued membership), there is no mention of the Alliance's Strategic Concept, nor NATO's possession of nuclear weapons (see note11). The role for NATO is arguably subsumed primarily within a United Nations framework. "Canada will also remain a strong supporter of a reformed NATO. Canada believes that NATO's reservoir of military competence and capabilities should make a greater contribution to UN operations." There is a hint of criticism in fact: "The Alliance should resist the temptation to intrude on the provision of political and strategic direction for the mission; that responsibility must rest with the Security Council." (in Bland 1997: p333)
However, the 1994 White Paper on Defence does not
go so far as to question the strategic significance of the United States
to Canada's ultimate "security":
"...even if the Government decided to reduce significantly
the level of defence cooperation with the United States, Canada would still
be obliged to rely on the US for help in protecting its territory and approaches
-- and this assistance would then come on strictly American terms, unmitigated
by the influence Canada enjoys as a result of its defence partnership with
the United States and with our other NATO allies." (in Bland, 1997: p321)
Yet the ambiguities within the 1994 Paper do contrast
dramatically with the full and enthusiastic embrace of NATO's strategic
concept as found in the 1987 Mulroney government White Paper, "Challenge
and Commitment". It was still imbued with the veneers of the Cold War and
of the explicit fundamental principle of "nuclear deterrence":
"...the most serious direct threat to Canada is
a Soviet nuclear attack on North America. Given the present balance
of strategic nuclear forces, such an attack remains unlikely...At present,
the only effective counter to such a threat is a strategy of deterrence
based on the maintenance of diversified nuclear forces...the structure
of mutual deterrence today is effective and stable. The Government believes
that it must remain so. " (in Bland, p215)
Further on:
"The most effective counter to the conventional threat is to convince any potential aggressor that the chances of an attack quickly achieving its objectives are slight and that, if he were to persist in his aggression, he would run the risk of a nuclear response...It may not be necessary to match the other side weapon for weapon, but the more effective the conventional forces, the less is the reliance which has to be placed on nuclear weapons. If early resort to these weapons is to be avoided, the conventional forces in place must be able to fight over an extended period." (in Bland 217-18)
While the rhetoric of the two papers (at least in the nuclear NATO context) contrast sharply, it is not clear if this represented a change of heart or indecision. Bill Robinson of Project Ploughshares wonders whether this was "a sign that the government is embarrassed by its [1994] policy on nuclear weapons and wishes to avoid debate on the subject, or that it expects changes in this area and doesn't want to commit itself too publicly to the current policy? That probably would be too optimistic an interpretation." (Robinson,1995, 12)
Certainly, Canada's commitment to NORAD's ballistic missile defense (BMD) research with the US (in the 1994 White Paper) "was a significant step toward deeper Canadian involvement in strategic defence activities [...and consistent with Canada's continuing...] to provide political and diplomatic support for nuclear weapons, voting against calls at the United Nations, for example, for the nuclear-weapon states to adopt no-first-use policies." (Robinson,1995, 17)
Yet there has been movement away from a Cold War rhetoric along with some reservations about a ballistic defence system being implemented. This signals some motion by Canada towards willingness to consider a more independent view on defence and foreign policy. However, the new emphasis on "human security" issues, states Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, should not be construed by critics as "weakness":
"Let there be no mistake. Promoting human security can also involve the use of strong measures. including sanctions and military force...We have been firm in confronting the challenges of weapons of mass destruction -- from Saddam Hussein's defiance of the UN to nuclear testing in the Indian subcontinent." (in Trickey, 1999, A6)
Others have suggested that independent policy initiatives (even those in concert with "like-minded" states and "Middle Powers") and the human security agenda effort may be fruitless within the context of membership within NATO and NORAD. Ann Denholm Crosby, for instance, points out that certain American policies in support of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative in 1985 ("Star Wars") through USSPACECOM, shared headquarters with NORAD and therefore involved at least compliance by Canadian forces, if not indirect participation. "On the basis of Canada's policy positions [which ran counter to SDI research at the time], the U.S. military formally excluded Canadian military personnel from US BMD and active space-based defence programme planning at NORAD Headquarters. However, informal involvement continued." (Crosby,1997, 47)
Crosby's point is that membership in NORAD makes it virtually impossible for Canada to truly exclude itself from US strategic policy decisions affecting the continent. She notes that:
"..it is most difficult for the Canadian government to do other than concur with Canadian/US military cooperative planning, if not sooner, then later. In short, because concurrence is often with programmes to which Canada has antipathies, an element of 'unanticipated militarism' is introduced to the Canadian decision-making environment through these processes." (Crosby, 1997, 49)
This was a problem that appeared during the Landmine Ban Treaty negotiations in 1997. Known as a problem of "interoperability", it required a formal decision to determine how Alliance partners should work together if one partner was party to a treaty banning a weapon and others were not. The APL Operational Planning and Policy Guidelines for the Canadian Forces ultimately determined that "the use of [antipersonnel landmines] by an ally in NATO, UN or coalition operations will not preclude the deployment of the Canadian forces nor effect interoperability with those allies". (Fredenburg, 1997: p7) In the case of nuclear weapons, however, it is unlikely that an ally could repudiate a fundamental strategic concept and remain part of the Alliance; nor is it likely that there is as much choice involved in the eschewal of weapons of mass destruction, if international law is to triumph as well, or in particular.
Compliance with International Law
In July of 1996, the World Court (International Court of Justice) delivered its Advisory Opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons and stated that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law..." (in CNANW: 1996) The Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons notes that "although the Court believed it could not determine definitively (see note12) whether there might be a circumstance of extreme self-defense in which nuclear weapons could be used lawfully, they did decide that all use and threat of use of these weapons must comply with international law. The highest legal body in the world has said, unanimously and clearly, that governments must not only pursue but conclude negotiations leading to total nuclear disarmament." (CNANW,1996, 1)
Canada chose to recognize the World Court Advisory Opinion, which itself made repeated reference to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in its discussions. Canada is also a signatory to the NPT, a treaty which obligates signatories, (in exchange for agreement by non-nuclear weapons states to remain "non"), "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." (in Green, 1998s, 38) Not only have a majority of states, including Canada, not developed nuclear weapons, but they have signed the NPT in part because it guarantees them that their eschewal would be both contingent upon and rewarded by eventual abolition by nuclear-armed states.
Increase Conventional Weapons?
One of the reasons nuclear weapons were attractive in the 1950s was that equivalent conventional forces allegedly could not be mustered with the resources available. However, without *deterrence* doctrine being replaced by an alternative framework, the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons would almost certainly give rise to calls for increased use and development of conventional forces as *replacement deterrent*. Fen Hampson suggests this in "A Second Look at No First Use", (Hampson: 86, p7):
"Although even the critics were willing to concede that the objective of moving towards a no first use posture was indeed a desirable one for the Alliance, they raised fundamental concerns about the means and the political feasibility of improving NATO's conventional capabilities to provide a deterrent that would replace the nuclear and, at the same time, reassure the allies."
Escalating conventional weapons proliferation could be the unintended result even in the rationale of declarations for "No First Use". For instance, in their "Call for A 'No First Use of Nuclear Weapons' Regime" in February 1998, a list of prominent Canadian signatories note that only "the threat or use of biological weapons by a state not party to the NPT" would fall outside the purview of existing conventions and treaties. Rather than justifying the use of nuclear weapons to respond to this threat, nuclear weapons states should rely on "adequate conventional responses"(Call, 1988). In the spring of 1982, former U.S. national security advisor McGeorge Bundy and others argued that the nuclear defence of Europe was not credible because it would eventually lead to destruction of the continent. "In effect, the authors were saying that NATO's deterrent was a big bluff." They urged Washington to join the Soviets in a NFU pledge
"while NATO/Europe markedly increased its conventional
forces. In case of war, [they] contended, Europe would be willing
to defend itself with conventional weapons. Deterrence would be heightened,
and the risk of nuclear war would diminish."
(Goldstein, 1993: p 229)
On his part, then-President Reagan called for an increase in conventional arms in addition to continuance of the nuclear option, and as some will note, the distinction between "poisons" can be a moot one for those victim to overwhelming conventional superiority, as was evident in the Gulf War "turkey shoot".
"Future victims may regard a distant risk of nuclear Armageddon as a small price to pay for a reduced risk of a conventional war that might be hard for some to distinguish from a nuclear conflict. Tanks are a strategic weapon if they drive through your sitting room; artillery is a weapon of mass destruction if your village is under bombardment by batteries of medium howitzers or multiple-rocket-launchers." (Windass, 1988: 76)
This contradiction for disarmament advocates was noted in the discussion on NFU during a seminar of the CNANW in 1998 (see note13). The argument for conventional substitution is itself dangerous because "it promotes the development of an overwhelming conventional force which in turn threatens other states and might prove an incentive for nuclear proliferation." The problem of seeking permanent conventional superiority would be the best rationale for keeping strategic nuclear weapons, the ultimate deterrent. Former arms control negotiator Paul Nitze's proposal for "high-precision" conventional weapons substitution for nuclear weapons technology offers the same conundrum: "Understanding and overcoming this gap [between nuclear and conventional strategic weapons] should become the focus of technological research. [New strategic conventional prototypes] are safer, cause less collateral damage, and pose less threat of escalation than do nuclear weapons" (Nitze, 1994: p97-101). They also call out for deterrence or as-strong a substitute counter strategy.
On the other hand, if No First Strike policy is to become preferred policy for Canada, in that it implicitly rejects the doctrine of deterrence, an entirely different political and military framework would need to be put into place. Suggestions for alternative frameworks abound, and include "human security agenda" emphasis on prevention of conflict, and theories of conflict resolution. There are also more elaborate proposals, such as that of the Palme Commission, which in 1989 put forward the concept of "common security" (see note14) (a significant shift in perspective that is much praised by development and disarmament groups and abolitionists, but the substance of which is outside the scope of this paper.)
However, in the view of Blechman and Fisher,
"the structure of international relations is undergoing an irreversible transformation that will eventually invalidate rationales for weapons of mass destruction. A community of states united by common interests, values and perspectives is emerging because of technology and economics.Among the "modernist" states belonging to that community, new norms of behavior are replacing the old dictates of real-politik: They reject not only the use of weapons of mass destruction, but even the use of military force to settle their disputes."
The "transformation", they note, is incomplete (Blechman and Fisher,1994-5: 81).
Popular Opinion
No First Use policy as part of a process leading to rapid nuclear weapons abolition, and while anathema to many defence advocates, is consistent with the "Red Book" electoral program that the Liberal Party presented and with recent public opinion polls taken around the world, including in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium. An Angus Reid poll in February of 1998 reported that 93% of Canadians supported a global ban on nuclear weapons and 92% wanted Canada to lead in that campaign. At the UN in December 1998, 12 out of 16 NATO countries voted differently from the nuclear-armed NATO states, and abstained on a key vote - thereby indicating a desire to consider a "new agenda" for nuclear weapons. This is evidence of a significant reduction in public acceptance of the nuclear weapons status quo from within the Alliance. Certainly, the overwhelming "soft" (see note15) support for nuclear weapons abolition within Canada is encouraging to the abolition movement (see note16). To it can be added the results of a poll across Europe that looked at post-Cold War attitudes towards NATO. (McIntosh et al., 1996: 187-221) In that study, while Europeans generally considered ties with the U.S. were "at least as important as before" and most of those surveyed believed NATO was still needed, still a large majority rejected the philosophy of "peace through military strength." The exception among those countries polled was Turkey, the only NATO member outside of the nuclear armed members which did not abstain on the UN General Assembly resolution in December 1998 calling for a "new agenda" approach to nuclear weapons in the Alliance. A solid majority of those polled in the European poll believed that peace was better achieved "through negotiations".
Conclusion: Consequences
No First Use of Nuclear Weapons advocacy is a more explicit policy change in the direction of abolition than an array of other abolition steps because it discredits the legitimacy of both deterrence by surprise and deterrence against nuclear and conventional weapons or other non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction. NFU puts defence policy on the footing of reliance upon conventional weapons only, and compliance with international law, or better yet (for many abolitionists at least), it begs for an alternative framework to deal with international conflict. The relatively rapid drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons which is necessarily implied by NFU policy, (while an obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in conformance with the World Court Advisory Opinion), is contrary to the doctrine of "deterrence", the existing policy framework of both Canadian defence policy and the NATO and NORAD Alliances to which Canada claims membership.
If Canada was to risk putting into question the principle of nuclear deterrence through NFU advocacy, this would require a new vision of both prevention of war and response to overwhelming aggression. The abolition component of the vision is not itself a dramatic departure from Canada's support for the NPT and the 1996 World Court Opinion. Nor does official policy, as laid out in the 1994 White Paper on Defence, religiously endorse the nuclear strategic concept. It is probably feasible, if not risk-free, for Canada to recommend a NFU debate within NATO without a severe political penalty being paid. (Canada had proposed such a debate in early 1999, in parallel with the German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer)(see note17).
Calling for a debate on NFU, implicitly leading to NW abolition, is in-step with recent "human security agenda" foreign policy orientation that has embraced such initiatives as the Landmine Ban Treaty, curbs on child soldiers, and restrictions on the trade in small arms. The principle of the superiority of humanitarian law and principles over military utility was fundamental to the drive for a ban on AP mines, as were the humanitarian concepts of proportionality, discrimination between soldier and civilian and avoidance of superfluous injuries and unnecessary suffering. These concepts apply similarly to BW, CW and nuclear weapons, although AP mines (unlike weapons of mass destruction as they are presently defined) are not considered a strategic weapon.
If however, NFU was to challenge directly the present NATO strategic concept, and the consensus within NATO did not change appreciably, Canada would have to determine if NW would continue to play its present role (in the words of the Conference of Defence Associations) as "the true cornerstones of [Canada's] security policy". If not and a non-nuclear NATO/NORAD was not forthcoming, Canada may have to consider withdrawing from its present military alliances, a prospect that holds some complications if the present popular support for both NATO and leadership in nuclear disarmament are to be taken into consideration. The knowledge that 12 of 16 members states within NATO have abstained on an UNGA vote relevant to the nuclear issue suggests that Canada may not be isolated in debate and that pressure may mount for the NWS to justify their refusal to comply with both the NPT and World Court Advisory Opinion. Nuclear weapons test blasts by both Indian and Pakistan in 1998 suggest that the NPT is in danger of unraveling because of the slow progress towards abolition by NWS. This degradation of the non-proliferation regime is likely to add pressure to the NATO debate and to further strengthen, rather than weaken Canada's chances of NFU advocacy(and towards abolition.)
In the defence policy vacuum created, there would be pressure to support a replacement of nuclear with expanded conventional forces (which, within NATO, is a stance which might conflict with NATO's raison d'etre as a nuclear deterrent or even result in pressures for a return to nuclear proliferation.This is aside from arguments which may raise budgetary issues.)
There would also be pressures from the disarmament "community" to seek a "Common Security" or similar change in philosophical approach to defence, peace and security. There would still be a significant role for Canadian Forces in "human security agenda" initiatives, including peacekeeping, conflict resolution, peace-building, truce monitoring and other "preventative" approaches, so it is possible that a significant change in defence policy philosophy could be pursued even without creating hostility amongst the Canadian Forces' rank and file. The "sea change" however would have to weather significant hostility from tradition-bound military organizations, such as the Conference of Defence Associations, and from NATO-NORAD diehards.
4Mar.1999.RC
----------------------------------------------------
Notes:
1. This perhaps is being generous. In fact the CDA also says in the same brief "the best disarmament treaty in the world will never be able to guarantee that all nuclear weapons have been eliminated, nor that rogue regimes and terrorists will not develop them in the future."
2. Advocates of nuclear "deterrence" may disagree with the tone of the inevitability of escalation alluded to by Goldblat, but that prediction is not inconsistent with the MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) scenario recognized by both the US and USSR during the Cold War and which was to be avoided at all cost. However, it does conflict with the idea of the utility of "tactical nuclear weapons", the new "bunker-busters" and other formats which can be directed to specific sites - the implication of which is that because they are scaled down, they do not inevitably lead to nuclear retaliation or nuclear escalation.
3. see the International Committee of the Red Cross SIrUS Report (Coupland, 1997).
4. (now both NATO's present strategic concept and Russiaís renewed policy allow for 'first use')
5. The CDA, founded in 1932 "to advise the government on defence policy and to foster well being and effectiveness of Canada's armed forces", claims membership of component associations with 500,000 individual members.
6. While the CDA is officially an independent military advocacy group, not directly association with the Department of National Defence, there is clearly mutual admiration in some areas of the military domain. There are differences as well, but the agreement in some areas of deterrence philosophy are being emphasized here. The DND webpages <http://www.dnd.ca/menu/menu/related links_e.htm>, list the CDA webpages in the relatively small group of "linked" associations and DND officials figured prominently in the Annual General Meeting of the CDA in 1999.
7. "Prudent" is also the word chosen by the Reform Party of Canada in its Minority Report to the SCFAIT on nuclear policy: "The Official Opposition expects the government to express its support for prudent nuclear arms reductions by countries that possess them..." (SCFAIT, 1998, 100).
8. See appendix 1 notes for discussion of NW deterrence during the Gulf War.
9. "Military cooperation between Canada and the United States will become an increasingly important element of Canadian defence policy. This reflects the fact that over eighty percent of Canada's trade is with the US. To protect the North American homeland and its crucial economic base, Canada will be expected to continue to contribute to North American protection, including the crucial field of aerospace defence" (CDA Strategic Assessment, 1999).
10. A resolution crafted by the New Agenda Coalition, a group of states gathered by Ireland to initiate fresh movement in the direction of a Convention on nuclear weapons.
11. "They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies" (in NATO's New Strategic Concept, 1997 from the NATO website,< http://www.nato.int>).
12. The lack of clarity by the Court on the right of states to use nuclear weapons when the "survival of the state" is in jeopardy is taken up by the CDA, who claim that the Advisory Opinion "provides a legal justification for the retention of nuclear weapons by the five major nuclear powers." In fact, "The even split of the vote did not reflect the real philosophical division among the Judges, three of whom voted against that part of the Opinion because they believed that not even "extreme circumstances" would justify the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The split was thus 10 to 4 substantively (i.e. four judges who thought threat or use of nuclear weapons to be legal, and ten who thought threat or use to be illegal in any circumstance or illegal "generally") (Watt, World Federalists of Canada Website,1998).
13. The seminar, Practical Steps for Canadian Policy Development on Nuclear Weapons Issues, March 27, 1998, was cosponsored by the CNANW and the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development.
14. see DeLong, 1996, 15-16
15. Ambassador and abolitionist Doug Roche has described poll opposition as "soft" to distinguish it from vocal opposition of politically-engaged citizens. It is not known how entrenched NW opposition is in Canada, despite strong poll results.
16. The Chair of the SCFAIT, Bill Graham, has noted that the committee had never received more public input on an issue than that in support of abolition of nuclear weapons.
17. There has been some pulling back from the position of debating NFU in NATO. Canada has stated that while the status quo is still unsatisfactory, the complexity of the issue requires that more preparation be done before the a full debate is launched (Trickey, 1999).
Appendix 1
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Notes on potential use of nuclear weapons against Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons:
It was more often argued that nuclear weapons possession by the US coalition deterred CW and BW use by Iraq during the Gulf War (and less so NW use, as suggested by the CDA). "After the gulf war, Iraqi officials let it be known that the possibility of a U.S. nuclear strike dissuaded Saddam from using whatever chemical and biological weapons he had on hand". (Gaffney, 1998, 7) Price notes: "General Wafic al Sammarai claimed that he told Saddam Hussein very clearly that should he use chemical weapons the coalition would use their nuclear weapons. In light of this threshold, Foreign Minister Aziz states simply that the Iraqi leadership did not think it wise to use "such kind of weapons in such kind of a war, with such an enemy." (Price, p150) However, that particular deterrence argument is somewhat in question, particularly in light of the conventional weapon superiority held by the US, and Iraq's failing weapons delivery systems. Richard Price, (The Chemical Weapons Taboo, 1997, 148) also notes: "Thus in August 1990 Aziz remarked in a little-noted statement that Iraq would not use chemical weapons unless the United States used nuclear weapons first. Chemical weapons were established as a threshold by both sides in the Gulf War, a weapon whose use would change the character of the war. For the coalition, the use of chemical weapons by Iraq would invite the possibility of unrestrained retaliation.." However, Price also questions whether the U.S. and its allies ever considered using WMD in retaliation against Iraq: "The coalition never explicitly threatened to use chemical or nuclear weapons in response to a possible chemical attack, and a chemical response in particular seemed to be ruled out".. ..Administration officials reported that the idea of using nuclear or chemical weapons had "never been on the table" in discussion involving top policy makers, though some junior military officers had advocated threatening or even using tractical nuclear weapons to save soldiers' lives....A senior Arab official confirmed that the coalition allies had prepared specific plans for retaliation if Iraq waged chemical war, maintaining that "We'll use the unimaginable, short of nuclear weapons. Still, the warnings of the coalition members were intended to cultivate ambiguity as to whether the threat of massive retaliation might include 'weapons of mass destruction'. According to Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, the coalition's threat was left deliberately vague so that Saddam Hussein might believe the coalition would respond to a chemical attack with nuclear weapons. This was so even though the issue of using nuclear weapons was never even discussed, and the US officials did not believe nuclear weapons ever would have been used..." (Price, 1997,149).
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