CANADA'S "YES":
CANADIAN POLICY STREAMS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NATO
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At the United Nations in 2002 and again in November of 2003, Canada voted alone among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states in favour of the omnibus New Agenda Coalition resolution pressing for the abolition of nuclear weapons[1]. Why did Canada support the resolution if Canada was alone within NATO?

A contradiction exists between official Canadian policy in support of NATO's maintenance of a nuclear weapon deterrent, on one hand, and Canada's support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its obligations towards nuclear weapon abolition, on the other. This paper, using an historical institutionalist approach, looks at the decision-making and agenda-setting process as it pertains to Canadian nuclear weapons policy. It finds that two "segmented" (partially separate) yet parallel, streams direct the Canadian foreign and defence policy cycles. They contain both consistent and contradictory elements, and their contention and coexistence explain Canada's ambivalent position on nuclear weapons.

In this study, reference will be made to leaders' belief systems to show why there has been debate and disagreement among policy-makers and their advisors. Public opinion and mass movements also play a role, but Canadian nuclear weapons (defence) policy is unquestionably initiated by NATO-adhering political forces from "within", rather than as a direct result of the mobilization of mass publics.

In what follows, the historical institutionalist model will be outlined. Two current but contradictory Canadian policy positions and two key belief systems held by decision-makers will be described. Observations about the process of decision-making and feedback in the two streams will then be offered and some conclusions about institutional access will be drawn from the study's findings. Topics for future study will be suggested.

Theoretical Approach: Historical Institutionalism

Theoretical models can provide more or less useful methods for understanding complex policy processes. There are two complementary studies that have broadly influenced the model chosen for this study:

The first is Erika Simpson's NATO and the Bomb, which is a major study of the belief systems of principle actors in Canadian NATO nuclear weapon policy, from 1957 to 1989, and how those beliefs affected changes within the policy cycle. Simpson reveals the existence of, and an explanation for, the *contention* within Canadian government bureaucracies and institutions over the period under study.

The second is Howard Lentner's article *Foreign Policy Decision Making: The case of Canada and Nuclear Weapons*. Lentner's case study of the Diefenbaker-Pearson debate surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis, underlines the preeminent role played by the personal values and styles of key actors (Prime Ministers). The Lentner study focuses on a particular political event, lists its many possible explanations, and determines which among them were most decisive.

The current study departs from the above two by its focus on the way broad institutional framing has subsumed actors' belief systems or -- put another way -- how personal beliefs and subsequent policy direction have accommodated the overwhelming influence of institutional expectations. This is not to say that belief systems were not kept intact in the face of institutional normative pressures. However, the challenges to NATO nuclear weapons policy from Canada did not disrupt and have not yet undermined NATO's nuclear strategic capacity and key institutional ideas: Alliance loyalty, multilateral preference, and security assumptions based upon deterrence doctrine.

While Lentner looked at a single historical event, this study briefly surveys an extended series of Canadian policy decisions (including the Diefenbaker-Pearson event) over several decades. While Simpson provides an analysis of belief systems over the long timeframe, this study looks at the dominance of institutionalization over an overlapping timeframe.

Historical institutionalism, or what Howlett and Ramesh call a "mild" institutionalism,[2] can be a useful way of looking at the shifts and resilience of Canadian defence and disarmament policies as they relate to nuclear weapons in NATO. The evidence gathered in this study suggests that institutions and government bureaucracies, not individual actors nor mass publics, probably play the dominant role in certain specific policy decision-making processes. Once legacy institutions are established, structures and extant policy is consolidated and this limits or constrains how (or whether) new ideas are received. The impact is great upon the behaviour of individual policy-makers even if they are not the ones who established the original framework -- they may even oppose the institutional framework (Pierson: p.628, Immergut: p.85). A significant role is played by leaders' belief systems in setting the tone (and influencing the specifics) of policy decisions. As might be expected though, in closed institutional settings (the Department of Defence and NATO, specifically), radical policy changes occur only when new ideas penetrate policy subsystems (Howlett, 2002: p.260). Dramatic changes in direction -- such as an explicit shift in defence policy away from reliance on nuclear weapon deterrence -- requires at least "third order" political clout (Hall: p.288).

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[1] The New Agenda Coalition was originally established by Ireland in 1998. It drew together eight "middle power" sized countries that were perceived as "not unfriendly" to the United States, and that hoped to develop support for nuclear weapons abolition at the United Nations. They annually offer a "NAC" resolution at the UN General Assembly. In 2003 Canada supported the resolution overall, but abstained on a paragraph related to ballistic missile defence.

[2] Howlett and Ramesh, p. 46.

The historical institutionalist approach, in Pierson and Skocpol's view, is thus a useful way to understand the progress of "big" policy questions as they pass through the prism of institutions and as they interact with other governing processes. The model also expects that bureaucratic and organizational structures and mechanisms are best observed over long stretches of time, "maybe even many decades or centuries" (Pierson and Skocpol: p.5). By observing causation in this fashion, the researcher is able to study the linkage between outcomes and process, and can assess the validity of claims made about effects that are maybe temporary or context-dependent[3]. Historical institutionalism recognizes that it may be difficult to reverse course because of "inertial stickiness" or "lock-in" (Pierson (1993): p.609, Pierson and Skocpol: p.7) and because positive feedback mechanisms can prevail. Inequalities of power may come to dominate and deflect opportunities for new and competing ways of understanding. For those reasons, changes in the decision-making process (to a large extent) may rely on unpredictable effects (Pierson, 1995: p.473), when they pass through a specific sequence of contingent events. Some options may be removed from possibility, but others "prove vulnerable to some [future] displacing event or process" (Pierson and Skocpol: p.8). And therefore, "institutions are not easily scrapped when conditions change" because the early policy choices linger, even if they seem to guide contemporary bureaucracies and functionaries in a clumsy way (Pierson and Skocpol, p.14).

There is also the possibility that *unintended* consequences in the context of this study are the result of Canada delegating authority to NATO, and then being ushered out of the decision-making loop because of NATO's troublesome consensus and hierarchical structure. However, for the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that Canada is generally aware of NATO's nuclear weapons framework and either welcomes it, or tolerates it.

Two Policy Streams

Canada, as a member of NATO, has recognized, accepted and helped establish nuclear weapons as a prominent part of the alliance's strategic capability and doctrine. Not all NATO members house nuclear weapons on their own soil, but through membership they are all willing signatories to NATO's "strategic concept", including its nuclear component. For instance, nuclear weapon member states and "non"-nuclear weapon members subscribe to the current formula, confirmed at the NATO summit in April 1999, which indicates that nuclear forces will

> "continue to fulfill an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States…"[4]

Canada is also a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968, and which entered into force March 5, 1970. Article 6 of the NPT explicitly recognizes a requirement to move quickly and surely towards the abolition of nuclear weapons:

> "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

The 2000 NPT Review Conference reiterated and emphasized nuclear weapon abolition obligations when stating that signatories to the NPT agreed to "An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI."

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) states in its Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division (NACD) website[5] that the government policy goal is "to ensure the consistent

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[3] This can be compared to Deborah's Stone's approach. Stone argues that "causal stories" that shift blame, are required for "difficulties" to enter the policy stream. The institutional approach taken here suggests that even well-framed, simple ideas have a great deal of difficulty penetrating closed policy subsystems. See Stone, pp. 281-283.

[4] Paragraph 62, 1999 Strategic Concept adopted in Washington, April 1999.

[5] http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/nuclear-en.asp

application of Canadian policy toward nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all international fora including […] the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO…."
A core policy objective is the "non-proliferation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction […] consistent with our membership in NATO and NORAD, and in a manner sensitive to the broader international security context."[6]

The contradiction of interest[7], therefore, is one Canadian policy stream that perceives nuclear weapons as "essential" and the "supreme guarantee" of NATO military security; and another that focuses on treaty obligations and foreign policy objectives directed towards nuclear weapon abolition.

Two Belief Systems

Erika Simpson provides convincing evidence that Canadian leaders and advisors were smitten by one of two major belief systems in the 1957-1989 period. She found that a debate between "Critics" and "Defenders" dramatically influenced defence decision-makers, and it explains successive Canadian positions towards NATO and nuclear weapons[8].

Defenders were those leaders and advisors, often realists[9], who believed that European and North American continental ties would be put in jeopardy, leading to Canada's abandonment, unless Canada held onto or strengthened its NATO defence commitments. Defenders also believed that the external military threat posed by the Soviet Union (in particular) was real and aggressive and that nuclear weapons were both a defensive response to that threat, and an appropriate measure that would enhance security.[10]

Critics were generally more idealistic, "less authoritarian, less rule-bound and less respectful of tradition and hierarchy".[11] They feared being bound by alliances that might draw Canada into an armed confrontation that was both avoidable and unnecessary. They were generally suspicious of both NATO and American strategic interests, but were not anti-NATO per se, and not necessarily anti-American. Some Critics believed the Soviet threat was exaggerated, and that the nuclear arms race was at least as dangerous as the Cold War foe.[12]

Because there were both Critics and Defenders in evidence in Parliament, in Government caucus, and in the bureaucracy, there was often an absence of consensus as well. As Simpson notes, "[c]ertain competing beliefs and assumptions of influential policy-makers led many to recommend maintaining, if not strengthening, Canada's NATO commitments; others, however, advocated de-emphasizing and restructuring select commitments" (p.222). While there was disagreement over a wide range of policy issues, most Critics and Defenders supported Canadian membership in NATO.

The debate was over "the measure and extent of Canada's military and non-military NATO commitments", "the nature of the threat" and the "suitability of a nuclear deterrence strategy" (Simpson: pp.5, 98). United States' political influence, while significant, was not the only external factor informing defence policy. It competed with fundamental ideas, such as the nature of Canadian loyalty to European allies, national concepts of security, perceptions of Cold War threats and the credibility given to deterrence doctrines. "Canada's approach to the Alliance and its NATO commitments often fluctuated and was frequently criticized" because of the interplay of the opposing belief systems, Simpson argues. While a "variety of other factors could have played a role in affecting defence decision-making", this ongoing debate came to dominate and was expressed in Canada's "shifting commitment to NATO" and its nuclear weapons policy (Simpson: p.6).

Policy Idea #1: Loyalty to Allies

The historical and diplomatic record shows a long history of Canadian ambivalence and discomfort about nuclear weapons since the early days of NATO. It also reveals a framework of loyalties, multilateralism, and obedience to established defence doctrines. Certain co-existing structures and ideas are dominant in the security field, and while they are arguably institutionally cocooned, they are also pre-eminent in shaping nuclear weapons policy. However, in recent years much of the international post-Cold War context for Canadian defence and foreign policy shifted. This is reflected in both incremental and substantive policy change, some of which at face value might be expected to fuel a rethinking of nuclear weapons policy as well.

Canada was present at both the invention of the atomic bomb in the 1940s and the formation of the North

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[6] http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/nulear2-en.asp

[7] It should be noted that all NATO members are subject to the same contradiction because they are all signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

[8] Simpson chose an "instrumental model" approach, rather than a "representational" analytical model for collecting data for her study, noting that in her view handwritten notes, interviews, diaries and secret and classified Cabinet documents were more reliable than public statements "designed to influence the general public" and which were therefore less likely to reflect true beliefs. (Simpson: p. 35.)

[9] For convenience, it could be said that realists focus on the way things "are"; idealists focus on the way things "could be" or "should be".

[10] Simpson: p. 41-68.

[11] Ibid., p. 219.

[12] Ibid., p. 73.

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. The former was an American-inspired Allied response to Nazism (and Japanese militarism); the latter's creation was in response to the perceived military and political threat of the Soviet Union,[13] an adversary that no longer exists. Canada played "a significant diplomatic role" in negotiating NATO's guiding texts and in the formulation of the alliance as an "integrated military and political structure" (Buteux: p.153). That integration resulted in Canada committing armed forces to the defence of Europe. But it also reflected a popular consensus in Canada that Europe mattered, and that the continued defence of Europe was a natural and legitimate consequence of World War II involvement. Canadian governing (and popular) policy preferences were consistent with the view that NATO could keep "the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in".[14] At NATO's outset, Canadian defence policy makers did not seek an independent capability or neutrality, but rather cohesive integrated command structures and collective defences in both Atlantic (NATO) and North American (NORAD) spheres. Canada's modest military contribution to NATO is arguably symbolic (as are the contributions of several small member states). The need to rely on alliances for defence "remains a basic assumption of official strategic assessments" (Buteux: p.157). As a small country, Canadian leaders were conscious of the importance of both "keep[ing] the allies happy and [maintaining] a seat at the table". Policy-makers believe that compromises might be necessary – particularly because larger powers dominate – and in order to ensure cost-effective access to institutions and other benefits, including liberal democracy (in the view of Macleod et al., a worthy Hobson's choice to this day, p.354.)

Policy Idea #2: Multilateralism to Resist US Unilateralism

American nuclear weapons were introduced into Europe sometime in the 1952-1953 period.[15] In 1954, the North Atlantic Council (the political wing of NATO) authorized "NATO commanders to plan to use nuclear weapons against the forces of the Warsaw Pact whether the latter used nuclear weapons or not" (Gregory: p.17). Misgivings and widespread fear over what some perceived as trigger-happy developments, driven primarily by U.S. (but also British) preferences and nuclear capability, percolated throughout Europe and within the alliance.[16] From 1957 the "first steps were taken towards the sharing of nuclear forces in NATO and a greater participation of the European allies in decision-making" emerged.[17] Bilateral agreements were separately negotiated between the U.S. and several other NATO allies, including Canada. This horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons made some observers nervous, but others believed it was more prudent to cooperate and then to abide by commitments made.

Paul Hellyer, Minister of Defence in 1963 stated in Cabinet that "the consequences of a failure to honour Canada's nuclear commitments would be far-reaching; it might, for example, jeopardize extensive sales to the United States of the Caribou II aircraft or lead to the withdrawal of U.S. concessions on the importation of Canadian oil" (in Simpson: p.43).[18] Threatened economic consequences[19] may have been important factors or they may have been exaggerated. In any case, they would be trumped by influences driven by Cold War security concerns. Some cabinet members in 1969 certainly believed that Canada's withdraw from NATO "would be a plus for isolationism in the US", affecting the role of Canada in the "preservation of western civilization".[20] Minister of National Defence Marcel Cadieux held that view, noting that "even if Canada were prepared to ignore its own security, it could not ignore the U.S.A.'s security interests; otherwise the U.S. would be pressed to take unilateral steps which would deny us the advantages we derived from co-operation and would at the same time threaten our autonomy" (Simpson: p. 45).[21] Lester Pearson also perceived Alliance loyalty, because of its implicit multilateralism, to be an acceptable means of ensuring national independence.[22]

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[13] Keating and Pratt: p.225.

[14] First Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay in Buteux: 155. Those three "NATO objectives" were consistent with several Canadian foreign and defence policy concerns (deterrence of Russian aggression, European post-war stability, and the concern over American unilateralism).

[15] According to Shaun Gregory, it is not clear whether nuclear weapons were placed in Europe in 1953 or in 1952 (Norstad's claim). Gregory: p. 17.

[16] U.S. President Eisenhower welcomed reliance on nuclear weapons as a low-cost alternative to a conventional arms race with the Soviet Union. British Field Marshall Montgomery in 1954 stated that planning was based on "using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our own defence. With us it is no longer: 'They may be used', it is very definitely: 'They will be used if we are attacked.'" In 1957, NATO strategy document (MC 14/2) "committed NATO to the massive use of nuclear weapons in response to Soviet aggression". (Gregory: p. 17-18.)

[17] That included decisions about the placement of nuclear weapons in Europe, although the Americans retained direct control over those they owned.

[18] Defenders External Affairs Minister Mitchel Sharp and another Minister of National Defence, Leo Cadieux, would have agreed with Hellyer. Critic Postmaster-General Eric Kierans would have disagreed. (Simpson: 43).

[19] Paul Martin Sr. also was inclined to believe that non-compliance with requests would have consequences. In referring to a nuclear weapons presence in Argentia, Newfoundland, he affirmed that the U.S. saw it as a significant contribution to deterrence against a missile attack on North America and "[s]hould we reject this request we would be likely to face some difficult problems. A rejection would be taken very seriously by the US…It would also add an important new item to the list of current Canadian positions about which Washington is unhappy…" (Simpson: 44).

[20] Secret memorandum, in Simpson, p. 45.

[21] And Cadieux again in 1984: "Should our support for NORAD (and NATO) decline, Canada could lose lucrative business to our 'more committed' Allies" (ibid: p. 45). Paul Buteux argues likewise that the "overwhelming influence of the United States on Ottawa's choices accounts in part for the ease with which Canadians fitted in to the integrated planning and command structure of NATO" (Buteux: p.159).

Canadian political leaders (and so-called "Atlanticist" policy-makers) may have escaped to NATO to counter the pressures of bilateral relations with the United States on security and economy issues, yet NATO institutional decision-making mechanisms, once established, were locked-in as a result of American prominence and the consensus policy-making structure. However, Canada was a willing founding member of NATO, accepted placement in the Military Planning Committee[23], and chose[24] to sit also in the Nuclear Planning Group. The Nuclear Planning Group[25] was "the principal architect of the refinement and elaboration of the arrangements for nuclear consultation in NATO" including the development of "political guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons" (Gregory: p. 32).

As Simpson notes, some defence experts in 1968 advised a government task force that Canadian input into the "formulation of the nuclear policies of the Alliance would also be threatened if Canadian forces in NATO should no longer be equipped with nuclear weapons: 'Nuclear matters lie at the core of NATO strategy and there is no logic to the claim that Canada would somehow be better off if it dissociated itself from the decisions that must in any case be taken. Any decision to withdraw from the nuclear role in Europe simply on moral grounds would be difficult to justify'" (Simpson: p.46).

Generally speaking though, several generations of Canadian leaders (and policy-makers) believed that NATO multilateralism (not nuclear weapons) "provided a consultative framework within which Canada could help build coalitions of like-minded states that could mitigate the unilateralism of American policy" (Buteux: p.159). However, consensus-building "from within" came at the price of also sharing the responsibility (and culpability) for NATO nuclear weapon policy decisions. That included, for instance, a Canadian endorsement of "the shift in NATO strategy in the mid-1950s towards much greater reliance on nuclear weapons", and the later sanctioning of the doctrine of "massive retaliation". It also led to Canada agreeing to subsequent strategic concepts that justified a nuclear weapon capability for the Alliance in perpetuity, including the participation of Canadian forces based in Europe (Buteux: pp.159-160). It was easier for Canada to endorse basing nuclear weapons in Europe or to support targeting from U.S. silos than to face any domestic discomfort over nuclear warheads on Canadian soil (Keating, 1993: p.150). That duplicity, however, did not absolve Canadian leaders from their legal attachment to NATO nuclear policy.

Sharing the load did not mean there was automatic equality of membership privileges. The first "clear expression of the willingness of the U.S. and U.K. to consult with their non-nuclear [weapon] allies on questions governing the role and use of nuclear weapons" was at the ministerial level at the North Atlantic Council in May of 1962 (Gregory: p. 30). Forty years later NATO had still not determined how best to achieve the "collective control of nuclear forces". NATO "trip-wire" strategy, which reigned between 1952 and 1967 was "rejected as lacking credibility", and according to Gregory, from 1967 to 1990 a huge gap opened up between NATO strategy and its actual capability (pp. 193-4). Reticence evident in Canadian policy towards nuclear weapons strategy during this entire period, then, was consistent with the mix of views held by other European allies (voiced or unvoiced) and their publics.

Policy Idea #3: Deterrence Doctrine

Loyalty to NATO allies was tightly interwoven with the establishment and preservation of a NATO deterrence capability.[26] The essence of the doctrine was that the threat of using overwhelming force (at a level to possibly cause massive loss of civilian life) would be sufficient to deter others from aggression. Support for nuclear deterrence was not necessarily based on any adequate knowledge of the deterrent mechanism, nor its logic, its likelihood of success, or its inherent risks.[27] Some decisions about weapons systems lacked an "appreciation of their strategic purpose". Defenders' assumptions were framed by Alliance allegiance, and the primary, original, military interest in defending against Soviet expansionism (Simpson: p.55) -- or more recently, in the absence of a Soviet Union, "uncertainty".

NATO nuclear weapons were framed as defensive and not offensive weapons[28] -- they would be used as a "last resort", and were perhaps not even perceived as weapons of mass destruction. Nonetheless once nuclear weapons were embraced in NATO, nuclear deterrence doctrine dominated the security agenda and became essential to NATO's mission.

Shifts in doctrine reflected difficulties with its inner logic, rather than doctrinal innovation. Until the late

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[22] Lentner: 59.

[23] The Defence Planning Committee was the "principal forum for NATO consultation and co-ordination in times of crisis" (Gregory: p. 40).

[24] France chose to withdrawal from all military components of the Alliance in 1966. Iceland chose to sit as an observer in the Nuclear Planning Group.

[25] According to Gregory, the NPG was involved in NATO's "theatre level nuclear targeting" (p. 68)

[26] Loyalty was linked to the World War II alliance and *Atlanticism*, from where (according to John Holmes), there came the perception of Canada as a "great military power" (Simpson: 49). In the post-war period, of course, the prior legacy was fragmented and reconfigured because the deterrent in question was targeted at one of the former Allied powers.

[27] For a critical view of nuclear deterrence doctrine, see Green, Hanson and Boyle; for a favourable opinion of deterrence as a workable doctrine, see Harvey, Fergusson. See also Simpson, pp. 63-68, Buteux, Jervis, Lebow and Stein: 1985, Richter.

[28] Lentner, pp. 34, 43, 61. See also: Munton: pp.510-512.

1950s, NATO relied on U.S. capacity (deterrence by "denial"); was later succeeded by deterrence by "massive retaliation" and "mutually assured destruction" (MAD); in the 1960s, "flexible response"; and from the later 1970s to the early 1980s, "tactical nuclear weapons" and "forward defences" balanced with nuclear and conventional forces; into the 1990s, with a "minimum deterrent", or "weapon of last resort" in combination with rapid reaction forces. On occasion, notes Simpson, Canadian defence policy supported one version of deterrence, while NATO supported another (Simpson: pp. 63-65; See also Buteux: pp.158-159).

NATO was institutionalized in order to make "co-operation more efficient and to increase the reliability and credibility of the alliance, and hence its deterrent and defence value" (Rafferty: p.348). Institutionalization meant that officers "shed their national perspective and adopt[ed] the viewpoint of the alliance". Countries' military and civilian staffs became integrated and indivisible, and there was a spill-over influence from each country into the foreign policies of others – larger members had greater authority, but smaller countries came to believe they had increased political access to the American leadership (Rafferty: p.349). Rafferty found that once alliances are formed and institutionalized, members are "unlikely to dismantle them with each transformation in the environment or [to cater to] the preferences of individual actors". Cost benefits and security advantages outweigh the inconvenient disagreements. Such was the case, for instance, when France chose to step out of NATO's military command structures, rather than leave the alliance altogether. Such was also the case when NATO survived the end of the Cold War, despite the expiry of its original mandate (and foe).

Canadian Defence Policy Change

These three key, interrelated "big" ideas – loyalty, multilateralism and deterrence – were important to NATO as an institution, as they are to Canadian defence policy. They also have direct bearing on the inner debate that was evident in the 1957-1963 timeframe when the Diefenbaker government switched commitments first towards, and then away from, holding nuclear weapons in the Canadian arsenal.[29]

Diefenbaker's change of heart[30] and discomfort with nuclear weapons deterrence was exploited by Lester Pearson who switched Liberal Party (or at least government) policy towards favouring the housing of nuclear weapons in Canada.[31] Pearson was subsequently elected as Prime Minister.[32] At the time, (future Liberal Prime Minister) Pierre Trudeau and (future Foreign Affairs Minister) Lloyd Axworthy were among those who opposed Pearson's alignment with the US request.[33]

Important for this study's argument are some of the extenuating circumstances that surrounded Lester Pearson's decision to reverse the up-until-then Liberal Party eschewal of nuclear weapons in Canada. Lentner suggests there are several causal claims made to explain Pearson's volte-face, including political opportunism, and ad hocism. However, prominent in the rationales Lentner offers, there are several that relate to NATO expectations: the decline of Canadian credibility in NATO, commitment to NATO, and potential for endangerment to the Alliance. The policy decision in question (accepting nuclear warheads on Bomarc missiles) relates to a bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States (and not a NATO commitment per se). However, both Diefenbaker and Pearson were concerned about American unilateralism, and whether nuclear weapons were safer under national, NATO or even UN control. As Lentner remarks, Pearson "took the stand that there should be no nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in NATO unless the United States were willing to surrender control to the NATO Council", something that was unlikely to happen (Lentner: p. 43).[34]

During this period, there was also evidence of a rift between Diefenbaker's Department of National Defence and Department of External Affairs bureaucracies. (DND's institutional framework was steadfast loyalty to the Alliance and thus also the assumption that Canada must honour its bilateral commitments with the United States. External Affairs' bureaucratic loyalties were to the Minister, Howard Green, who opposed nuclear weapons for Canada.) As notes Lentner, there was "nothing sinister in any of this activity. Each of the actors in the drama was simply doing his job. But the incompatibility of objectives and duties led to inevitable conflict" (Lentner: p.49, emphasis added.)

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[29] Much that has been written about this period accuses John Diefenbaker of vacillation, confusion, or even instability. But others note Diefenbaker's thoughtful questioning of the morality and effectiveness of nuclear weapon threats and use (Lentner: p.30). Diefenbaker had originally supported the acquisition of nuclear-tipped Bomarc missiles and nuclear-capable F-101 Voodoo interceptors (two systems destined for Canada), and showed a willingness to remain a member in good standing of the NATO nuclear "club" (Simpson: p.137). But at the time of the Cuban missile crisis and under the influence of External Affairs Minister, Howard Green, Diefenbaker came to believe that "nuclear weapons as a universal deterrent are a dangerous solution" and while the stockpile in Europe would suffice for NATO requirements, Canada should eschew nuclear weapons on Canadian soil (Simpson: pp.123-124).

[30] Keating notes that in December 1957 "in his speech at the Paris summit, Diefenbaker accepted nuclear stockpiles as a necessary part of a defence strategy that had already been adopted by the alliance in 1954". Keating, 1993: p.152)

[31] Lentner argues that Pearson personally opposed nuclear weapons until the last minute. Brigadier Malone stated that shortly before Pearson issued his "Scarborough speech" in which he argued Canada should abide by its prior commitments, he told Malone that "he thought Canada should have nothing to do with nuclear weapons. He felt it was a moral issue…[and] he intended to come out against them for Canada." (in Lentner, p. 38.) Simpson describes Pearson as a borderline Defender.

[32] The public support for Pearson was based on a combination of factors, including support for Liberal Party policy, media impact, disagreement with Diefenbaker's breach of prior agreement with the U.S., and manipulation by U.S.and Canadian defence and military actors.

[33] Nuclear weapons would not be entirely removed from Canadian soil until 1984, at the end of Trudeau's reign as Prime Minister. Canada's commitment to a nuclear-armed NATO continues to the present time.

[34] Notes suggest that Pearson wanted nuclear weapons under NATO command, not U.S. command (p. 46). He believed there was a "moral obligation for a proud nation such as Canada to honour its [NATO] undertakings", that there was clear advantage to the "western alliance shar[ing] in a single nuclear deterrent rather than develop[ing] individual deterrents of their own", and there was an obligation for Canada to play its "full part in the common defence" (Lentner: 62) – these were multilateralist frameworks.

Canadian NATO nuclear weapons policy, throughout, has been fundamentally similar to NATO's own "consensus". There are two simple explanations for the tight correspondence: Either Canadian policy-makers have been in agreement with NATO policy all along, or Canadian policy has been reluctantly or willingly driven by the NATO consensus. If the latter, it can be assumed that NATO nuclear policy was by default written by nuclear weapon states within NATO, and primarily the United States.

The internal policy process in the Department of National Defence mirrors the closed process within NATO. When there were management changes proposed in the 1964 (Paul Hellyer) Defence White Paper, (a "command era" style was replaced by a "management era" style), the military held onto the role of "defence planning and the command, administration, and management of the Canadian Forces" (Bell: p. 330). When Donald Macdonald, a "Critic", was appointed Minister of Defence under Trudeau in 1970, a greater civilian role was inserted into the policy formation process. There was an expansion of direct participation by the Prime Minister's Office, and the Privy Council Office in the defence policy process. The Prime Minister "took from the civil service the initiative in formulating the basic principles and objectives toward which defence policy was to be directed. While tactical decisions might still originate in the civil service, it was in the Prime Minister's Office that the overall strategy decisions were being made" (Thordarson in Bell: 330). Although the Trudeau-Macdonald initiatives were likely not appreciated by the defence department's bureaucracy, they explain how contrary positions might be taken by Canada, even if in friction with NATO prescriptions.[35] Notwithstanding exceptions such as these around the margins, the defence policy process continues to be a closed process.

In the 1968-71 timeframe, Pierre Trudeau and other Critics[36] "moderately reshaped" Canadian NATO policy,[37]although probably with little effect on NATO itself. Nuclear weapons in Canadian arsenals were being phased out and the 1971 Defence White Paper shifted emphasis away from European commitments. "Despite DND's established policy in favour of nuclear weapons for the Canadian Forces, despite the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and contrary to the recommendations and recriminations of other allies, the convictions of a few politicians brought about significant changes in the government's defence policy" (Simpson: p.99).

The most recent defence policy white paper (1994)[38] reveals a post-Cold War framework, while acknowledging that "Canada faces an unpredictable and fragmented world, one in which conflict, repression and upheaval exist alongside peace, democracy and relative prosperity." It refers to NATO commitments, but not nuclear weapons deterrence, and it reflects a change in tone from the posture of an earlier Defence Minister, Perrin Beatty, who presented the 1987 Defence White paper, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*. Beatty informed the Empire Club that year[39] that

> "NATO must demonstrate its capability and preparedness to use its forces, if necessary, should deterrence fail. NATO's nuclear arsenal thus serves a fundamental political purpose in signaling that aggression would not be tolerated; it would provoke retaliation and unacceptable consequences."

In introducing the 1994 Defence policy outline, Defence Minister Collenette indicated that the joint committee "travelled across the country listening to the views of ordinary citizens, defence experts, disarmament advocates and non-governmental organizations [and it] sought the advice of our allies" (in Bland: p.293).

Janice Stein, however, found that Canadian defence policy, to a much higher degree than foreign policy, was resistant to a changing external environment. She examined and compared the two 1994 Special Joint

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[35] The regular shifts in NATO deterrence doctrines were also suspicious to some Canadian leaders. Pierre Trudeau came to believe that the NATO policy process was "pre-cooked" and effectively cocooned even from individual alliance members. He commented in 1982 at a NATO summit that speeches were "paraphrases of the Communiqué which has been drafted in Brussels by people who have been working for years together. And so we all make speeches repeating what we are all saying in the Communiqué, and nobody has a chance to say: 'Well, why did you say that? And where did you get that idea? And what makes you think that?'" (Simpson: 78). Trudeau suggested in 1983, that the appropriate strategy might be to both steer away from nuclear weapons and reduce conventional weapons: "The far more sensible approach would be for both sides to reduce their conventional forces to mutually agreed levels, a task to which we have devoted the past ten years at the Mutual and Balance Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna" (Simpson: p. 94). At the UN in 1977, Trudeau advanced his proposal for a "strategy of suffocation", which included a "comprehensive test ban, a ban on the flight testing of new strategic missiles, a stop to the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and reductions in defence spending." (Geoffrey Pearson: web resource).

[36] Gordon Robertson, Ivan Head, Donald Macdonald, James Richardson, Gerard Pelletier and Eric Kierens.

[37] Simpson also notes that the appearance of a "vociferous peace movement" and US posturing may have contributed to the policy shift as well. However Cabinet documents for this period are not yet all available. Simpson: p. 98.

[38] http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/white_e.htm

[39] http://www.empireclubfoundation.com/details.asp?SpeechID=1754&FT=yes

Committee processes that reviewed Canadian foreign and defence policies. While the foreign policy committee appeared to "embrace" new ideas[40], the defence committee "rejected new concepts even as it recommended policy adjustment" (Stein: p.67). And yet, as Simpson notes, the Defence White Paper that followed from the 1994 review, placed U.N. obligations ahead of NATO obligations for the first time, seeming "to herald a fundamental reordering of Canada's defence priorities" (Simpson 2000: p.13). Was defence policy becoming more pervious to public input after all? (And if so, why?)

Stein believes that the range and kinds of arguments available played a role in the two foreign affairs and defence processes: "That the committees worked in different institutional and political contexts is of central importance […] Almost all of the sessions of the foreign policy committee were open, while many of the sessions of the defence committee early in the process and again at the end were held in camera while it heard from the senior military leadership." For this reason, Stein argues, embedded military and defence assumptions were "not subjected to the same kind of critical scrutiny". Policy actors and officials concluded that the most appropriate route was the *prudent* one, a view echoed by conservative military lobby groups, such as the Conference of Defence Associations and the partisan right (including the then Official Opposition Reform Party). This line of strategic thinking, which embraces the *prudent management* of nuclear weapons rather than their *prompt abolition*, is also a perspective that once viewed the post-Cold War world as "less imminently threatening but more dangerously unpredictable" (Hubert: Conclusion, p.6).

However, even if policy windows do open because of the entry of new ideas, those new ideas may not be sufficient to dislodge pre-existing institutional "inertial stickiness" (in Pierson and Skocpol's formulation: p.7). Integrating new ideas typically involves significant political risk. If change is to occur, Stein concludes, it requires an "engaged senior leadership with the willingness and the capacity to bear the political costs of change in the face of the strong coalition of vested institutional and private interests" (Stein: p.69). That leadership, in addition to being highly organized, and "interested, able and willing to sponsor policy change" (p.48) would need to enable political coalitions that could support the "painful redistribution of resources".

Stein's primary focus is the likelihood of the defence (and foreign affairs) establishment embracing incremental common security approaches in the early post-Cold War environment. Because foundational ideas -- power (certainty and consensus), loyalty (solidarity and the avoidance of abandonment) and deterrence (perceived safety) -- are at the heart of a nuclear-armed NATO, the difficulties she envisions may be qualitatively different from the process of eschewing nuclear weapons in NATO. That latter scale of transformation entails a shift in fundamental values -- a higher order in the shift of ideas -- and is not primarily about the availability of human or financial resources (even though nuclear weapons have been touted as providing cost advantages over conventional forces).

Disarmament Ideas and International Law

While the Department of National Defence has arguably not been an enthusiastic Canadian policy instrument in the formulation of (NATO) disarmament and arms control policy, yet sympathy for nuclear disarmament is evident in Canadian diplomatic correspondence at least as early as early as November 1951, when Canadians negotiated phrasing for a U.S. drafted disarmament treaty that included the "prohibition of atomic weapons".[41] In the 1950s, Canada "renounced the deployment of nuclear weapons in its own forces in the interest of nonproliferation" and was a leader in the UN Disarmament Agency (Sokolsky: p.152).[42]

Canada was instrumental in establishing the "largely ignored" Article 2 in the NATO Charter, a clause that was "intended to foster closer co-operation among the member governments in non-military areas" (Keating, 1993: p.145). Some believed that NATO provided an avenue to pursue disarmament objectives.[43] Stepping out of NATO, it was argued, would reduce Canada's ability to influence policy in this area.

In late 1960, Canada considered its support of the "Irish Resolution", a UN resolution that Canada had co-sponsored, but which was perceived by NATO members and supporters, (including several Cabinet ministers), as a challenge to the legitimacy of NATO nuclear policy. Although Diefenbaker did dilute Canada's endorsement of the resolution with a conditional clause, he directly instructed his Foreign Minister, Howard Green, to lend support (Simpson: 114). The second version of the Irish Resolution, which was ultimately adopted unanimously in the

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[40] It can be argued that the Department of Foreign Affairs shifted towards the "human security agenda" during this period.

[41] "Believing that the necessary means to this end is the development by the United Nations of comprehensive and coordinated plans, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction to levels adequate for defense but not for aggression of all armed forces and all armaments, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only".
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/history/dcer/details-en.asp?intRefid=5622

[42] But by the late 1950s, Canada sold "almost every tonne of uranium produced in this country" to the Americans for military purposes (Bothwell: p.42).

[43] Ross Campbell, Canadian ambassador to NATO in 1969, informed the Department of External Affairs that "NATO is performing important functions in the arms control and disarmament field […]. We have, in fact, been doing so, and in subjects which have a far more direct bearing on present peace than the long term activities" of the Conference on Disarmament. (Source mislaid.)

General Assembly in 1961, is believed to be the precursor to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)[44] that entered into force in 1970.

The NPT has been "and will always remain, a Treaty of commitment, not convenience [for Canada]. We are dedicated to seeking the full implementation of all of the provisions of the Treaty",[45] stated Tariq Rauf at the 2000 NPT review conference.

What has inspired the Canadian disarmament policy process in the most recent decade are fresh goals that, in the language of policy learning analysts such as Hall, shift the "locus of authority" to accommodate "third order change" (Hall: p.284). Unlike for the more closed institutional framework of NATO and the Department of National Defence, the end of the Cold War (and the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, NATO's *raison d'être*) brought fresh peace dividend momentum and urgency to the disarmament agenda.

There were many international actors and instruments that were enthusiastic about the new opportunity to fulfill legal obligations that nuclear (and non-nuclear) weapon states had agreed to as signatories to the NPT.[46] Uppermost perhaps was a civil society effort to have the International Court of Justice (ICJ) express an Opinion. The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons "would not have happened without the work of citizens' organizations worldwide. They launched the initiative, lobbied the World Health Organization and U.N. General Assembly to put the questions to the ICJ, and supported States participating in the case."[47] The Court in 1996 determined that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is illegal in any foreseeable armed conflict and there exists an obligation to "pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."[48]

The 1996 ICJ Opinion weighed in heavily on the side of NPT obligations and while Canada ultimately voted in favour of only a portion of the subsequent follow-up resolution at the United Nations,[49] the disarmament imperative appeared to take on greater relevance in policy circles. A Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) that was established to address the nuclear weapons issue, was inspired by a cross-Canada roundtable organized by the peace and disarmament organization Project Ploughshares, and Douglas Roche, former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament at the UN. The standing Committee was chaired by (future Foreign Minister) Bill Graham, and it issued a major report, Canada and the Nuclear Challenge, Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century,[50] in 1998. The report called on the Government of Canada to "argue forcefully within NATO that the present re-examination and update as necessary of the Alliance Strategic Concept should include its nuclear component". The government response to the report's recommendations was positive.[51]

A broad group of internal and external actors pressed the Canadian government to advance the disarmament agenda both inside NATO (by pressing for a review of the Strategic Concept) and inside the United Nations (by supporting a leading group of pro-abolition states known as the New Agenda Coalition).[52] While government ministers, Cabinet and members of Parliament were divided on their level of commitment to abolition, an activist Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, spoke out often[53] within the confines of his Cabinet responsibilities. Douglas Roche (appointed by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to the Senate in full knowledge of Roche's commitment to abolition[54]) established and chaired an organization, the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), which acted as a communication bridge between the New Agenda (non-NATO) states and non-nuclear members of NATO.

In 1998, a significant breakthrough occurred when all but one (Turkey) of the non-nuclear NATO states abstained on, rather than voting against, the UN resolution proposed by the New Agenda. In 2002 and again in 2003,

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[44] http://cnsdl.miis.edu/npt/npt_3/history.htm, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/npthist.htm

[45] http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/NPT/2000revcon/CanadaStrengthnReview.htm

[46] Prominent among them, were the Canberra Commission report, the NPT review, initiatives in favour of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and statements by world statesman, and former senior military leaders.

[47] http://disarm.igc.org/dtrobkate.html

[48] http://www.pnnd.org/un_ga_icj_opinion.htm

[49] See: http://www.pnnd.org/un_ga_icj_opinion.htm

[50] http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/36/1/FAIT/Studies/Reports/faitrp07-e.htm

[51] It noted that because of the changed post-Cold War environment, "NATO is better placed to defuse crises through diplomatic or other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence. Consequently, the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by the Alliance are now extremely remote and ever more difficult to envisage." The government response concluded: "Taking into account that NATO works on the basis of consensus, Canada will continue to urge NATO partners to consider the impact on potential nuclear proliferators when considering the characterization of the purpose of NATO nuclear forces." (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nucchallenge/POLICY-en.asp - 7)

[52] The New Agenda Coalition's original statement was entitled: *A Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda,' Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, 9 June 1998*

[53] Within NATO, he and Canada became known as the "nuclear nag".

[54] Roche was also instrumental in establishing the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, a group of NGOs with a focus on abolition.

Canada voted in favour of the New Agenda Coalition[55] resolution (the "Yes" in the title of this paper), even though by then "misguided activist" Lloyd Axworthy[56] had left government and the Foreign Affairs ministry. By several measures, Canada has shown a willingness to take the "abolition" lead within NATO.[57]

The Impact of Mass Publics and Experts

The effect of public mobilization campaigns on the policy decision-making process is unclear and ambiguous. As Don Hubert notes, for instance, while the abolition movement through several decades has been effective in politicizing risks, "modest steps taken [by governments] in the direction of disarmament seem to have had little correlation to the periods of popular mobilization". Because public mobilization is usually most effective at times of highest perceived risk -- but when hostile states are least willing to negotiate -- the "timing of popular mobilization, therefore, seems to be out of phase with the opportunities for risk reduction" (Hubert: unpublished thesis).

Lentner also notes that "the public's activity was not a factor" in Pearson's decision to honour the Diefenbaker government's earlier commitment to nuclear-armed Bomarc missiles.[58]

Another view is that without effective mass mobilization on the horizon, it becomes evident "that only pressure from within NATO can persuade the Alliance's three nuclear-weapons states that international arms control is not only a viable option but ultimately safer and more rational" (Koster).

Such sober assessments of mass publics and their impact on the decision-making process are shared by many others, and they hint at why contemporary nuclear disarmament campaigns show a tendency to avoid "fringe organizations or radical groupings" that may be out of sync with policy cycles.[59] Deborah Stone points out that causal stories that argue "the capitalist economic and political system is the cause of innumerable social ills" are "consistently shut out", not because they are demonstrably invalid, but because their "implicit prescription entails [the] radical redistribution of power or wealth" (Stone: p.294). Jonathan Schell was effective, Stone argues, because in Fate of the Earth, he was able to portray the *consequences* of a nuclear holocaust that had not yet happened, and by doing so we were no longer able to "regard the effects of nuclear holocaust as accident", but as result of human intention or unintended human cause (p.290).

Campaigns have turned to military specialists, groupings of states such as the New Agenda Coalition and the "NATO-5", and nongovernmental professional organizations of doctors, lawyers and scientists. Maxwell Cameron suggests that nongovernmental organization influence (arguably as surrogate for mass publics) is about NGO access, and not about NGOs seizing the reins. "Advocates of democratization should rest their defence of civil society-government partnership on publicity, not on participation" (Cameron: p.162). Denis Stairs would agree: Former Foreign Affairs Minister Axworthy's "active cultivation of relations with the NGO and academic communities [was] designed to provide him with a base of both political and informational supports that [allowed] him to force the process of innovation and to countervail, in at least some degree, the more conservative of his department's own inclinations" (Stairs: p.47).

In other words, there may be a shift in emphasis – offered from the NGO side, and requested from the government side -- towards actors with credibility and expertise, and away from crowds with bad timing or worse haircuts. That may indicate explanations both for the ear given to retired- and ex-military advocates who have found common cause with the disarmament community, and therefore also for the policy opportunities that may be lost for lack of disarmament advocates willing to venture into the military establishment. Why?

Hanson argues that the nuclear weapons debate has become a "serious mainstream issue in international diplomacy…[so much so that]… there is full acceptance of the norm against nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons and a widespread acceptance of [abolition]", at least at the declaratory level (Hanson: 366). While this may be a contested view, there is little doubt that in the absence of public mobilization, abolitionists will need to work with what they can get and where they can go, particularly if the effort has proved to be (more) fruitful.

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[55] There is little doubt that Roche, and the MPI he established, have played a significant complementary role in the relationship between the NAC, Canada and friendly NATO states.

[56] http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/MONITOR/mond00b.html

[57] While the subject of this paper is Canada's "Yes" in favour of the NAC resolution, it should be noted that there is a great deal of significance to all other non-nuclear weapon NATO states, save Turkey, abstaining on the NAC vote. The decision to not vote "No" may be as important as Canada's "yes". An abstention, notes Robert Green, constituted "almost unprecedented insubordination" in the face of U.S. authority within NATO, and is evidence that "the deterrence argument may be weaker than ever before". The reasons for the difference between Canada's "yes" vote and the votes of the NATO abstainers is of interest, but deserve substantial space not currently available for this study.

[58] The divided public did express an electoral decision shortly afterwards, albeit by electing a minority government (Lentner: 50).

[59] The dominant framework in much of the peace movement is pacifist: a discomfort with militaries of any type (suspicions even of peacekeeping in some circles), and a overarching assumption that conflict can be (or should be) solved by peaceful means in all but a few circumstances. A significant number also support a statist or structuralist framework and believe a dramatic change in political actors (by elections or otherwise) is necessary in order to replace the military-industrial complex and its existing doctrines.

Conclusions: Why did Canada vote Yes?

Tracking institutions over time offers much explanatory power to our understanding of Canadian *disarmament behaviour* at the General Assembly two years running. The relationship under observation in this study is the interplay between two major international institutions (NATO and the UN's NPT), two overlapping Canadian government departments (DND and DFAIT), and key political leaders and their advisors. Two segmented frames (disarmament and defence) through the decades under review, appear independently robust even while in contention with each other. Through almost 55 years of history (1949-2003), and even during periods of hostility between Cold War adversaries, Canadian policy actors including several Prime Ministers, publicly and privately expressed their discomfort with the nuclear-armed status of NATO. They or their governments also broke bread with their nuclear-armed Alliance cousins. There is little evidence of interest in breaching the NATO code, however mystical its formulation, even while there is recurring disenchantment with NATO's nuclear ghost. The imperviousness of NATO's institutionalism -- its structure and its foundational ideas -- seems to have been pre-eminent, and it is mirrored by policy decisions and an equivalent decision-making process in the Department of National Defence. Debate has not yet undermined NATO's fundamental nuclear-armed capability, or Canadian defence policy adherence to it.

Where there has been contention from nuclear disarmament advocates inside and outside the bureaucracy, sometimes driven by credible belief systems of leading policy actors, it has been countered by obligations presumed to be sacrosanct by "big" foundational ideas shared by both NATO and DND: loyalty to Allies, multilateralism to dilute U.S. unilateralism, and *alliance security* as defined by deterrence doctrine. Indeed "loyalty", "multilateralism" and "security" (if not nuclear deterrence), are policy goals that are shared by the two Canadian policy streams. NATO membership appears also to be a tolerated, if not shared policy goal.

Canada's "Yes" vote was driven by a disarmament agenda which had come untethered with the end of the Cold War and the pressure of international legal norms, civil society actors, and friendly progressive governments. To the extent that NATO itself is reminded of its legal obligations without being offended (and Canada was certainly not alone while surrounded by a sea of abstentions), the "yes" is possible. The vote was also necessary in the face of risks to the non-proliferation regime; certainly the "Yes" was entirely consistent with Canada's historical record.

The end of the Cold War – a potentially transformative opportunity -- had different repercussions for different institutions. The disarmament stream of policy-makers showed renewed enthusiasm to advance further along the disarmament policy track by seizing upon opportunities provided by civil society, the International Court of Justice, and the Non-proliferation Treaty.

But no alternatives to nuclear deterrence have yet fascinated defence policy decision-makers. Rather, they seem willing victims of NATO's "inertial stickiness", to the extent of questioning whether the end to the Cold War should have any impact at all on the status of NATO's "essential" deterrent.

The influence of mass publics in the evolution of the two parallel policy streams is harder to gauge. There is evidence that civil society expertise is made bolder by attachment to a range of compatible scientific, military, legal and government actors. They may have greater institutional leverage and be more sustainable than crowds driven by sporadic fears of a nuclear holocaust. *But sufficient leverage?*

This study offers little guidance towards determining when old ideas will be displaced by new ones -- except to suggest that there are unpredictable outcomes that occur when the right sequence of events is put in place. For new institutional ideas to be credible, articulate advocates that stay the course will need to be equipped with sophisticated, yet simple, alternatives that respond better to current and future security obligations.

Future Study

While this study looked at some of the shifts in policy over time, it will be useful to look deeper into some of the attributes of military and non-military actors in the two policy streams (disarmament and defence). Do the different policy actors (employees, officials, advocates, politicians) have unique attributes? Are both policy streams equally resistant to shifts in direction or is one more insulated (cocooned) than the other? If former military officers are willing to enter the disarmament stream (with apparent success), will disarmament advocates encourage their own to enter into military institutions to make their case "from within"? Is that an effective way to advance nuclear disarmament?

On the diplomatic front, what were the merits of Canada's "Yes", as compared to the abstentions offered by other "non-nuclear" NATO members? How do others perceive Canada's nuclear "nagging", and is it credible while Canada remains a member of the Nuclear Planning Group? Are Canadian contributions to NATO perceived as only symbolic – does that reduce Canada's ability to advocate in support of nuclear disarmament within NATO? In view of American (and British and French) nuclear weapon policy intransigence, is Canada's withdrawal from NATO really a viable option -- now, or in the future?

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(This revision: March 13, 2004)