Peace and Environment News* July-August 2002
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Peace and Environment News * July-August 2002 |
by Robin Collins
Most agree that prevention, diplomacy and reconciliation—not military intervention—are the best approaches to resolving conflict. Election monitoring, aid to support peace building, and disarmament should be more effective than having to send in The Boys.
But when prevention fails, waiting too late can result in genocide, or end in a full-scale military intervention. Not intervening at all may allow for higher casualties than an early intervention that protects a refugee corridor or "smothers" the conflict before it escalates.
Non-traditional common security approaches to global crises have been called non-offensive defence (NOD), nonprovocative defence, defensive defence, and cooperative security. Self-defence measures to protect citizens are still believed to be morally justified, while the means and extent of any response—including the use of deadly force—are strictly limited by international law and the "rules of war."
Common security
The current use of the term common security comes from a study in 1982 by former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, "Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival," which outlined a model for the radical transformation of security policy away from confrontation and nuclear deterrence, towards community building, sustainable development and a sustainable peace. "Sustainability," the key word, includes socio-economic, environmental, political and human rights. Bjorn Moller of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute defines common security as "neither a full-fledged theory of international relations nor a political program," but "an approach to international politics from which a security [and] political strategy might be derived."
Cooperative security and Non-offensive defence (NOD)
Ten years ago, Ashton Carter, William Perry and John Steinbruner proposed "A New Concept of Cooperative Security" to address the problem of post-Cold War weapons proliferation. Their central argument was that the "only legitimate purpose of national military forces [is] the defense of national territory or participation in multinational forces that enforce U.N. sanctions or maintain peace." Offensive forces (such as missiles and long-range aircraft) should be constrained and phased out. Ground forces should be restructured to defend national territory. Steinbruner has also proposed "reassurance" (a variation of confidence-building measures) as a replacement for deterrence. A good example of reassurance in action was the joint nuclear weapons monitoring arrangement between the U.S. and Russia that was proposed during the Y2K scare. The proposal was unfortunately dropped because of disagreement over the Allied intervention in the Kosovo-Serbia conflict.
Non-offensive defence (NOD, also known as nonprovocative defence) is a comprehensive restructuring of military forces within the common security framework. Its history can be traced quite far back to the 1920s and '30s. It figured quite prominently in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s in response to the tensions of the Cold War.
NOD is a preference for dissuasion over deterrence (which means emphasizing persuasion over the threat of retaliation). It encourages a minimum-force standing army to resist aggression. There is support for lowered military spending, unambiguous rules of engagement, and a preference for non-lethal responses to conflict. It follows that NOD is about confidence-building, diplomacy, peacekeeping and early intervention, strengthening the United Nations, and support for institutions such as the newly ratified International Criminal Court. Bjorn Moller gives a concise definition of NOD as "armed forces [seen] in their totality to be capable of a credible defense, yet incapable of offense."
While recognizing that all weapons can be used offensively, NOD nonetheless obliges states to keep only sufficient force to defend themselves—in effect calling on states to be "defensive," but not provocatively so. Realists argue that because this is so easily violated by states with missiles, bombers and fighter jets, the powerful states will never find NOD palatable. The United States, for example, would be required to eliminate most of its military force. This may be a tall order for a country that can currently flick a switch to lock a tomahawk cruise missile onto a small room a thousand miles away.
Promising signs
There is a fork in the road ahead, and while the difficulties are not trivial, the advantages of alternative security arrangements are well known. Common security and NOD postures have been supported by many governments over the last two decades—Norway, Finland, Sweden, the former Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Germany, South Africa, Austria, Ireland, New Zealand and several Eastern Europe states. Mikhail Gorbachev was also moving in that direction prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Here at home, Canada's human security agenda emphasizes security for people, quite apart from the security of states. This led to Canadian leadership in support of the landmine treaty, the International Criminal Court, and efforts to restrict the use of child soldiers and improve controls on the circulation of small arms and light weapons.
The Human Security Network was established by Norway and Canada in 1999 and has since then expanded to include thirteen countries. They see themselves as catalysts to "re-energize political processes aimed at settling conflicts, establishing and securing peace and promoting development." Late in his mandate as Canadian foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy initiated the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Its report, released in late 2001, looks at the responsibility of states to protect citizens while specifying when intervention is justified.
These are trying times, faced as we are with a regressive unilateralism in the United States. If we hope to challenge the current unsustainable global security model, we need to reconsider common security and non-offensive defence.
Robin Collins is on the steering committee of the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. These views are his own.
Converted July 21, 2002 - Lg
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