Comparing Nigerians and Canadians:

Insights from Social Survey Research, 1990-2005

 

The Gallup, GLOBE, Social Axioms, Pew and World Values Surveys,
coupled with a look at Nigerian migration and home remittances

 

Version 20070509

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Many Canadian firms find the export of physical products to Nigeria a challenge, sometimes regardless of the abilities of their local representation, due to problems in … ix) the physical and psychological distance between Nigeria and Canada … This goes some way to explain why the more successful Canadian ventures tend to be either service-oriented or have established business facilities directly in the marketplace.

InfoExport - The Canadian Trade Commissioner Service

The Canadian Dimension in the Nigerian Economy,” January 2003. [emphasis added]

 

 

 

What has happened to Nigeria? Why has a country with such fantastic natural resources gone down this road? That's the question everyone here asks each other every day.

 

The answer is quite simple. No-one gives a damn. The country has rulers instead of leaders - they set the example; and in a bid to survive the system we all stupidly follow, and sink lower.

 

In the traffic this morning, the drivers myself included did what we had to get by.

 

I drove up the wrong side of the road with everyone else, and along the verge to try to weedle my way through the jam caused by the petrol queues, causing more havoc as I went. I would never do this back home, so why was I doing it here I wondered?

 

Hilary Andersson, BBC Correspondent, Lagos, 1998
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/107731.stm

 

 

 

On re-reading the text, it occurs to me I’ve left out a lot of the good things about Africa.  The kindness of the people, their passion for life, the extraordinary hospitality of the poorest of the poor, the joy of Congolese rumba music, the sunset over the Okavango delta; the list goes on.  But this is a book about why Africa is poor, so it has to grapple with war, pestilence, and presidents who think their office is a license, literally, to print money.

Robert Guest, 2004,

Correspondent for the Economist
The Shackled Continent: Power, Corruption and African Lives,
 Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian, p. 2.

 

 

African joie de vivre has always impressed visitors… In fact, cheerfulness can survive in unlikely places.  Nigeria is one of the most disorganized, violent, and corruption-plagued countries on earth.  Yet, in September 2003, an international survey found that it had the highest percentage of happy people in the world, followed by Mexico, Venezuela, El Salvador and Puerto Rico.  The United States ranked 16th and Great Britain 24th.

Robert Calderisi,

Canadian International Development Agency, Tanzania 1976-78; World Bank 1978-2002,
The Trouble With Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn’t Working,

New York: Palgrave MacMillan:2006, p.195; 197.

 

 

My general impression during my stay here is that the image that Nigerians have abroad of being obnoxious, overbearing and short-tempered is undeserved.

BBC correspondent Joseph Winter (21 April, 2003).

"Nigeria election diary - part III"

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2935491.stm

 

 

The World Values Survey... answers are eye-opening.  When asked in 2000, for example, whether it is especially important for children to be encouraged at home to learn "hard work", 61 percent of Americans said yes, whereas 80 percent of Nigerians, 75 percent of South Africans, and 83 percent of Tanzanians responded affirmatively.  This answer and others hardly demonstrated social values of laziness in Africa and other poor countries.

 

Jeffrey Sachs (2005). 
The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time,
New York: Penguin, p.318.

 

 

Nigeria is resource-rich in humans and minerals.  If the services of its non-resident citizens were withdrawn from the British National Health Service and that of Saudi Arabia, there would be a crisis of national emergency proportions.  Similar things could be said for several American hospital systems and information and communications technology (ICT) companies.

Pat Utomi, Lagos Business School.

 World Economic Forum (2000). The African Competitiveness Report 2000/2001

New York: Oxford University Press, p. 183

 

 

Our women know how to show respect for their men.  They also know how to cook real food.  None of these Burger King or Big Macs.  Rice, gumbo sauce with hot pepper, and fresh and clean meat.  That is what I miss.  I want to sit outside with my friends and talk into the night.  I want to be in a place that has real Muslim friendship.

El Hadj Moru Sifi,
Undocumented Nigerien migrant street merchant in New York City, August 1994

Quoted in: Paul Stoller (2002). Money Has No Smell: The Africanization of New York City,

University of Chicago Press, p.160.

 

 

Another important problem with the programs and methods of these NGOs is that they have almost always paid scant attention, if any at all, to those aspects of the cultures that constitute Nigeria's social fabric that tend to support their struggle for human dignity, and that can help legitimate that struggle... This parallels a similar historical tendency within the larger international human rights movement in which African culture tends to be seen almost exclusively as a source of human rights violations and almost never as a source of the norms that can ground a human rights renaissance on the continent.  In tending to tow this sort of line, these Nigerian NGOs have missed yet another easily available step on their route to their own popular legitimization.  Had these NGOs attempted to study and understand the various local cultures in Nigeria, with a view to gleaning those aspects of these cultural systems that support their human rights work, they would be in a much better position today to understand and speak the various languages of human dignity that are widely and continually spoken by most ordinany Nigerians -- languages that form part of a rich, long, and continuous tradition of struggle against violations of human rights.

 Obiora Chinedu Okafor (2006).

Nigerian-Canadian professor of law, York University, Canada
Legitimizing human rights NGOs: lessons from Nigeria,

Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, p.109. 

 

 

One thing that seems to come up all over the continent in recent years is a shift from a focus on temporal dynamics of societal progress toward a new reliance on individual spatial mobility.  How is one to escape the low global status of being “a poor African”?  Not through “patience” and the progress of national or societal development, but by leaving, going elsewhere, even in the face of terrible danger.  Today, anthropological fieldworkers in Africa tend to be asked not, “What can you do for us?” (the time-honored question), but, “How can I get out of this place?”  Not progress, then, but egress.

James Ferguson (2006).

Global Shadows: Africa in the neoliberal world order,

Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, p. 191-192.

 

 

Poverty, despair and violence are usually rooted in failed institutions of basic governance and rule of law. This is where Canada, with its commitment to pluralism and human rights, can make a unique contribution. That is why the Government is establishing the Canada Corps. Its mandate is first, to put our idealism to work by helping young Canadians bring their enthusiasm and energy to the world; second, to bring our skills and ideas to bear by ensuring that experts of all ages and backgrounds – for example, in governance, health, economics, human rights – can get to the places in the world that need them; and third, to coordinate the efforts of government and to work with civil society. The Canada Corps will bring the best of Canadian values and experience to the world.

Speech from the Throne to the Third Session of the

Thirty-Eighth Parliament of Canada, October 5, 2004, p.14.

 

 

Unstructured postings in areas like “community development”, “capacity-building”, “institution building”, agricultural extension, and even public health are much more difficult. … This is even truer for postings in the fields of governance and human rights. The more unstructured the job, the greater will be the need for support. And support for international staff in unstructured positions, especially in fragile states, cannot be provided by telephone. These sorts of postings must be backed by experienced, on-the-ground field staff employed by Canadian or other international organizations.

Ian Smillie, CUSO Volunteer, Sierra Leone; Nigeria Field Staff Officer, late 1960s;

CUSO Executive Director, 1979-1983,

“Hubris, Humility and Human Resources: Notes on the Proposed Canada Corps”, October, 2004
http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_cda_corps_hubrishumility_final.pdf

 

 

The rate of expatriate failure is a subject of considerable debate.  Irrespective of the precise percentage of failures, all agree that the human and financial costs associated with personnel who do not succeed are great.  GLOBE researchers speculate that expatriate failure rates should be associated with the cultural distance between the home and the host country.

Robert J. House et al, (2004) Culture, Leadership, and Organizations:
The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies,

London: Sage, p.203.


OUTLINE

ABSTRACT.. 7

HIGHLIGHTS.. 7

INTRODUCTION.. 12

Nigerian Views on Cultural Change. 18

BACKGROUND.. 20

Disorienting, Dis-occidenting, Diss Africa-ning.. 22

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLLING/SURVEY DATA.. 23

International Surveys. 23

Afrobarometer.. 23

World Values Surveys, 1990 & 2000. 24

Some Basic Socio-economic Contrasts: Canadians and Nigerians. 25

CHARACTERISING CANADIANS.. 29

Canadians’ Volunteer Participation in Global Social Justice. 31

Canadians’ Support for International Development Aid. 32

FLUX AND STASIS IN NIGERIA OVER THE 1990s.. 34

Reasons to expect stasis in Nigerian attitudes and behaviours between 1990 and 2000  34

Signifiers of social change under macro-economic stasis. 35

Nigeria and the UN Millennium Development Goals. 37

Within-Nigeria Variability in Social Indicators. 40

SURVEY METHODOLOGIES.. 42

The Survey Results.. 47

Gallup 2005: All 18 Published Responses. 47

Pew and World Values Survey Data Rankings. 53

Pew 2002: Nigeria Highest in the Range of Country Responses (80-100%). 53

World Values Survey Data.. 72

WVS 2000: Nigeria Highest in the Range of Country Responses (80-100%). 72

Disagreement: Pew Results for 2002. 92

Disagreement: WVS Results for 2000. 106

Disagreement: WVS Results for 1990. 111

Agreement: Pew Results for 2002. 122

Pew Global Attitudes Project: 44-Nation Major Survey (2002) 122

Agreement: WVS Results for 2000. 135

Agreement: WVS Results for 1990. 141

GLOBE Study of 62 Societies (1997) 150

Social Axioms Project (Bond & Leung) 156

Gire & Carment, 1992. 157

Gowdy, Iorgulescu & Onyeiwu, 2003. 158

Geert Hofstede, 1973 and 1990. 159

DISCUSSION.. 161

Analysis of Canadian-Nigerian Value Disparities by Topic, WVS 2000 and 1990. 161

Cross-Cultural Values Maps. 164

Nigerian Muslims and Nigerian Christians: Some Significant Differences. 166

Gross National Optimism: Happiness, Satisfaction, "Irrational Exuberance", Material Deprivation & Thriving On Indeterminacy.. 168

Public Morality, “Corruption”, and the Unregulated Economy.. 179

Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Indexes. 181

Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer, 2005. 182

Anthropological Interpretations of the Western-defined “Corruption”. 184

Nigerian “Family Values”, Vertical Transmission of the Ties that Bind, Obedience & Impunity   188

Trust, Reciprocity and Fairness. 191

Individualism and Locus of Control: Fatalism vs. Free Choice. 195

One Modernity or Alternative Modernities? Nigerian Social Dynamics, Thriving on Indeterminacy   201

Case Studies in Nigeria Migrant Workers’ Home Remittances. 209

Shortcomings of These Surveys. 211

Future Research.. 213

CONCLUSIONS.. 215

APPENDIX 1: Nigerian Immigration Statistics.. 220

The Nigerian Diaspora in OECD countries, and their remittances. 220

United States Diversity Visa Lottery. 227

Nigerian Diaspora in Europe and North America. 228

Nigerian-Canadian Home Remittance Estimates Compared to Canadian Aid to Nigeria. 229

Net Official Development Assistance to Nigeria from Selected OECD Nations (US$, millions). 229

Aid, Foreign Investment and Debt Service Compared to Gross Domestic Product, 2003. 230

Net Migration Rates from Nigeria, 1995-2050. 232

United Kingdom... 233

United States. 234

APPENDIX 2.  ENVIRONICS 3SC SOCIAL VALUES SURVEY.. 238

BIBLIOGRAPHY.. 242

Supplementary Data.. 249

Compiler.. 249

 

 


ABSTRACT

 

What is the “intercultural distance” between Nigeria and Canada?  Where are these two nationalities “on the same page” and where are they effectively inhabiting different planets, when it comes to their norms and values, attitudes and behaviours?

 

This document reviews the sociological and psychological literature over the last decade and a half, primarily from European and North American sources, involving cross-national values surveys that have included both Nigerians and Canadians within their samples.  The purpose is to identify semi-quantitatively, as opposed to anecdotally, both the key commonalities and the acute differences between citizens from these two countries, in terms of generalized beliefs, social norms and behaviours.  By finely calibrating the "intercultural distance" along multiple attitudinal scales, Canadians and Nigerians may begin to dismantle innate assumptions and good or bad stereotypes about each other, and hopefully undertake more effective intercultural communication and collaboration.  This is particularly crucial in the domain of global justice advocacy and social transformation/re-engineering, where the aim is literally "changing the way people think", and, ultimately, how they act. 

 

Owing to their demographic predominance on the continent, Nigerians have been included in major international surveys since the 1970s, yet there appears to have been no systematic review of these potentially rich sources of data to date.  They represent a valuable set of Nigerian attitudinal data that both international and indigenous civil society groups should exploit as external benchmark indicators for comparison against their own local and regional development interventions.  In this review, Canadians’ and Nigerians’ responses are presented from six surveys: World Values Survey 1990 and 2000, Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002, Gallup 2005 Voice of the People, GLOBE Survey 1997, and the Social Axioms Survey 2002.  Collectively, they polled approximately 3,500 Canadians and 5,100 Nigerians between 1990 and 2005.  Respondents from both these nationalities were asked 826 questions in common, from which the results of 500 are presented in this report.  Supplementing these data are selected results from eight other surveys, Geert Hofstede’s Culture Dimensions (1967-1973), the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index and Global Corruption Barometer, three Nigerian-only studies (Afrobarometer 2002; Demographic & Health Survey (DHS), Nigerian Federal Office for Statistics, 1990; Gowdy, Iorgulescu, and Onyeiwu 2003), one pan-African survey (BBC Pulse of Africa 2004), and one study that included only Nigerian and Canadian university students (Gire and Carment, 1992).

 

 

HIGHLIGHTS

·         Given the option, three-quarters of Nigerians surveyed in 2004 said they would emigrate.  In May 2004, 750 Nigerians from all walks of life were asked by the BBC which country they would most prefer to live in, and only 27% chose Nigeria; out of the ten African countries surveyed, just one other country’s respondents (Malawi) ranked their own country lower as the first choice to live in.  Seventeen percent of Nigerians wanted to move to the USA, 12% chose the United Kingdom, and 4% wanted to live in Canada.

·         About one in five thousand Nigerians emigrates annually, and one in fifteen thousand enters the United States.  The chances of a Nigerian “escaping” from their land of birth is about two in ten thousand: in both 1990 and in 2000 the UN estimates that the net migration rate was -0.2 per 1,000 (i.e. about 19,000 more persons exiting  Nigeria than entering) [UN, International Migration Report 2002:131].   The UN Population Division predicts the rate of exodus to increase marginally to -0.3 per 1,000 during the period 2000-2005, or about 39,000 emigrés annually [UN, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision].    Each year over the 1990s, about twenty to twenty-five thousand Nigerians emigrated; of them, about 7,000 entered the United States, while 5,000 entered the United Kingdom, and 1,500 entered Canada each year [International Organization for Migration, World Migration 2003:219].  In 2004, about 3,300 Nigerians received permanent resident visas to the U.S. via the Diversity Visa program (a lottery system), comprising 56% of total Nigerian immigrants in that year, and about 80% of Nigerian applications are refused [Krikorian, Mark (Center for Immigration Studies) (2005). http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/krikorian061505.pdf, p.2,3 of 6].  These data triangulate well with a survey in 2002, in which 64% of 1,000 Nigerians polled by the Pew Research Center believed that the United States’ policies lessened the gap between rich and poor countries, while only 10% of Canadians believed this; Nigerians believed this more than any of the other 42 nations surveyed, with Kenyans (41%) and Filipinos (39%) following [Pew 2002:Q65]

·         One in every 500 persons who were born in Nigeria now resides in one of the 30 high-income countries that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  Nigerians are the second-most highly educated class of immigrants in the OECD, and the highest-educated immigrant community in the United States.  As many Nigerians live in the U.S. as are employed in Nigeria’s oil industry. About 248,000 Nigerians were estimated to reside in OECD countries in 2000 [OECD 2004:148], or about 0.2% of Nigeria’s estimated 118 million inhabitants in the same year.  The OECD estimates that 55% of global Nigerian emigrés are “highly skilled”, i.e. possessing tertiary-level education, thus ranking them second-highest after the Taiwanese.  In the United States, 83% of the 109,000 Nigerian immigrants possess tertiary-level education, making them the most highly-educated immigrant group in the USA [Adams 2003:26].  Nigerians do offer a highly-educated migrant workforce, as the UNDP reports that Nigeria’s combined school enrolment rate surpasses all but two low human development countries, and indeed many medium human development countries such as India and Ghana [UNDP 2005:Table 1].  By contrast, one in 125 Ghanaians resides in the OECD, however their proportion possessing a university degree is much lower, only 34.0% [OECD 2005:148].  It is estimated that Nigeria’s oil industry employs about 100,000 persons [Guest 2004, The Shackled Continent: 191], while the roughly 30 indigenously-owned motor vehicle parts factories Nnewi, Anambra State, established beginning in the 1980s, through collaboration and technology transfer between networks of Taiwanese and Igbo capitalists, employ over 2,700 persons [Bräutigam 2004:462].

·         Migrants’ home remittances: Nigerians who have left their rural homes for work in Nigeria’s urban centres, and Nigerians who have emigrated overseas, are remitting about 8% of their earnings to family members and their home communities [Gowdy, Iorgolescu and Onyeiwu, 2004; Osili, 2004].  Proportionally, that’s about ten times more effective wealth redistribution than the UN Millennium Development Goals and Make Poverty History targets of 0.7% of high-income nations’ GNP allocated to official development assistance by 2015. Private transfers from the Nigerian diaspora amounted to $1.677 billion in 2003 [IMF 2004:141], compared to $317.6 million in official development assistance receipts, $1.23 billion in direct foreign investment, and outflows of $1.64 billion in loan repayments [UNDP 2005: Tables 14,19].  Nigerian expatriates’ remittances (about $6,000 per expatriate Nigerian) were equivalent to 2.9% of Nigeria’s gross domestic product of US$58.4 billion in 2003 [UNDP 2005:Table 14] and they have maintained this ratio since 1999 [IMF 2004:141].  By comparison, the average Canadian household contributed 21.6% of its 2004 expenditures to taxes, and 2.6% to gifts and other voluntary contributions [Statistics Canada (2004). Canadian Statistics: Average household expenditures, by province and territory, http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/famil16a.htm]. 

·         Expatriate Nigerians’ average remittances to their families and communities back home, $7,800 in 2000, exceeded Nigeria’s per capita GDP (PPP $) by a factor of 7.7, placing it well ahead of the ratio for Sudanese expatriates (7.5) and Ghana (1.5).  These data may go a long way to explaining the enormous immigration pressure experienced by young and un- or under-employed Nigerian university graduates [Adams 2003:22-24; OECD 2004:148-149].  Nigerian migrants’ high rates of home remittances may be supported by World Values Survey responses that showed that in 1990, 71%, and in 2000, 73% of Nigerians polled said that obedience is a quality that “children should be encouraged to learn at home” compared to only 28% and 30% of Canadians, respectively [World Values Survey: V236, A042]

·         Considering the sum of official development aid, foreign direct investment, and debt service, Nigeria is worse off than 24 other sub-Saharan African nations.  Expressed as a percentage of the country’s Gross Domestic Product in 2003, Nigeria’s ODA (0.5% of GDP), FDI (1.7% of GDP) and Debt Service (2.8% of GDP) translated into a net outflow of 0.6% of GDP.  By comparison, the same summations for 24 other sub-Saharan nations were all net inflows, ranging from 0.8% of GDP for Kenya, to 8.3% for Benin Republic, 17.9% for Tanzania, and 95.6% for the Democratic Republic of the Congo [UNDP 2005: Table 19].

·         Nigerians residing in Canada are collectively sending six times as much money back to Nigeria as the Canadian government is providing in official development aid.  Nigerian-Canadians are personally remitting an estimated US $60 million annually back home to Nigeria, compared to Canada’s official development assistance to Nigeria annual average of US $10.4 million during 2000-2004.  Although there appear to be no published remittance data specifically between Canada and Nigeria, assuming that the ca. 10,400 Nigerians living in Canada are remitting at the same rate as Nigerians in the United States, US $6,000 per household in the 1997 study by Osili [2004:821], or the US$6,881 per Nigerian living in the OECD [OECD 2004: 148-149], then we may estimate that approximately US $60 million (10,000 x US$6,000)  is being remitted by Nigerian-Canadians back home to their communities in Nigeria.  By comparison, Canada’s net level of Official Development Assistance to Nigeria averaged US$ 10.38 million between 2000 and 2004, or about 0.44% of Nigeria’s total aid receipts from OECD nations over these five years [SourceOECD: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows - Part I].

·         Income appears to improve life satisfaction significantly better than one’s level of educational attainment. For Nigerians, their income level increases perceptions of happiness and feelings of life satisfaction nearly twice as strongly as do levels of educational attainment. Going from the poorest third to the richest third of Nigerians, self-reported life satisfaction (a rating of 7 to 10 on a 10-point scale) increased by 26 percentage points, from 54% to 80%, but only increased by 13 percentage points for happiness, reported as "very happy" (from 61% to 74%). However, going from the least-educated to best-educated thirds of Nigerians, satisfaction increased only by 15 percentage points, from 57% to 72%, while those reporting themselves to be "very happy", the increase was only ten percentage points, from 62% to 72%. Thus, high income influences Nigerians’ satisfaction 73% more strongly than high educational attainment [World Values Survey: A108, A170].

·         Asking people to rate their overall life satisfaction could be a useful proxy for the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI).  When self-reported satisfaction is regressed against national aggregates of longevity, education, and income, forty-three per cent of the variation in responses in 2000 from persons in 66 nations to the question “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” was statistically correlated with the HDI for the same year [World Values Survey, 2000: Q. A008; UNDP, Human Development Report 2005, Table 2].

·         In low-income countries such as Nigeria where life expectancy is below 65 years, it would require a 30% increase in income, or about $310 to raise life expectancy (at birth) by one year.  But, to increase a Canadian’s life expectancy by one year would require a 63% increase in income, or an extra $19,300.  This is based on linear regression analysis of the plot of life expectancy at birth against per capita income (purchasing power parity) in 2003 [UNDP 2005: Tables 10,14].

·         Among the UNDP’s 32 “low human development” countries, Nigerians have the third-highest educational attainment, yet Nigeria has the fifth-highest level of income inequality among those 32.  In 2002/03, Nigeria’s combined school enrolment level was 64%, placing it third-highest (after Malawi and Lesotho) among the 32 “Low Human Development” nations as defined by the Human Development Index for 2003 [UNDP 2005:Table 1]; Nigeria’s enrolment ratio exceeds some “medium human development” nations including India (60%), Ghana (46%), Sudan (38%) and Zimbabwe (55%).  However, in 1996, the wealthiest one-fifth of Nigerians were responsible for 12.8 times more of the country’s total household expenditures, than the poorest fifth.  For the 25 low human development countries for which these data are available, Nigeria ranked fifth-most inequitable on this measure [UNDP 2005:Table 15]. 

·         On twelve attitudinal scales relating to democracy, work, and interpersonal trust, Nigerian Muslims and Nigerian Christians in 2000 were statistically indistinguishable by their survey responses.  However, the same survey data do show that Nigerian Christians express significantly higher respect for others, higher sexuality and gender role tolerance, and are more likely to encourage their children to practice determination and perseverance than Nigerian Muslims.  Conversely, Nigerian Muslims practice their faith more frequently than Nigerian Christians, and express lower belief in free choice.  These differences are reflected consistently across eight other African, Asian and European nations having both large Islamic and non-Islamic populations.  Nine countries, including Nigeria, with significant proportions of both Christian (or Hindu) and Muslim populations were compared across 18 attitudinal scales pertaining to work, interpersonal trust and respect, religiosity, gender roles and democratic participation.  Nigerian Muslims and Nigerian Christians showed no statistically different attitudes with respect to attitudes towards democratic institutions, work, thrift, or interpersonal trust, however there were statistically significant differences regarding the importance of religion in their lives (higher for Muslims), belief in free choice, perseverance, and tolerance for working women, abortion and prostitution (all higher for Christians) [Esmer 2004].

·         Materially deprived, yet indefatigably optimistic:  Fifty-eight percent of Nigerians reported being unable to afford food, health care or clothing at least once during 2001, compared to just 13% of Canadians [Pew 2002:Q87.a], yet 86% of Nigerians are optimistic about their futures [Pew 2002: Q2 & 4].  The 2005 Gallup International Voice of the People poll found a similar result for a survey of 500 Nigerians: 56% said “there were times in the last year when [they] did not have enough money to buy food”, while only 5% of Canadians made this claim [Gallup International 2005:4-5]. Statistics Canada reported that 15% of Canadians were “food-insecure” in 2000/01, defined broadly as worrying or actually having an insufficient quantity or quality of food to eat.  Nevertheless, more Nigerians profess to be “very happy” than in 80 other nations surveyed in 2000 (WVS 2000:A008), and Nigerians professed the third-highest level of “personal optimism” among 44 nations, after Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. [Pew 2002: Q2&4]

·         A university education determines Canadians’ support for global social justice twice as strongly as age or income level.  Voluntary membership in third world development or human rights organisations triples from 3.3%, for Canadians having completed secondary school, to 9.5% for university graduates.  Whether a Canadian is in the middle or high income group, they are twice as likely to belong to global justice organisations (6%) than those in the low income group, while being over the age of 30 doubles membership in these organisations.  Canadian university graduates are also 32% more likely to support increased economic aid to developing countries compared to secondary school graduates [World Values Survey 2000: A070, E129].

·         Research findings on individualism/collectivism orientations between Canadians and Nigerians are contradictory, but labelling Nigerians as more collectivist is probably an over-generalisation.  In a study in the early 1990s that exclusively compared Nigerian to Canadian university students, no overall differences were found along a standard psychological scale of individualism-collectivism.  However, the student subjects at the University of Jos were statistically more collectivist than their counterparts at McMaster University in Canada when relating to their spouse or neighbours, while Canadian students were more collectivist with parents, friends and co-workers.  Both cultures preferred negotiation first as a conflict resolution tactic, however Canadians preferred it statistically more strongly and Nigerians chose to resort to the use of threats more often (Gire & Carment, 1992).  A large 56-culture study done in the 1970s found that Canadians were far above the global average for individualist tendencies, while West Africans (mostly Nigerians) were far more collectivist than the 56-country-weighted mean [Hofstede, 2005].

·         Igbo Nigerian villagers demonstrate levels of fairness and social reciprocity similar to peoples in other “traditional” cultures in Africa, based on the Dictator and Ultimatum economic behaviour games [Gowdy 2003; Cardenas 2004].

·         Sharp socio-economic stratification of social trust is found among high-income countries, but not in low-income countries.  Income and education increased Canadians' perceptions of general societal trust and belief in fairness in both 1990 and 2000 by fifteen to twenty percentage points, but there were no significant inter-generational differences.   In the case of the United States, rising age also increased trust significantly.  Age, education, and income had no significant effect on Nigerians' or Indians' views of societal trust, however [WVS 1990: V94; WVS 2000: A165, A164; Putnam 2000: 140]. 

·         On average, university-educated Canadians operate on the presumption of trust and fairness, while university-educated Nigerians operate on the presumption of deceit.  39% of Canadians (54% for those with university degrees) believed in 2000 that “most people can be trusted”, compared with 26% of Nigerians (24% of university graduates), and a global average of 28% (36%, university graduates); for the two East African nations surveyed, trust is close to the bottom of the 61-country sample range, at 8%.  Canadians’ support for the statement “most people try to be fair” increased from 59% for those with primary education to 77% for university graduates (with a similar effect for income), however, for Nigerians, support for this assumption remained around 29% regardless of income or education level.  Overall, Nigerians’ “fairness” assumption, was two-thirds of the global mean of 43%, while overall Canadian support was 67%.  [WVS 2000: A165, A168].

·         Nigerian business managers see a very large gap between existing behaviour and desired behaviour, much larger than for other countries.  The GLOBE survey data are particularly interesting in that they represent Nigerian business managers as recognizing that they would like to be much more humane, more institutionally-collective, less assertive, more future-oriented, and more performance-oriented, yet the gap in existing practice and desired behaviour is great indeed.  This confirms that Nigerian managers recognize they are quite different in behavioural orientation, but it offers no explanations. [GLOBE 1997].

·         Nigerians and Canadians differ most acutely in their attitudes towards gender roles and sexuality.  An analysis of survey differences across 14 broad thematic categories in the 2000 World Values Surveys revealed that for twelve categories including religion, work, ecology and health, aggregate opinions were not significantly different, i.e., large differences (over 50% of the country range) in individual questions were cancelled out a nearly equal number of questions with close agreement (under 15% of response range).  Only with respect to questions concerning gender roles and sexuality did Canadians’ responses differ by 20% across the country range, while in the area of government and politics, the two countries’ opinions were 11% more likely to agree within 15% of range as opposed to differ by more than 50% of range.  Analysis of the 2002 Pew survey data corroborated the latter result, but not the former, but this is partly due to differences in the construction of the survey instrument content; the Pew results showed large value differences with respect to perceptions of life (crime, determinants of individual success, personal optimism).

·         Rose-tinted futures.  Nigerians persistently express higher levels of optimism for themselves and their families - faith in a better future - than most other nationalities.  On two independently-conducted social surveys in 2000 and 2002, Nigerians’ overall life satisfaction placed about 20 to 40 percentage points above countries with similar “human development indexes” such as Ghana, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Bangladesh and Pakistan [UNDP 2000; WVS 2000: A170; Pew 2002:Q2].  Similarly, Canadians place higher on life satisfaction in both surveys than is predicted by the statistical linear regression.

·         73% of Nigerians and 81% of Canadians believe that corruption “moderately” or “largely” affects political life in their country [Transparency International 2005: Q.1.1]; 7% of Canadians and 48% of Nigerians believed that their respective customs officers were “extremely corrupt” [TI 2005: Q4.1].  Given that the Corruptions Perception Index is largely contingent on the views of Western business people attempting to negotiate trade borders, the CPI does not accurately depict domestic levels of corruption.

 

INTRODUCTION

 

 

The compiler of this review is a Canadian who worked in Nigeria a total of four years, two during the 1980s and two in the 2000s.  Both times, my work was in the area of “social development” and both were of a “volunteer” nature, i.e. relatively low salary and living arrangements analogous to a Nigerian’s.  I am especially interested in how empirical (quantitative and semi-quantitative) indexes of social and material well-being (or deprivation) can inform our understanding of global social justice and its obverse, inequality and oppression.  I wish here to gather social and attitudinal data that compares both similarities and differences in a non-judgemental way between two population groups from nearly opposite poles of the human development spectrum, Nigerians and Canadians.

 

This approach resonates with some of the ideas of the anthropologist James Ferguson, who has studied the relationship between Southern African and high-income nations since the 1980s.  Ferguson has tried to overcome some of the traditional anthropological practices of “grounded” “fieldwork” that he regards as, perhaps unintentionally serving the same barriers to our understanding of absolute global inequality as economic technocrats:

 

[T]he familiar anthropological claim that “they have their own culture” carries something of the same effect in cultural analysis as the development planner’s claim that “they have their own economy” does in economic analysis – namely, the closing off from view of those connections and relations that would allow for a very different analysis… It problematizes the “givens” and demands an accounting of why cultures are “different,” “exotic,” “isolated,” or what have you, and how they got to be that way.  [Ferguson 2006:68].

 

There is ample recent evidence that cultural misunderstandings, however innocuously initiated, can become sparks, lighting conflagrations of intense emotions and even acts of violence. Canadian condemnation of events in Nigeria's recent history attests to that: positively when Canada urged the Commonwealth to ostracise the military regime of General Sani Abacha, and quite adversely when Canadians criticised the imposition of Shari’a law in some Nigerian states.

 

Many have noted that, on a continent where, until recently, individual opinions have been long suppressed, Nigerians are the first to criticise their own society and government; even during the repressive military regime under Babangida and Abacha, their newspapers were quite outspoken, despite assassinations of journalists like Dele Giwa. But when an outsider states an opinion about Nigeria, it can have quite serious consequences. I can think of two recent examples. In 2002, Muslim clerics objected to the Miss World pageant being held in Nigeria. A British-born 22-year-old journalist of Nigerian parentage, Isioma (Issy) Daniel, commented in an article in the Lagos-based newspaper ThisDay "[w]hat would Mohammed think? In all honesty, he would probably have chosen a wife from one of them." This led to denouncement by Muslim clerics, the razing of the ThisDay offices in Kaduna, 200 deaths resulting from religious rioting in Kaduna and Abuja, and a quick change in venue for the pageant from Abuja to London. Ms Daniel was exiled in Europe following a fatwah placed on her in Nigeria by the Zamfara State Deputy Governor according to a report in the Globe and Mail (Toronto, Canada) by the Nigerian-Canadian, Ken Wiwa. In March 2003, the Globe and Mail ran an exclusive interview with the now fatwahed and exiled-in-Europe, 22-year-old, female journalist, Issy Daniel, whose casual statements instigated the 2002 Miss World pageant riots in Nigeria. This sentence from her interview may sum up the tone:  "If you're going to be working in a country like Nigeria," she said, "it's best to just accept the country the way it is."  The fatwa keeping her hiding, she stated: "The question in my mind at the moment," she said, "is whether I'll be able to have a full and successful life."  Knox, Paul (2003). "Issy Daniel, whose words sparked days of murder, mayhem in Nigeria."  [Globe & Mail (Toronto, Canada), March 8, 2003]

 

In February 2002, Jeff Koinange, a Kenyan-American CNN news correspondent interviewed Lagosians during the ethnic violence in Mushin and Idi-Araba and then filed a story on CNN television claiming that "Nigerians are tired of democracy and now want the military back...Soldiers have taken over the streets of Lagos and the people are happy because they believe that only soldiers can ensure security." Outraged by such a claim that could undermine the democratisation process after 15 years of military rule, Nigeria's federal information minister Jerry Gana telephoned CNN in New York requesting that Mr Koinange be withdrawn from his post in Nigeria.

 

The Canadian political scientist Rhoda Howard-Hassmann has carried an extended analysis of recent Canadian-Nigerian "cultural dissonance" within the public sphere with respect to the post-1999 imposition of Shari’a law in some northern Nigerian states, and its perceived curtailment of women’s rights by many Canadians:

 

Howard-Hassmann, Rhoda E.  [Global Studies Program, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario) (2004). "The flogging of Bariya Magazu: Nigerian politics, Canadian pressures, and women's and children's rights," Journal of Human Rights, (March 2004) 3(1): 3 -20.

Excerpts (McMaster University, Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition, Working Paper 02/5) http://anscombe.mcmaster.ca/global1/servlet/Xml2pdf?fn=RA_Hassmann_Magazu ]

 

p. 3: Canadian members of the public and of Amnesty International sent many letters. As Nolen herself noted, even "grannies from Moose Jaw [Saskatchewan]" were caught up in this story, and Amnesty International received many letters from individuals who were not the type of people who normally wrote to it. The congregation of the First United Church of Ladysmith, British Columbia, even offered to sponsor her for immigration to Canada, angering a Nigerian diplomat who argued that his country was perfectly capable of taking care of its own children."

p. 3: The early flogging of Bariya Magazu may have been in response to outside interference and pressure to overturn her sentence. Resentment of Canadians’ interference may have pushed the authorities of Zamfara to take more precipitate action than they might have taken, had their only criticism come from fellow Muslims or fellow Nigerians.

The constant reporting in Canada of Bariya’s sentence as if "Sharia" or "Muslim" law is a monolithic, inherently cruel form of law did not contribute to cultural understanding. Ordinary readers of the Globe and Mail and other sources were under the impression that Bariya Magazu had no recourse under Muslim law. They were not informed, for example, that under Zamfara’s own legal code her sentence could have been reduced to 20 strokes, rather than 100, because she was under 18 (Imam 2001).   Nor were they aware that Quranic law had been violated, in so far as there were no witnesses to her alleged act of zina, and other rules of evidence had not been followed. As reported in Canada, the case of Bariya Magazu may well have reinforced pre-existent anti-Muslim stereotypes. Muslims in Canada and in Nigeria were told by the Globe and Mail that their legal system was backward and barbaric. (“Barbarity in Nigeria”, 2001)

These Canadian misunderstandings of Islamic law may well have contributed to resentment of the West in the Muslim world. As one Muslim Canadian put it, “Telling Muslims that they should not apply Sharia is neither a wise step, nor a productive one.” (Khan, S., 2001)

p.14: None of the above analysis means, therefore, that Canadians or other Westerners, or indeed liberal, secular, or non-Muslim Africans interested in human rights, should stop doing what they are doing. Owens Wiwa, brother of the hanged Nigerian playwright Ken Saro-Wiwa and a resident of Toronto, gave it as his view that Canadian diplomatic intervention would assist indigenous human rights groups: “it will surely start the process of getting human-rights groups in Nigeria and internationally to pay more attention to what’s happening”, he was quoted as saying. (MacKinnon, 2001, p. 1) Social values do change, in Northern Nigeria as anywhere else. Values change in part because individuals encounter ideas. Whether literate or not, whether living in freedom or living in fear, individuals have the capacity to think. And individuals who suffer take heart from knowing that others care about them, even others far away whom they have never met.

Bariya Magazu herself may not have been able to express her pain and humiliation at being flogged, or may have been sufficiently intimidated not to express it. Or, she may have accepted the punishment as in some manner just, despite her early protestations that she had been raped. But perhaps she did draw heart from knowing that some people in faraway Canada worried about her, so much so that representatives of their government spoke to representatives of her government.

 

 

 

Many observers have found that there is something really unique about Nigerians among African people, and these include Nigerians who have just left their country:

 

Hunt, J.Timothy (2005). The Politics of Bones: Dr. Owens Wiwa and the Struggle for Nigeria's Oil, Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.

 

Owens Wiwa, born in 1957 and junior brother to Ogoni human rights and environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, fled from Nigeria with his family into the Benin Republic on 13 November, 1995, three days after his brother and eight other Ogoni men were hanged extrajudicially under the Nigerian military regime.  It was Owens's first time outside of Nigeria.  Arriving in the Benin capital of Cotonou, the Canadian journalist Timothy Hunt describes Owens's first impressions:

 

p. 281: "After the crackpot chaos of Lagos, Owens found Cotonou's orderliness inexpressibly foreign."

 

This may relate to the legacy of British indirect rule in Africa, or "hegemony on a shoestring" that attempted to graft a skeletal British system onto the existing indigenous infrastructure of traditional rulers.

 

The Canadian Robert Calderisi worked for 26 years in international development, including two years with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in Tanzania (1976-78) and three years in Côte d'Ivoire with the World Bank (1991-94).  In his memoir and analysis of the West’s developmental failures, after recounting several personal anecdotes of “Africans” preying on Western guilty consciences in which he encountered illegal poaching of endangered species that locals were otherwise accepting Western donations to protect, he concludes [Calderisi 2006:1971]:

 

p. 178; 179: "Unfortunately, international good will and imaginative arrangements like the Chad-Cameroon pipeline wil not help Africa as long as Westerners and African governments disagree on what is important.  This clash of values takes many forms… If parrots and turtles can illustrate opposing Western and African values, the indifference of governments to broader issues of poverty and democracy is even more graphic.  In fact, poverty in Africa is more of a Western issue than an African one.  Most African governments consider poverty to be as natural as the wind or the rain, rather than something they can do anything about. "

 

 

Of course, the construction of stereotypes and false assumptions isn’t limited to a single set of players.  If the praxis of social transformation and social justice is about attitudinal and behavioural modification, it behooves us in cooperating societies in the north and south to carefully gather and interpret empirically the dynamics of cultural value changes.  This will move us beyond the rubric of cultural imperialism that may be expressed in the federal government’s Speech from the Throne to the Canadian Parliament in October 2004:

 

Poverty, despair and violence are usually rooted in failed institutions of basic governance and rule of law. This is where Canada, with its commitment to pluralism and human rights, can make a unique contribution. That is why the Government is establishing the Canada Corps. Its mandate is first, to put our idealism to work by helping young Canadians bring their enthusiasm and energy to the world; second, to bring our skills and ideas to bear by ensuring that experts of all ages and backgrounds – for example, in governance, health, economics, human rights – can get to the places in the world that need them; and third, to coordinate the efforts of government and to work with civil society. The Canada Corps will bring the best of Canadian values and experience to the world. (p. 14)

 

 

What is needed is some empirical understanding, a topographical mapping  of where value differences lie, and how large they are, between the multitude of communities involved in “social justice”, and that is the overarching theme of this paper.  Today, terms like “modernity”, “development”, or “global rights” cannot be universally and narrowly defined in Euroamerican terms, as the Congolese-American philosopher has eloquently demonstrated:

Mudimbe, V.Y. (1988). The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.

p.72-73 : "Evolutionism, functionalism, diffusionism -- whatever the method, all repress otherness in the name of sameness, reduce the different to the already known, and thus fundamentally escape the task of making sense of other worlds."

 

There is considerable evidence that cultural values are quite resilient over time, i.e. independent of other political and economic changes.  Robert J. House, principal investigator for the GLOBE study that is presented in this paper, writes (House 2004:54):

 

p.54:  “Studies in many geographic regions show consistent results between earlier and subsequent studies even though as many as 20 years may have elapsed between the time the two studies were conducted.  Hofstede’s rankings of counries by cultural dimensions, which are based on data collected between 1967 and 1973, have been replicated by several studies of selected countries in the lates 1980s and 1990s [Hoppe, M. (1993). “The effects of national cultural on the theory and practice of managing R&D professionals abroad,” R&D Management 23(4):313-325].  What little evidence exists suggest that change in fundamental cultural values such as those studied by Hofstede [Culture’s Consequences: International differences in work-related values Beverley Hills: Sage, 1980] appear to be very slow and likely quite resistant to convergence forces [Hoftede, G. 2001 Culture’s Consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage].

 

So-called etic values are judged to be universal, i.e., culture-free and scientifically measurable, while emic values are culture-specific, reflecting culturally-defined explanations of truth.

 

There is evidence elsewhere that self-reported conditions of deprivation of basic human needs have not changed significantly over the last three decades.  In 1974-76, the polling firm Gallup International conducted their first “Global Survey” of human needs and satisfactions.  Out of 9,072 survey respondents in 57 nations, they included 377 Nigerians, 105 Tanzanians and 82 South Africans, along with other sub-Saharan Africans, and reported their responses only in aggregate form as 914 sub-Saharan Africans; 1,032 Canadians were also included [Gallup International, 1977:69].  To the question “[h]ave there been times during the last year when you did not have money enough to buy food your family needed?”, 71% of sub-Saharan Africans responded “yes”, compared to 6% of Canadians.  Subsequent Gallup global polls have repeated this question, most recently in 2005, at which time 56% of Nigerians replied “yes”, compared to 5% of Canadians [Gallup 2005:4,5].  A separate poll conducted by the Pew Global Trust in 2002 found that 10% of Canadians and 56% of Nigerians reported inability at least once in the last year to afford food [Pew 2002:Q.87a].  However, there appear to be discrepancies in sampling methodology, or statistical validity, given that the variation in Ghanaian and Kenyan responses between the Pew 2002 and Gallup 2005 surveys differ widely by 33 and 17 percentage points, respectively!  Only the Nigerian and Canadian responses were similar.

 

Have there been times in the last year when you did not have enough money to afford…

Food

Clothing

Medical expenses, health care

Gallup, 1974-1976 (1)

Canada

6%

12%

4%

Sub-Saharan Africa

(41% of whom, Nigerians)

71%

81%

57%

Pew, 2002 (2)

Canada

10%

16%

13%

Nigeria

56%

60%

58%

Ghana

65%

66%

71%

Kenya

56%

56%

67%

Gallup, 2005 (3)

Canada

10%

n/a

n/a

Nigeria

56%

n/a

n/a

Ghana

32%

n/a

n/a

Kenya

39%

n/a

n/a

Afrobarometer (4)

Nigeria: 2000

41%

n/a

36%

Nigeria: 2001

49%

n/a

69%

 

Sources                                   

(1) Gallup International (1978). Human Needs and Satisfactions: A Global Survey, [s.l.]: Gallup International Research Institutes.  Q.40A.             

(2) Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2002). 2002 Global Attitudes Survey, Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center. Q.87.  http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/165topline.pdf              

(3) Gallup International (2005). Voice of the People 2005: Survey Results, Hunger and Poverty, Accessed 2006.IV.13 from http://www.voice-of-the-people.net/ContentFiles/files/VoP2005/Hunger%20&%20Poverty%20VoP%202005.pdf

(4) Lewis, Peter; Alemika, Etannibi; Bratton, Michael (2002).  “Down To Earth: Changes In Attitudes Toward Democracy And Markets In Nigeria,” Afrobarometer Paper No. 20, Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in South Africa.  http://www.afrobarometer.org/papers/AfropaperNo20.pdf   The authors caution that 2001 sample included a "greater proportion of small villages and remote settlements" than the 2000 sample (p.28, Note 14).

                         

Afrobarometer, a consortium of The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), and Michigan State University (MSU), Department of Political Science, has conducted two broad attitudinal surveys in Nigeria, in 2000, and 2001, and the results in the above table concur within ten percentage points of the American-based Pew and Gallup poll results.

 

There is at least some evidence to support stasis in Nigerian household budgets.  The anthropologist Jane Guyer surveyed Yoruba farmers in Idere, Nigeria in 1968 and again in 1988, and found that “[i]n general, the proportion of total money expenditure devoted to just living, to consumption in the narrowest sense, has stayed almost exactly the same over this twenty-year period.  Change in the asset/debt/investment domain is almost entirely accounted for by a shift from ceremonial and gift conversions to investment in production” and that “[t]he real value of their money incomes from farming had risen by about 25 percent over the twenty-year period as a result of the complex of influences exerted by market integration” [Guyer 2004:123].  She found there was a dual shift in budgeting over these two decades: a decrease in life-cycle ceremonial contributions (funerals, marriage, apprenticeship freedom ceremonies) and an increase in agricultural expenses, and that rites of passage had become “streamlined”, occurring only on the weekends, while the bulk of the financial burden came to rest on the central celebrant.

 

Farming household budgets, Idere, Nigeria

 

Percentage of Expenditure

 

1969

1988

Living expenses, Total

28%

34%

Food, household items

13%

21%

Clothes

9%

2%

Medical

1%

5%

Travel

2%

5%

Other

3%

1%

Lifetime assets, Total

18%

11%

Building

10%

1%

Schooling

8%

10%

Social membership, Total

48%

17%

Ceremonies/gifts

35%

11%

Associations

5%

3%

Credit associatoins

8%

3%

Production, Total

6%

38%

Farm inputs

2%

1%

Hired labour (cash)

4%

3%

Hired labour (debt)

0%

23%

Tractor hire

n/a

11%

 

Source: Guyer, Jane I. (2004). Marginal Gains: Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Table 7.1.

 

Recently the economist Brank Milanovic has published global income inequality data for the period from 1820 to 2000; when weighting between-country by their populations, income inequality increased from a Gini index of 12.0 in 1820 (very low inequality) to 30.8 in 1890 to 54.3 in 2000.  However, when within-country inequality is also taken into consideration, the trend flattened in the twentieth century, from 50.0 in 1820 to 58.8 in 1890 to 61.0 in 2000 (Milanovic 2005:143).  These data suggest that inequality of income between humans has not really changed significantly at all over the last one hundred years.

 

Nigerian Views on Cultural Change

 

Civil society groups have the capability of influencing popular opinion, and thereby, effecting political change.  Perhaps the most successful example of this is Western Europe’s late eighteenth slavery abolitionist movement in which, over the course of one generation, discontinued a practice which had been carried on for probably tens of millennia.  It was accomplished via a campaign of widespread public meetings, lectures, boycotts, petition-signing, and general information dissemination [Stearns 2005: 28-30].

 

 

The following extracts suggest that intergenerational shifts in Nigerian attitudes may in fact be changing rapidly.

 

Ibhawoh, Bonny (2000). “Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights in the African State,” Human Rights Quarterly 22:838-860.

 

Ibhawoh is a Nigerian from Edo State who obtained his Ph.D. on the history of Nigerian human rights at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Canada; he is now on the history faculty at Brock University, also in Canada.

 

p. 849-850  “Social anthropologists have long identified the ambivalence of cultural norms and their susceptibility to different interpretation as one of the defining features of culture.  Typically, dominant groups or classes within a society seek to maintain perceptions and interpretations of cultural values and norms that are supportive of their own interests, proclaiming them to be the only valid view of that culture.  Such powerful groups and individuals tend to monopolize the interpretations of cultural norms and manipulate them to their advantage.  In contrast, dominated groups or classes may hold, or at least be open to, different perceptions and interpretations that are helpful to their struggle for control for justice and improvements for themselves.  This type of internal struggle for control over cultural sources and symbols can be said to underline the contemporary discourse on the cultural legitimacy of human rights in Africa.”

 

p. 850 “On the one hand, there are the male-dominated, urban-based elites whose perception of ‘cultural legitimacy’ focuses on the idealized African traditions of collectivism, definitive gender roles, and conservative male dominance and interpretation of moral values… I will call this the ‘conservative paradigm’ of cultural legitimacy… On the other hand, there are emerging and increasingly vocal groups, represented mainly by women groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working for women and minority rights… they use the global human rights debate in criticizing present cultural practices which infringe human rights… the ‘dynamic paradigm’ of cultural legitimacy.”

 

p. 854 “[A]t the core of this apparent conflict between the paradigms of cultural legitimacy is the fact that the realities of present day African societies, particularly in the urban areas, are characterized by destabilization and breakdown (without effective alternatives) of traditional models of rights and support in the family… The dilemma of the African state today is that the community and extended family are no longer able to play their social welfare roles, while the state is not yet able to replace them in doing this.  Put differently, cultures are no longer able and constitutions are not yet able.”  [Emphasis added]

 

 

 

 

http://www.codesria.org/Links/Publications/ad3_004/faniran%20_adeboyejo.pdf

Adetoye Faniran (University of Ibadan) and Thompson Adeboyejo (Ladoke Akintola University of Technology, Ogbomoso).

 “The Challenge of the Participatory Approach to Rural Poverty Alleviation: The Example of Olugbena Group of Villages, Ewekoro, Ogun State, Nigeria,”

Africa Development/Afrique et Développement Vol. XXIX, No. 3, 2004, p.58-69.

 

Abstract

This paper draws from the experiences of a Non-Governmental Organisation, Man and Nature Study/Action Centre (MANASC)—concerning a rural development project being undertaken in Olugbena, a group of six villages in Ewekoro Local Government of Ogun State, Nigeria—to highlight the challenges of participatory rural development in Africa. The project part, funded by the Australian High Commission in Nigeria under its Direct Aid Scheme, comprises a component of a much broader development plan for the area as contained in a pre-feasibility report undertaken in 1995 by MANASC for the National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA), a Parastatal of the Federal Ministry of Health. It is observed that one of the challenges for rural development facilitators, policy makers and practitioners, revolves around appropriate strategies for managing unpredictability, especially those that reduce the unknown elements to acceptable levels and impose the minimum of appropriate structures.

 

p. 81 (Conclusion): “One possible explanation of the negative attitude of the people to participatory development is the apparent breakdown of the communal spirit and tradition under the combined onslaught of ‘modernisation’ and capitalism. Individualism and personal gain have replaced communalism and community interest respectively in the urbanised forest communities… The interest among the people is how much money they can obtain quickly from it; any project that will not provide it is not relevant to the people’s life.”   (italics added)

 

 

 
 

While 10,425 Nigerians resided in Canada in 2000, of whom 4,545 arrived between 1996 and 2001, and 1,575 were temporary residents [2001 Census, Immigrant Status and Period of Immigration (10A) and Place of Birth of Respondent (260)] and although the Canadian presence in Nigeria is relatively small – about 1,200 citizens in 1999, according to an interview with then-Canadian High Commissioner Ian Ferguson [Huang 1999]  - Canada's moral support for human rights there has been long and sustained. After having supervised the construction of railways in the Sudan and South Africa, the Montreal-born military engineer Sir Percy Girouard was appointed in 1907 by Winston Churchill, then Britain’s Under-Secretary for State for the colonies, to oversee the construction of Nigeria’s railway system and succeeded Lord Lugard as High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief; he spent two years as Governor of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, during which time he oversaw the location and reconnaissance surveys of 350 miles of rail track from Baro on the Niger River to Kano, initiated with the emirs a secular system of education, established “telegraph conversations” with the provincial Residents of each province, and recommended to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of Crewe,  a reform of land tenure and revenue assessment that would be more equitable for native administrators [Orr 1911; Stuart 1999].  The Canadian Stephen Lewis, presently UN Special Envoy on AIDS in Africa, did a six-month volunteer teaching stint in the Eastern Region of Nigeria, in 1961, shortly before the Canadian University Service Overseas posted its first contingent of Canadian volunteers in the country in 1962 [Lewis 2005:42]; since that time, around 1,200 Canadians have been posted by CUSO to Nigeria, nearly one-tenth of all CUSO postings worldwide [derived from CUSO RV Database].  During the Ogoni protest over Royal Dutch/Shell occupation of their land in the 1990s, former Canadian foreign minister and then-head of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Flora MacDonald and Acting Canadian High Commissioner to Nigeria, Gerald Ohlsen, were among the first foreign diplomats to visit Ogoniland while on a fact-finding tour in 1994.  They viewed the Kaa Waterside village which had, in 1993, experienced severe destruction and loss of life, reportedly at the hands of the Nigerian military; the Canadian government helped in rebuilding Kaa Village.  Following the extrajudicial killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa in November 1995, Ken’s brother and strong ally, Owens, fled undercover with his family into Ghana.  Despite initially being denied refugee passage by the Canadian High Commission there, Owens was granted temporary haven in Britain.  At Canada’s initiative, the Commonwealth Heads of Government voted to suspend Nigeria from the Commonwealth, based upon the abrogation of the 1993 elections, and the hanging of Saro-Wiwa.  Following meetings with Canada’s foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, and Greenpeace Canada during a speaking tour in early 1996, Bloor Street United Church and Interchurch Action in Toronto sponsored the family of Ken Saro-Wiwa's brother, Owens, to settle as political refugees in Canada in 1996 [Hunt 2005: 217-19,309-12].  Two Nigerian human rights scholars, Bonny Ibhawoh and Obiora Chinedu Okafor, received their doctoral degrees in Canada in the late 1990s, and are now on the faculty of Canadian universities.  Since the 1990s, CUSO’s involvement in Nigeria has been principally via collaboration with indigenous grassroots non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in the areas of democracy building, inclusive governance, women’s empowerment, human rights, and sustainable forestry.

 

BACKGROUND

 

The 21st-century’s “Scramble for Africa” is currently on indefinite hold.  When it comes to Africa’s “failings” to develop economically as rapidly as India and China have in the last decade and a half, the usual moth-eaten excuses are trotted out from the Washington Consensus:  bad governance, corruption, the end of the Cold War, political and conflict instability that is too risky for foreign investors…  As the IMF puts it “[c]orruption, the poor state of basic infrastructure, and weak institutions remain the major deterrents to investment, sustainable growth, and improvements in social welfare” [IMF, Nigeria. 2005 Article IV Consultation Concluding Statement, March 25, 2005]. More recently the impact of extrinsic variables including unfavorable trade barriers and intrinsic ones such as Africa’s unique geography (a large land mass with very little coastline; a disease-ridden tropical climate) have come to the fore, notably from the biologist Jared Diamond (Guns, Germs and Steel) and the economist Jeffrey Sachs, Special Advisor to Kofi Annan on the UN Millennium Development Goals.  It was Adam Smith who got the ball rolling on the geography affliction thesis over two centuries ago:

 

‘There are in Africa none of those great inlets, the Baltic and Adriatic Seas in Europe, the Mediterranean and Euxine [Black] seas in both Europe and Asia, and the gulphs of Arabia, Persia, India, Bengal and Siam in Asia to carry maritime commerce into the interior parts of that great continent: and the great rivers of Africa are too great a distance from one another to give occasion to any considerable inland navigation.’ [Adam Smith (1776) An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Chapter 3, final paragraph].

 

 

 

Grassroots development workers are conscious of the fundamental need in their work for making attitudinal (and, ultimately behavioural) changes in stakeholders in both the North and the South [Fowler 1997].  Are the practices of development and social justice, fundamentally, about behaviour modification, transforming people into the Global Economic Order, expanding opportunities in people’s lives, and changing ways of thinking one brain at a time?  If so, how can cultural values transmitted from one generation to the next impede or encourage development?  In the trajectory of world development, did Nigeria get the short end of the stick, and how do they barely manage to cope with the “sheer impossibility of their lives” (David Hecht and Maliqalim Simone, Invisible Governance: The Art of African Micropolitics Autonomedia, 1994)?  Recent archaeological evidence shows that people have been farming in the region now called Nigeria for at least four thousand years [“Four thousand years of plant exploitation in the Lake Chad Basin (Nigeria), part III: plant impressions in potsherds from the Final Stone Age Gajiganna Culture,” Klee, M.; Zach, B.; Stika, H.-P.  Vegetation History and Archaeobotany, 2004 , vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 131-142].  It’s really only in the last 250 years that gross inter-continental divergences in human well-being (material possessions, health-related quality of life, formal education) have arisen.

 

The “happy natives” pre-colonial paradise fallacy has been debunked by many including John Reader’s extensive review in which he asserts that, owing to “unpredictable climatic conditions, arduous envionrmental circumstances, and endemic disease that restrained population growth”,  “[t]he poor, whom the Merrie Africa scenario presumes never to have existed in pre-colonial Africa, were a conspicuous feature of African society when the Portuguese established Europe’s first direct contacts with Africa in the early 1500s [Reader 1997:313,314], and more recently by Daniel Jordan Smith, a social anthropologist at Brown University in Rhode Island.  Brown happens to be married to an Igbo woman whom he first met while working for an international NGO in Nigeria in the early 1990s.  In a recent article he expresses from his personal experience the Igbo villagers’ ardent aspirations for improvements in their lives to flow from their familial affiliations to those who have moved to Nigerian cities and abroad:

 

‘The reality of Nigeria’s current political economy is that few rural Igbo families and communities can make a decent living simply from farming.  Further, formal education, exposure to global media, and ordinary people’s almost every-day contact with Nigeria’s elite have raised expectations and ambitions well beyond subsistence.  Access to modern opportunities and resources like higher education, urban employment, business contracts, international migration, and development services depends on having patrons laced across the social landscape.  In this context, rural-urban migrants become important potential patrons.’ [Smith, 2004]

 

 

            Modernisation theory may not necessarily imply the wholesale forfeit of traditional values for Euro-American ones – values which have evolved gradually over the past two centuries of industrialisation, urbanisation et cet.  Some have suggested that, out of calculated self-interest, citizens and governments in the south may conform in behavior to expectations in the north in order to serve their own interests (Windsor, Duane; Getz, Kathleen A. (2000). “Multilateral Cooperation to Combat Corruption: Normative Regimes Despite Mixed Motives and Diverse Values”, Cornell International Law Journal 33(3):731-772).  Hence, the goal may be functional equivalence, as opposed to “brain-washing” or “ethical laundering”.  The analysis of recent attitudinal surveys may help us to identify signs of any value/behavioural convergence between North and South.

 

Disorienting, Dis-occidenting, Diss Africa-ning

 

Postcolonialism guru Edward Said wrote of the cognitive dissonance that Joseph Conrad's narrator, Marlow in Heart of Darkness, (and indeed Conrad himself) encountered in the Belgian Congo during the 1890s (Culture and Imperialism. New York: Knopf, 1993, p. 29):

 

Yet the whole point of what Kurtz and Marlow talk about is in fact imperial mastery, white European over black Africans, and their ivory, civilization over the primitive dark continent.  By accentuating the discrepancy between the official “idea” of empire and the remarkably disorienting actuality of Africa, Marlow unsettles the reader’s sense not only of the very idea of empire, but of something more basic, reality itself.  For if Conrad can show that all human activity depends on controlling a radically unstable reality to which would approximate only by will or convention, the same is true of empire, of venerating the idea, and so forth.  [Italics added]

 

Eight decades after Conrad, the Ghanaian writer Ama Ata Aidoo related her reverse voyage into Europe’s heart of darkness in her novel Our Sister Killjoy or Reflections from a Black-Eyed Squint.  As Sissy, the young Ghanaian student arriving on scholarship from Accra in Frankfurt, she hears a woman say to her daughter Ja das Schwartze Mädchen and reacts this way (Aidoo 1977:12) -

 

She was somewhat puzzled.

Black girl?  Black girl?

So she looked around her really well this time.

And it hit her.  That all the crowd of people going and coming in all sorts of directions had the colour of the pickled pig parts that used to come from foreign places to the markets at home.

Trotters, pig-tails, pig-ears.

She looked and looked at so many of such skins together.

And she wanted to vomit.

Then she was ashamed of her reaction.

Something pulled inside her.

For the rest of her life, she was to regret this moment when she was made to notice differences in human colouring.

 

 

In antidote to Conrad’s character navigating his steamship up the treacherously uncharted waters to Stanleyville, Aidoo’s character Sissie was profoundly disoccidented among these colour-conscious Germans [Hildegard Hoeller “Ama Ata Aidoo's Heart of Darkness,” Research in African Literatures, Spring 2004, 35(1):130]. 

 

So, how much has the values chasm filled or deepened in the intervening quarter of a century?  Do high income countries’ residents and Africans' worldviews, their articulations of being, their ways of thinking about their lives still oppose each other as starkly as the colours white and black?  The short answer seems to be “yes”, but then, Nigeria’s annual change in per capita GDP and life expectancy hasn’t changed at all over the 1990s. 

 

Negative impressions of sub-Saharan Africa are remarkably persistent in the mainstream Western media.  Long-time Africanist Sandra T. Barnes concludes that owing to a willful vacuum, “Afropessimism is rampant… we are conditioned to accept the worst” [Barnes 2005: 248].  Robert Guest, a correspondent for Africa for the influential pro-capitalist public opinion-maker, the Economist maintains a tone in his recent book typical of “Afropessimism” journalism since 1990:

 

“The reason that [Western journalists] report that Africa is plagued by war, famine, and pestilence is that Africa is plagued by war, famine and pestilence.  They will stop reporting this when it stops being true.  Of course there is much that is good going on in Africa, and some news organizations go out of their way to report it.  CNN regales viewers of Inside Africa with plenty of upbeat stories, and BBC World devotes a regular slot to African business.  But these are not the stories that people remember… I could be wrong, but I suspect that you, too, recall the ghastly images of Ethiopia’s famine of 1984 more sharply than you can recall the last article you read on microcredit” [Guest 2004:254-255].

 

 

Can an attitudinal poll of the citizens of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, with her fabled 283 different languages and geographic diversity from steamy mangrove swamp to arid Sahel even come close to being nationally representative?

 

How can the 2000 "World Values Survey" declare that Nigerians’ subjective well-being (“"taking all things together, would you say you are very happy, quite happy, not very happy, or not at all happy" ) is the highest globally?   When their country ranked 151st out of 177 nations on the UNDP's 2004 "Human Development Index", with a value of 0.466 out of a range from 0.273 (Sierra Leone) up to 0.956 (Norway) that is just 29% of the range.  Does it all have to do with disparities in personal and state monetary wealth, or are there subtler factors at work?  Can these differences in values, and how they have changed over time inform the work of expatriate-based international development agencies collaborating with Nigerian groups for social change?  Is “social development” all about changing people’s values, behavioural modification, social re-engineering… so that the Southern “partners” become more like individualistic, self-maximising Westerners?

 

If, as a page on the Canadian Trade Commissioner website suggests, there is “physical and psychological distance” between Nigeria and Canada that presents a “challenge” and “problems” for Canada’s export of tangible goods to Nigeria, is there also a “challenge” for Canadians working as social change agents with NGOs in Nigeria?

 

 

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLLING/SURVEY DATA

 

International Surveys

http://einstein.library.emory.edu/courses/ps309_S05.html

 

Afrobarometer

http://www.afrobarometer.org/
The Afrobarometers are a series of surveys conducted across a dozen Sub-Saharan African countries with the intent of gathering data on social and political attitudes towards subjects such as political participation, national identity, civil society, and other such topics. The series is modelled in part after the Eurobarometer series (see below). The Data Center has many Afrobarometer data files available here.

 

International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)
http://www.issp.org/homepage.htm
The ISSP is an ongoing effort devoted to cross-national research on social attitudes. In addition to asking general questions about attitudes towards various social issues, the ISSP series also includes special topic modules focusing on matters such as national idenitity, the role of government, and gender roles. The Data Center has many ISSP data files available here.

ISSP 1999 - "Social Inequality III" surveys only 28 countries in OECD & E. Europe & Philippines.  Ditto for ISSP 2001 - "Social Networks II" - ZA No. 3680.

 

World Values Surveys, 1990 & 2000

http://www.democ.uci.edu/resources/virtuallibrary/wvs.pdf

“World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, Cumulative for the First Three Waves”) p. 104-5.  V234: Region Codes for Nigeria. 

Three recent, cross-national, face-to-face surveys of lifestyles, personality traits, attitudes and emotions have included significant contingents of Nigerians:

Pulse of Africa  A pan-African survey done for the BBC in 2004 (7,700 respondents in ten Anglo-African countries including Ghana, Nigeria),

The Pew Research Center’s Pew Global Attitudes Project (interviews with 1,000 Nigerians conducted in May 2003, as well as 65,000 other respondents from nine African nations and 40 other nations on every continent in 2002 and 2003) and

The latest in a two-decade old series of World Values Surveys (WVS) that has included 1,000 Nigerians and 2,500 South Africans may begin to unravel some of these paradoxes.  In the 1990 poll (summarised in Inglehart, Ronald Human Values and Beliefs: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook: Political, Religious, Sexual, and Economic Norms in 43 Societies: Findings from the 1990—1993 Word Values Survey,” University of Michigan Press, 1998), 939 Nigerians (1,001 Nigerians on p.63) were surveyed by the Nigerian arm of the Gallup poll firm, Research and Marketing Services, Ltd., headed by Kareem Tejumola in Lagos (p. 469), in collaboration with WVS's principal investigator and University of Michigan sociologist, Ronald Inglehart.  Two African nations were surveyed both in 1990 and 2000, Nigeria and South Africa, while Tanzania, and Uganda entered the fold in 2000.  Three low-income countries were included in the 1990 WVS, Nigeria, China and India, and the authors admit that for all three countries, they 'undersample[d] the illiterate and rural portions of the public and oversample[d] the more educated and urban portions' (p.472) because 'rural and illiterate respondents … tend to given large numbers of "don't know" responses.'   Weighting factors were applied to boost the responses from the undersampled segments, but the fact is that 90 percent of the Nigerians surveyed were urban and literate (p.471) when in 1990, only about 35% of Nigerians were urban dwellers [UNDP 2004:154-155]. 

The Nigerian sample size for the third wave (fall, 1995) of the WVS was 2,769, while the “fourth wave” of the WVS, conducted in the fall of 2000 by Bukola Bandele (RMS Media Services), surveyed a total of 2,022 Nigerians.

 

           

http://www.columbia.edu/acis/eds/dgate/pdf/C6149-4.wvs4.pdf

ICPSR 3975: User Guide and Codebook.  p. 12 of 109:

These surveys cover a broader range of variation than has ever before been available for

analyzing the belief systems of mass publics. They provide data from representative national

samples of the publics of 81 societies containing 85 percent of the world's population and covering the full range of variation, from societies with per capita incomes below $300 per year, to societies with per capita incomes of more than $35,000 per year; from long-established democracies to authoritarian states; and from societies with market economies to societies that are in the process of emerging from state-run economies. They cover societies that were historically shaped by a wide variety of religious and cultural traditions, from Christian to Islamic to Confucian to Hindu; and from societies whose culture emphasizes social conformity and group-obligations, to societies where the main emphasis is on human emancipation and self-expression.

 

To date, four “waves” of the WVS surveys have been conducted (1980, 1990, 1995 and 2000; the 2005 wave is underway).  The 2000 WVS used the same Lagos firm (RMS) and targeted a total of 2,002 Nigerians, while a mid-decade WVS survey in 1995 surveyed 2,769 Nigerians: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/statistics/country_det.asp?cc=29

 

Inglehart has collapsed 18 of the WVS responses into a single variable which places societies along a “pre-materialist”/ materialist / “post-materialist” axis.  The mechanistic aggregating methodology of Ingelhart’s WVS series has been criticised by cultural anthropologists who focus on particularist analysis.  Can the responses of 1,000 Chinese and 2,500 Indians accurately reflect the voices of those countries’ one billion citizens each?  Low sampling sizes were justified since “obtaining random probability samples from them would have required far more funding than was available for this project.  We accorded a high priority to including such societies as China, India, and Nigeria, and were willing to accept imperfect samples rather than omit them from this study.”  (p.472)

 

With all its faults, the WVS series offers a rich source of Nigerian values stratified by time (1990, 1995, 2000), religion (Christian, Islam), age, education and income.  For sociologists attempting to understand value differences between Christians and Muslims, Nigeria offers a control for other variables (Ingelhart 2003).  A sub-study on the 2000 data found that Nigerian Muslims differed in their opinions from Nigerian Christians in only three areas, including attitudes towards the role of women in society [vide infra, Esmer 2004].

 

 

Some Basic Socio-economic Contrasts: Canadians and Nigerians

 

 

 

 

 

Canada

Nigeria

Comments

Human Development Index rank, 2003 (1 = highest ; 177 = lowest)

5

158

Canada, at 0.949, is 98% of the range from 0.281 (Niger) up to 0.963 (Norway), while Nigeria, at 0.453, is 25% of the range.

Life expectancy at birth, 2000-2005 (years) (2)

79.9

43.3

In 1996, for Canada's Nunavut region, the expectancy was 69.8, compared to 78.3 years for all of Canada.  England’s life expectancy rose from 25 years in 1725 to 40 in 1850, to 69 in 1950 (12).

Mortality rate, 2001, per 1,000 population (11)

7.2

19.4

Nigeria’s rate is on the rise primarily due to HIV/AIDS infections, from 18.4 during 1990-95, but is expected to return to18.4 in 2005-10 (11).  England's death rate fell from 28 per 1,000 in 1800 to18 in 1900 to 3 in 1950 (10).

Infant mortality rate, 2001 (deaths per 1,000 live births) (3)

5

98

Canada's highest regional rate is for Nunavut, where it was 16.9.  England’s infant mortality rate in the 1700s was estimated to be 170 per 1000 births (13).

Total fertility rate (births per woman, 2000-2005)  (4)

1.5

5.8

Canada's highest regional rate is for Nunavut, where it was 3.1

Abortions, per 1,000 women aged 15-44 (5)

15.5
(1995)

25.4
(1996)

Estimates by region of Nigeria: Southwest: 46; Southeast: 32; Northwest: 10; Northeast: 32

Unemployment rate, 2003 (6)

7.6%

14.8%

Afrobarometer survey, 2001: 20% ("currently without a job but actively looking") (8)

Income per capita, Purchasing Power Parity, 2003, US$

$30,677

$1,050

 

Total water withdrawal per capita, 2000, cubic metres per inhabitant per year (14)

1,470.

66.25

Water withdrawal by sector:  Canada, 11.8% agricultural water, 19.6% domestic water, 68.7% industrial water.  Nigeria, 68.8% agricultural water, 21.1% domestic water, 10.1% industrial water.

GDP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-2003

2.30%

0.00%

While the “average” Nigerian has seen no change in their income in nearly a decade and a half, Sala-i-Martin found that the income held by the wealthiest 2 percent rose from that equal to the poorest 17% in 1970 to the poorest 55% in 2000 (Sala-i-Martin, 2003:4). (9)

Ratio of income, richest 20% to poorest 20%

                5.8

              12.8

 

% of population undernourished, 2000/2002 (7)

not available

9%

15% of Canadian households estimated to have either lacked or worried about insufficient food at some point in 2000/01. (6)

Urban population, 2003 (% of total)

80.3%

46.6%

Western Europe’s urbanisation rate is estimated to have risen from 7% in 1700 to "over a third" in 1800 and "close to 40 per cent" in 1900.  (12)

 

Sources

(1) Unless otherwise stated, data are from: UNDP (2005). Human Development Report, (various tables).

(2) Statistics Canada, "Disability-free life expectancy, by province and territory," http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/health38.htm                                           

(3) Statistics Canada, "Infant mortality rates, by province and territory", http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/health21a.htm                                      

(4) Statistics Canada, "Births, 2003", http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/050712/d050712a.htm                                         

(5) Henshaw, Stanley K. et al. (1999). The Incidence of Abortion Worldwide, International Family Planning Perspectives 25, Supplement.  Regional Nigerian data: International Family Planning Perspectives 1998, 24(4):156-164. http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/25s3099.html

(6) Federal Government of Nigeria, National Bureau of Statistics, Unemployment Rates from 1999-2004, http://www.bosng.org/nbsdata/Unemployment_Rate_All_Datagraph.pdf 

(7) Statistics Canada, "Study: Food insecurity in Canadian households," The Daily, Tuesday, May 3, 2005, http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/050503/d050503b.htm                                    

(8) Lewis, Peter; Alemika, Etannibi; Bratton, Michael (2002).  “Down To Earth: Changes In Attitudes Toward Democracy And Markets In Nigeria,” Afrobarometer Paper No. 20, Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in South Africa, p.29, Table 17.                                       

(9) Sala-i-Martin, Xavier; Subramanian, Arvind (2003).  “Addressing The Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration From Nigeria,” Working Paper 9804 Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.  June 2003.  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03139.pdf            

(10) Fogel, Robert William (2005). The Escape from Hunger and Premature Death, 1700-2100: Europe, America, and the Third World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.7.                    

(11) United Nations. Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp, 20 April 2006; 11:18:31 AM.

(12) Fogel, Robert William (2000). The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 53.

(13) Maddison, A. (2004), "When and Why did the West get Richer than the Rest?", in Exploring Economic Growth: Festschrift for Riitta Hjerppe, Aksant, Amsterdam.

(14) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Aquastat Online Database, Accessed 13 June, 2006.  http://www.fao.org/ag/agl/aglw/aquastat/dbase/index.stm

 

Canadian exports to Nigeria in 2004 amounted to Cdn. $81 million (principally wheat, telecommunications, oil and gas equipment and pharmaceuticals), while Nigerian exports to Canada fell from $442 million in 2003 ($412 m. of which was crude oil) to $94 million in 2004 ($38 m. of which, crude oil, the remainder primarily cocoa beans) [International Trade Canada 2005].

 

Compared to Canada’s social welfare system, there is much greater regional variation in social and health indicators across Nigeria.  UNDP Nigeria estimated that in 2001, the national HIV infection rate was 5.8 per cent [UNDP Nigeria 2004:19], however, in 2003, it varied from a low of around 2 per cent in the southwest region up to a high of about 6 per cent in the north central region [UNDP Nigeria 2004:22].     

 

In terms of income inequality among their citizens, the United Nations Development Program’s  Human Development Report for 2005 ranked Canada 36th-most egalitarian and Nigeria 104th-most egalitarian among 124 nations, as measured by its Gini index; the Gini ranges from zero, representing perfect income equality (all citizens have exactly the same income or assets) and up to one, representing perfect income inequality (one citizen has all the income, while the others have nothing).  Twenty-seven of the 35 nations with Gini indices lower (more equitable) than Canada are found in Europe and the former Soviet Union, while ten of the 20 nations with Gini indices higher (less equitable) than Nigeria are Latin American, and nine are in sub-Saharan Africa.  At the extreme ends of geographic location clearly is a predominant factor in determining domestic inequality.  For the 25 “low human development” countries, as defined by the UNDP, for which data are available, Nigeria ranked fifth-most inequitable on this measure [UNDP 2005:Table 15]. 

 

 

Country

Survey Year

Share of Income or Consumption

Ratios

Gini Index

Poorest 10%

Poorest 20%

Richest 20%

Richest 10%

Richest : Poorest 10%

Richest : Poorest 20%

Canada

1998

2.5%

7.0%

40.4%

25.0%

10.1

5.8

33.1

Nigeria

1996

1.6%

4.4%

55.7%

40.8%

24.9

12.8

50.6

Maximum

 

 

 

 

 

 

Namibia: 78.7(1)

Namibia: 70.7 (2)

Minimum

 

 

 

 

 

 

Slovakia 34.8 (3)

Denmark 24.7 (4)

Notes

(1) Namibia 78.7 Botswana 70.3 Lesotho 66.5 Central African Republic 65.0 Guatemala 64.1 Sierra Leone 63.4 Brazil 63.2 Chile 62.2 South Africa 62.2 Colombia 61.8 Burkina Faso 60.7 Mexico 59.1 Zambia 56.6 Argentina 56.4 Mali 56.2

(2) Namibia: 70.7, Lesotho 63.2, Botswana 63.0, Sierra Leone 62.9, Central African Republic 61.3, Swaziland 60.9, South Africa 57.8, Zimbabwe 56.8, Zambia 52.6

(3) S.Korea 37.5, Albania 37.4, Finland 36.7, Uzbekistan 36.3, Czech R. 35.9, Bosnia & Herzegovina 35.8, Denmark 35.8, Japan 35.7, Slovenia 35.7, Slovakia 34.8

(4) Ghana 40.8 USA 40.8 UK 36.0 Canada 33.0 France 32.7 India 32.5 ...Germany 28.3 Hungary 26.9 Bosnia & Herz. 26.2 Slovakia 25.8 Norway 25.8 Czech 25.4 Belgium 25.0 Sweden 25.0 Japan 24.9 Denmark 24.7

 

 

The plot of human life expectancy versus income per capita is curvilinear in shape, with an initial sharp slope for low life-expectancy populations below 65 years, followed by a rapid flattening of the relationship above this age.  It is important to note that there are six outliers from this curve, all middle-human development countries in southern Africa that have been most heavily stricken by the AIDS pandemic: Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland, and they have been excluded from the following analysis.

Source: Compiled from UNDP 2005:Tables 5 & 10.  Income is expressed in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP).  South Africa and Equatorial Guinea are among the outliers, due to the extent that the HIV pandemic has attenuated life expectancies.

 

 

Based on a UNDP sample of 159 national averages, comprising 96% of the global population,  thirty-five per cent of human beings could, in statistical terms, expect to live less than 65 years if they were born in 2000-2005, 49% would live between 65 and 74 years, while the remaining 16% could expect to live between 75 and 82 years.  Using linear regression, it is possible to predict the following relationships for each of these three age ranges:

 

Life Expectancy Range

Correlation Coefficient

Slope

Ordinate

For every extra dollar earned, how much longer life? (Hours)

Extra income required to live one year longer?

64 yrs and less *

0.449

0.003225

46.032

28.250

 $310

65-75 yrs, all

0.451

0.000291

68.927

2.550

 $3,435

76 yrs and above, all

0.333

0.000052

77.273

0.453

 $19,319

 

Source: Calculated from from UNDP 2005:Tables 5 & 10.   * For these calculations, the “64 years and less” country group excludes six outliers (Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland) because the HIV/AIDS pandemic skews these middle-income countries into very low life expectancies.

 

 

Therefore, a Nigerian who raises her income by just one dollar per year can roughly expect her lifespan (or more properly, the lifespan of her infant born in 2003) to be extended about 28 hours longer than the mean life expectancy; she would have to increase her income from the average of $1,050 to $1,360 (30%) in order to extend life by one extra year.  By contrast, the average Canadian with one extra dollar of income could statistically expect his child to live only an extra half-hour greater than the average, and if he would like to increase the life expectancy by one year, he would have to earn 63% extra, or $19,319 more than the Canadian average of US$30,677!  In fact, the relationship between income and life expectancy is quite weak among the high income nations: Uruguayans, whose infants can expect to live to 75.3 years, earn only $8,280 per year, whilst American infants can expect to live only two years longer, to 77.3 years, but their parents’ incomes are $37,562.  The correlation coefficient is twice as strong, twice as reliable a predictor, for the three-quarters of humanity that can expect to live only to age 74.  This illustrates the dramatic impact that small increments in personal wealth can make on citizens’ fundamental right to life.  With a life expectancy at birth of 43.3 years in 2000, Nigerians presently fall among the shortest-living 3.5% of humanity; only ten nations – eight in southern Africa - have shorter life expectancies.

 

 

 

CHARACTERISING CANADIANS

 

According to the sociologist and Environics pollster, Michael Adams, Canadians are quite distinct in their social values when compared to Americans.  Based on an analysis of survey responses made by 6,245 Americans and 8,168 Canadians aged 15+ to 101 questions, and their statistical aggregation into two independent dimensions, Adams produced the following graph, showing that only the residents of the northeastern American region of New England demonstrate similar orientations in terms of their individuality (rejection of traditional authority) and their desire for what he calls “fulfillment” (the desire for personal control, a global consciousness, and tolerance for differing points of view).

 

M. Adams: Canada-USA cultural values map

Source: Adams, Michael, Fire and Ice: The U.S., Canada, and the Myth of Converging Valuesand the Myth of Converging Values, downloaded from Public Policy Forum website 02.IV.2006 http://forumpp.ca/ow/Micheal_Adams_Presentation.pdf Slide 9 of 36.  Originally published in: Adams, Michael (2003). Fire and Ice: The United States, Canada and the Myth of Converging Values, Toronto: Penguin.  p.81 "The Regions of North America on the Socio-Cultural Map".

Status & Security: Obedience to Traditional Structures and Norms
Authenticity & Responsibility: Well-being, Harmony and Responsibility
Exclusion & Intensity: Seeking Stimulus and Attention
Idealism & Autonomy: Exploration and Flexibility

 

Adams’s central thesis is that Canadians and Americans diverged in their social values over the 1990s.  While Americans moved into the “Exclusion & Intensity” quadrant, Canadians moved increasingly into the “Idealism & Autonomy” quadrant over the 1990s: from 41% of Canadians in the latter values quadrant in 1992 to 49% in 2000, while the shares for Americans in this quadrant fell from 26% to 22%, respectively [Adams 2003:177-78].  Further, in the 2000 survey, 49% of Americans agreed with the statement “[t]he father of the family must be master of his own house” while only 18% of Canadians agreed [Adams 2003:51].

Despite Quebec occupying the most extreme corner of Adams’s socio-cultural map – lending quantitative support for this province being a “distinct society” in more ways that simply linguistic terms - the fertility rate is only the national average, 1.5 children per woman aged 15-49.  This may reflect Quebec's high immigrant population, e.g. in the 2001 census, 86% of Canada's Haitian community had settled in Montreal; but nationally, Toronto had the highest immigrant population, 37.3%, followed by the rest of Ontario with 18.7%, Vancouver with 13.5% and Montreal with 11.4% [Hou, Feng (2005). Summary of: The Initial Destinations and Redistribution of Canada's Major Immigrant Groups: Changes over the Past Two Decades ]. Quebec's foreign-born population comprised 9.9% of the total (707k / 7126k), compared to Ontario’s 27%, British Columbia: 26%. Saskatchewan: 5%. Nova Scotia: 5% [Statistics Canada, Census 2001: Immigrant Status by Period of Immigration. 2001 Counts. for Canada. Provinces and Territories - 20% Sample Data]

However, the more conservative/authoritarian provinces do have the highest fertility rates: Manitoba 1.8, Saskatchewan 1.9, and Alberta 1.7. The Northwest Territories and Nunavut, where Canada's aboriginal populations predominate, show the highest fertility rates, 2.0 and 3.1, respectively [Statistics Canada (2005). "Births 2003." The Daily Tuesday. July 12. 2005.  http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/050712/d050712a.htm], however these regions are sparsely-populated, with just 37,000 and 27,000 persons in the 2001 Census, respectively.

Quebeckers have the highest percentage of divorced persons in the country, 6.02% out of the total provincial population, compared to the national average of 4.89% in 2005 [Statistics Canada, Population by marital status and sex, by province and territory, 2005].  Atlantic Canada, Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan have divorced person ratios lower than the national average.  Quebec’s single population, 41.7%, is close to the national average, 41.8%, however its married population, 47.1%, ties with Saskatchewan as the lowest provincially, wih the national average at 48.5%.

 

Canadians’ Volunteer Participation in Global Social Justice

Canadians’ self-reported membership in “Third world development or human rights” organisations has remained constant at about 4.6% between 1990 and 2000, according to two polls conducted by the World Values Survey [Question A070].  For a sample of eight high-income nations, membership in these organisations grew 1.7% over the last decade.

 

WVS: Voluntary membership in 3rd-world  organizations

Source: World Values Survey, 1990 and 2000, Question A070 (no data for Nigeria in either year).

 

When stratifying the Canadian responses for 2000, one finds that there is a strong correlation between level of educational attainment and world development-related affiliation, but a much weaker correlation for age, or income level:

 

Canadians’ Membership in 3rd World Organisations in 2000

by Educational Attainment, Age and Income Level

Incomplete Elementary

Elementary

Incomplete Secondary: Vocational

Secondary: vocational

Incomplete Secondary: Academic

Secondary: academic

Incomplete University or other Tertiary

University or other Tertiary

3.4%

4.6%

3.0%

3.2%

3.3%

3.1%

5.3%

9.5%

 

Age

Income Level

15-29

30-49

50+

Low

Middle

High

2.4%

4.8%

5.1%

3.1%

6.0%

5.8%

Source: World Values Survey, 1990 and 2000, Question A070/V45.

 

These response data suggest that, for Canadians, support for global social justice issues as demonstrated by volunteer membership is most strongly influenced by completion of a university education: membership triples from 3.1% for Canadians having completed secondary school to 9.5% for university graduates.  Whether a Canadian is in the middle or high income group, they are twice as likely to belong to global justice organisations (6%) than those in the low income group; and being over the age of 30 doubles membership in these organisations.

 

In 1990, 2.7% of Canadians reported doing unpaid volunteer work for third world development and human rights organisations, while in 2000, the proportion had fallen slightly to 2.4%; thus,  about 60% of those who reported “belonging” to such groups also report active volunteer work.  As for “belonging”, “volunteer work” increases most with a university education, 5.2% versus just 1.2% for those whose highest education is secondary school (World Values Survey 2000:A087/V60).

 

Canadians’ Support for International Development Aid

In response to the 2000 World Values Survey question, “Some people favor, and others are against, having this country provide economic aid to poorer countries. Do you think that this country should provide more or less economic aid to poorer countries?”, 54% of Canadians overall either gave the response “A lot more than we do now” or “Somewhat more than we do now”.  A university degree increased support for increased foreign aid by a ratio of 32%, from 55% for those whose highest education was a secondary school diploma, to 72% for university graduates:

 

Should Canada provide more economic aid to poorer countries?  % “Yes” in 2000 survey
Educational Attainment: Canadians (N=1,931)

Incomplete Elementary

Elementary

Incomplete Secondary: Vocational

Secondary: vocational

Incomplete Secondary: Academic

Secondary: academic

Incomplete University or other Tertiary

University or other Tertiary

34.6%

46.9%

43.3%

52.2%

50.9%

54.8%

56.8%

72.3%

 

 

Age

Income Level

15-29

30-49

50+

Low

Middle

High

64.7%

53.0%

49.8%

50.5%

49.7%

64.0%

Source: World Values Survey, 1990 and 2000, Question E129 (V176).

 

Opoku-Dapnah (2002) carried out face-to-face interviews with 50 Canadians in Toronto and Sudbury during 1997-98, with the question “Should Canada give aid to poor nations?” and found that 46% agreed; this is quite close to the WVS result for 2000.  A 2000 Earnscliffe Research and Communications poll, commissioned by CIDA, the Canadian International Development Agency, found that 41% and 36% respectively of Canadians thought that the federal government should put either “high priority” or “priority” on “world poverty” and the “quality of life in poor countries”, compared to 80% to “Canadian poverty” and 85% to “health care” [Noël et al. 2004:36].  Restricting the responses to “high priority”, 48% of Canadians felt that the government should make Canadian poverty a high priority, compared to just 20% for “world poverty” and 14% for the “quality of life in poor countries” [Noël et al. 2004:36].

 

A team of political scientists at the Université de Montréal and the University of Toronto concluded from a detailed review of Canadian public sentiment over international aid that “[j]ust as they appear ambivalent in their support for foreign aid, Canadians also seem divided over the question. Those who identify themselves on the left, who vote for the NDP and, to a lesser extent, the Liberal Party and the Bloc québécois, and who approve income redistribution, trade unions, women’s rights and environmental protection, are more likely to favour a more generous aid commitment. Those who place themselves on the right, support the Conservative party or the Alliance, think individuals should see for themselves, and dislike minorities tend to disapprove development assistance. Behind the familiar portrait of a public committed to “humane internationalism,” we find a more fragile consensus, defined by an awkward combination of generous principles and guarded commitments, and a divided public, which disagrees on foreign aid, just as it does on most issues of political relevance. These divisions are in part social, cultural and regional: a young educated woman from Quebec is more likely to support development assistance than an older, less educated but wealthier man from outside Quebec” [Noël et al. 2004:42].  They also reported correlation tests that suggest the strongest determinant of support for Canadian international aid was the respondent’s region, with Quebeckers showing the strongest support (p < 0.001).  Other factors of lower statistical significance were gender (women support aid more than men), income (low-income earners show stronger support, p < 0.01) and education (higher education levels support aid spending more, p < 0.05) [Noël et al. 2004:39].

 

Canada’s net official development assistance (ODA) to Nigeria grew from US $1.82 million in 2000 (2.5% of the OECD total) to $15.17 million in 2004 (4.0% of all OECD net ODA of $376 million), peaking at $18.06 million in 2002 [OECD, SourceOECD: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows - Part I, http://oecd-stats.ingenta.com/OECD/eng/TableViewer/wdsview/dispviewp.asp].  Canada’s ODA to Nigeria consists solely of grants, whereas countries such as France, Germany and the United States provide a combination of grants and loans.

 

 

Based on a survey of 14 volunteer-sending agencies published on the Canadian Centre for International Co-operation’s website, in 2004/05, CIDA funded about 3,300 Canadians who were working abroad as volunteers and/or in the field of international development.  Many of them are working neither in emergency humanitarian relief, nor as technical advisors for large physical infrastructure projects, but rather in the area of soft development, i.e. social transformation, assisting the voiceless and excluded in societies in the South.  Essentially, their work involves changing how people think – both the powerless and the powerful.  It is therefore necessary for both the expatriate and the host organisation to know what is the tacit social knowledge, innate cultural biases, implicit mutual understanding, core values and worldview that governs how people think and act (Volunteers CIDA funded 2004-2005, referring to Canadians overseas as volunteers, experts, youth exchanges, and/or technical advisors, in areas related to governance. AFS  20, CCI 70+76, JCM 1027, SACO 297+162+40+96+8, SUCO 19, VSO 70-80 (11 CIDA), CUSO 248+19, Oxfam Quebec 100+13+36, CECI/WUSC  17+73+191+6+24+10, CANADEM 116+23+16+56+2,  Terre sans frontiere  1+16+15+3+1+1, World Vision Canada 6 (over last 5 yrs), Christian Children`s Fund of Canada CCFC 4 (over 5 yrs), AUCC 2+4+4+3+5+4+1+3+4+3+4+322+12   TOTAL = 3,258.) [http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_cda_corps_mapping.pdf MAPPING – CANADA CORPS/ CARTE– SOLIDARITÉ CANADA (Information provided directly by organisations)].

 

 

Unlike the short-term technical advisors who may have only limited interactions with the host culture, CUSO cooperants in particular are enthusiastic, results-oriented, pro-egalitarian “global citizens” who are embedded, face-to-face, with a small group of their host counterparts in the South for a minimum of two years.

 

Coming closer to characterising persons who work in volunteer-sending agencies such as CUSO, Keith Child and Carly Manion surveyed 97 undergraduates and 20 graduate students in six Canadian university international development studies (IDS) programs (Dalhousie, Saint Mary's, McGill, Queen's, Trent and Calgary) and found that 53% of the undergrads chose IDS primarily for "humanitarian social justice" reasons and 24% because they liked "overseas travel/intercultural experience", whereas for graduate students, the percentages were 15% and 30% respectively.  They found that "[a]mong undergraduates (domestic and foreign) their views of development... were much more cynical and pessimistic about the future" while cynicism was "largely absent" for the graduate students (2004:183).  Twenty-five percent of IDS graduate students in their survey were international students from developing countries who said they intended to repatriate and work on the country's development.  Canadian-born students chose development studies as their major for the following reasons: “Humanitarian (social justice, etc.)”: 53%, “Overseas travel / intercultural experience”: 24% while for foreign students, 32% each expressed these reasons [Child and Manion 2004].

 

The more or less equal divide among Canadians in supporting wealth redistribution, both nationally and internationally, may reflect two streams of Canadian political thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Through its Protestant and especially evangelical-rooted idealism and belief in a benevolent God, the Social Gospel movement addressed the growing social problems of materialism, corruption and inequality in the 1880s and 1890s, promoting the modern values of liberal progressivism and social justice; it is claimed that this movement gave birth to the academic disciplines of social ethics and sociology in Canadian universities, and that its heirs were the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, and the contemporary support for social welfare, Canadian peacekeeping, and related causes [Allen 2006].  The other stream, the Social Credit movement evolved in the 1930s from the support of the Albertan and evangelical minister William Aberhart, eventually promoting conservative social and financial policies [Morley 2006].

 

FLUX AND STASIS IN NIGERIA OVER THE 1990s

Reasons to expect stasis in Nigerian attitudes and behaviours between 1990 and 2000

*       Declining life expectancy: The UN Population Division estimates that Nigerian life expectancy peaked during the period 1985-1990, reaching 46.6 years at time of birth; it then fell to 44.5 during 1995-2000, and is expected to descend to 43.3 years in 2000-2005 before it returns upwards, largely a result of the AIDS pandemic [World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision Population Database, Detailed Data].  Over the same period, Western European life expectancy rose steadily, from 75.6 years in the latter half if the 1980s to 78.9 in the first half of the 2000s.  Setbacks, serious reverses in social indicator trends are largely unheard of outside of sub-Saharan Africa.

*       Zero economic growth: the aggregate annual change in GDP per capita has averaged around 0.0% (on the whole, no major increase or decrease in wealth for the average Nigerian, while the population grew 2.8% per year).  The World Bank estimates the Nigerian GNI per capita increased by 0.3% per year from 1990-2002 [African Development Indicators 2004:Table 1-1, p.5].

*       No reductions in under-five mortality rates, nor in maternal mortality ratios.  The reduction of under-five mortality rates (UN Millennium Development Goal Nr. 4) was only 4% between 1990 to 2001, placing the target of a 67% reduction by 2015 very far off [Human Development Report 2003, Table 3]. 

 

 

Signifiers of social change under macro-economic stasis

*       Electoral, multi-party democracy.  The advent of a civilian regime in 1999, following 13 years of progressively rapacious military rule has brought opportunities for increased freedom of expression and social mobilisation.

*       NGOisation, privatisation and divestiture of publicly-owned social services.  The imposition of “user fees” and/or petty bribes in state-owned hospitals, as well as the emergence of private medical clinics, private schools and universities, and non-governmental organisations involved in activities ranging from financial lending to low-income individuals to the supply of HIV antiretroviral medication.  With roughly 75 public enterprises and parastatals up for full or partial commercialisation, the Economist Intelligence Unit noted in 2004 that “[u]nder the original plan, the entire privatisation agenda was to have been finished by 2003, but by April none of Nigeria's major state-owned corporations had been sold.”  [IMF, Nigeria Country Report May 2004: 26].

*       Dawning of microfinance for the poor.  Microcredit Microfinance Institutions in Nigeria: Policy, Practice and Potentials C. M. Anyanwu Deputy Director Central Bank of Nigeria, Abuja, Nigeria November, 2004 Paper Presented at the G24 Workshop on “Constraints to Growth in Sub Saharan Africa,” Pretoria, South Africa, November 29-30, 2004 http://www.g24.org/anyanwu.pdf.  p.3: “The number of MFI [Microfinance institutions] branches increased five fold and the employees ten times. Their asset base and clients rose six and sixty-seven times, respectively. The value of outstanding loans and savings increased in multiples. Yet the number of beneficiaries of MFI operators is an insignificant proportion of over 60 million people that are in need of microfinance services.” "The number of borrowers from the ten MFIs rose over sixty-seven times, from 6,013 in 1993 to 405,915 in 2003..." and for three of these ten institutions, "the number of clients doing savings with them rose from 6,958 in 1993 to 61,895 in 2003, while the value of savings increased twenty fold, from N4.868 million to N107.751 million". (p.8) "average savings rate of N3,707 in 2003" (p.9). repayment rates averaged 92.5% (p.9), for "petty-trading, and micro hair-dressing, sewing, low level agro-allied activities, etc.".  The largest NGOs involved in microfinance are DEC, FADU, LAPO, COWAN, and JDPC, receiving an average of 60% of their funding from donors.  Well out of reach to the poorest 80% of Nigerians, the prime lending rate for Nigeria’s chartered banks, in 2000 was 19.5%, while the savings deposit rate was 4.9% [IMF Country Report No. 05/203, August 2005, p.91].

*       A bifurcation of the income distribution.  Nigeria’s income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, grew rapidly over the 1990s.  The incomes of one-fifth of the populace increased while the other four-fifths suffered losses.   Nigerians living on over $2 per day (1985 US$, PPP) represent just 30% of the population; the wealthiest 2% possessed incomes equivalent to the total income of the poorest 17% in 1970 and the poorest 55% in 2000 [Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003].

*       Declining fertility rates.  Consistent with other areas of the developing world, there has been a concomitant drop in the number of children borne per woman and in population growth.  The population growth rate averaged 2.7% per year between 1993 and 2002 [World Bank, African Development Indicators, 2004, Washington D.C. , Table 1] while the total fertility rate went from 6.5 births per woman (1985) to 5.7 (1995) to 5.1 (2002) (Table 13-5). 

*       Declining Antenatal Care and Attended Birth Deliveries.  The United Nations Population Fund estimates that Nigerians suffered a setback in the proportion of mothers having at least one antenatal care visit (64% in 1990, 58% in “most recent” period) and having a skilled attendant present at the time of birth (45% vs. 42%).  By comparison, Ghana and Burkina Faso had increases in antenatal care from 65% to 88% and 49% to 62%, respectively while their attended birth rates also remained constant around 30%-40%.  [UNFPA, Compare Country Indicators].

*       Growing urbanisation.  Nigeria’s urban dwellers as a percentage of the total population rose from 26.9% (1980) to 35.0% (1990) to 45.9% (2002).  In 2002, Nigeria was as urbanised as Ghana (45.6%) but less so than Cameroon (50.6%).  [Human Development Report 2004:154-5].

*       Increasing educational attainment and low national adult illiteracy.  Oxfam reports that gross primary school enrolment is 80.7% [Measuring Poverty in Nigeria, 2003: 19].  Data from UNESCO show that Nigeria had a Gross Primary School Enrolment Ratio (both sexes) in 2002/2003 of 119% (up from 60% in 1990/91). The country also appears to be closing the gender education disparity, with 132% primary enrolment for males, and 107% for females in 2002/03.  The UN Population Fund estimates that the age 15 and over male illiteracy rate fell from 41% of that population in 1990 to 22% for the “most recent” period, while for females the corresponding decline was from 62% to 36% [UNFPA, Compare Country Indicators].  In fact, the 2005 Human Development Report ranks Nigeria’s combined (primary, secondary, tertiary) school enrolment, 66%, second-highest among the 32 “low human development” countries for 2002/03 [UNDP 2005:Table 1].  And among these 32, Nigeria’s adult illiteracy ratio for 2003, 33.2% of persons aged 15 and older, was eighth-lowest [UNDP 2005:Table 3].  Nigeria’s northern neighbour, Niger Republic, had the second-highest illiteracy rate, 81.0%, suggesting a steep descent in literacy rates from southern to northern Nigeria.

*       Religious polarisation: “Personalised” Christian Evangelical churches; Shari’a Criminal Law.  Prosperity religion, the Pentecostalist faith, and numerous weekend crusades are changing people’s behaviour, placing greater emphasis on Western-style individualism and the nuclear family [Meyer, Birgit Translating the Devil. Religion and Modernity among the Ewe in Ghana, 1999].  When Nigerians were polled by the BBC in 2004 on their favourite pastimes, there was a two-way tie at 90% each for practicing their religion and watching television.  Listening to the radio came third (86%).  (BBC Pulse of Africa, 2004).

*       Nollywood.  In spite of flat per capita economic performance, Nigeria’s commodity entertainment industry is burgeoning.  Hastily-produced, micro-budget Nigerian narrative films shot on video, have thrown themselves up onto the big silver screens and flat plasma screens across the global diaspora.  In 2004, major New York City and Rotterdam film festivals hosted mid-career retrospectives on the work of Yoruba filmmaker Tunde Kelani.

*       Six per cent annual growth in principle food crops production.  Data aggregated from the World Bank for volume of food output (yam, cassava, sorghum, millet, rice, palm oil, et cet.) over the period 1990 to 2000 show an annual average increase in production of 6.1% [African Development Indicators, 2004, Washington D.C., Table 8-6, p.222-225].  This is double the rate in growth of the human population!

*       Rainforest coverage reductions.  Deforestation is occurring at a rate of about 0.5% of Nigeria’s total area per year.  Nigeria’s forest coverage fell, literally, from 19.2% of its land mass in 1990 to 14.8% in 2000 [Human Development Report 2003:220].  This is a significantly greater reduction than for Ghana (27.8% forest coverage in 2000), Benin (24.0%) and Cameroon (51.3%).  [World Bank, African Development Indicators, 2004, Washington D.C. , Table 13-4].

*       Remittances of Nigerians working abroad grew 38% per year over the 1990s, reaching $2 bn. in 2000. Based solely upon “worker remittances which enter the official banking system”, expatriate Nigerians sent home to their families and communities $12 million in 1990 [R. Adams, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3069, 2003: 23] and this increased steadily to an estimated $1.80 billion US in 2001 [IMF Country Report No. 03/60, 2003:143, “Private transfers (net)”], attaining about 4% of Nigeria’s GNP, and dwarfing by one order of magnitude the country’s official development assistance receipts from the OECD of $185 million in 2001.  As such, Nigerians’ home remittance in 2000 ranked about sixth-highest among 24 migrant-economy countries, after India, Mexico, Turkey, Egypt and Morocco [Adams 2003:23-24].

*       Capital flight is about double the annual remittances.  Alas, about twice as much privately-owned money escapes the country than returns.  Between 1990 and 1996, private outflows from Nigeria to foreign banks averaged $4.5 bn. (1996 US dollars, range: $1.5 bn in 1995, $8.4 bn in 1991) [Ndikumana 2003].  This has prompted the economist Branko Milanovic to argue that Nigeria, like other nations with high income inequality, does not warrant the benefits of global wealth redistribution: “The mean-to-median [income] ratio in Nigeria is 1.7 vs 1.2 in Bangladesh… The argument against helping [countries like Nigeria] is that their own rich should be willing to share some of their gains with the poor before expecting the rest of the world to contribute.”  [Milanovic 2005:124].

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nigeria and the UN Millennium Development Goals

 

Nigeria has reduced its citizens’ malnutrition by half, nearly attaining in 2003 its 2015 UN Millennium Development Goal of just 7% undernourished citizens.

 

 


Human Development Report 2003, Millennium Targets for Hunger

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Source: United Nations, Human Development Report 2003:54.

 

 

                

It performed this despite complete stasis in its aggregate per capita income from 1990 to 2001 (and indeed to 2005) – this attests as much to the extraordinary resourcefulness and ingenuity of its people as the fertility of Nigerian soil:

 

 

 

 

 

Human Development Report, 2003: Millennium Targets for Income Poverty

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Source: United Nations, Human Development Report 2003:53

 

 

 

The second UN Millennium Development Goal is to “achieve universal primary education” by 2015.  According to UNESCO data last updated in May 2005, Nigeria has increased its net primary level enrolment for both sexes from 59.9% in 1990 to 70.6% in 1999 (the latest year available), implying that 100% enrolment by 2015 may not be achievable.  There is probably a steeply-diminishing gradient from southern to northern Nigeria on this indicator.  For other coastal West African nations, the rates are similar: Togo registered a 90.7% enrolment rate, for Benin it was 71.3%, and for Ghana 61.8%, all in 1999.  For Sahelian West African nations, the rates are uniformly lower, Burkina Faso: 34.3%, Mali: 38.3%, Niger: 27.1% (1999 or 1998).  The UNDP reported in its Human Development Report 2005 estimates from UNESCO that Nigeria’s combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment rate for 2002/2003 was 64%, lower than that for Uganda (74%) and Togo (66%), but higher than rates for Ghana (46%), Benin, Cameroon and Zimbabwe (all 55%) and 18 other low human development nations.  The UNDP also estimated that Nigeria’s net primary enrolment rate in 2002/03 was 67%, placing it 11th out of 26 low human development nations for which this datum was available.

 

 

Economist Intelligence Unit (2004). Country Commerce: Nigeria, New York: EIU.

p. 37: "The official unemployment rate is consistently reported to be around 5%, but this conceals far higher rates in the cities and high underemployment in rural areas. Unofficial rates estimate unemployment at closer to 40%. But few reliable figures are available. The National Manpower Board estimates that about 6m Nigerian graduates were unemployed in 2000."

p.37-8: "The country also continues to suffer from an incurable brain drain with the best talent leaving home for developed countries with better wages and living conditions. Many emigrants leave as students and do not returned after finishing their studies abroad.  Statistics show that there are about 250,000 Nigerians living in the United States. According to the US Census Bureau, Nigerians are the most-educated ethnic group in the US: 64% of foreign-born Nigerians aged 25 and older have at least a bachelor’s degree.  More than 23,000 of these are registered medical doctors."

 

Estimates of youth unemployment in Nigeria's urban areas are between 40% and 60%, while Nigerians account for 6% of the global poor population [World Bank 2004:2].

 

    

Within-Nigeria Variability in Social Indicators

 

The World Bank economist Branko Milanovic has found that Nigeria reduced its income inequality between independence and the second world oil price shock in 1979-1981, and since then has returned to the same level of inequality as in 1960:

 

Income Inequality in Nigeria, 1960-1996

Milanovic: Gini index for Nigeria, 1950-2000

Gini Coefficients in Nigeria (0=perfect income equality; 100=perfect income inequality)

Source: Milanovic, Branko (2003). Is inequality in Africa really different? WPS 3169, Second draft, May 2003, Figure 1, p.19. http://www.worldbank.org/research/inequality/pdf/africa.pdf

 

 

Many sub-Saharan African nations are close to Nigeria’s level of within-country income inequality (50.6) and Nigeria’s GDP per capita ($1,050), including (Gini Index from 1993-2002, GDP per capita, PPP $US, 2003): Burkina Faso (48.2, $1,174), Madagascar (47.5, $809), Malawi (50.3, $605), Mali (50.5, $994),  and Zambia (52.6, $877) [UNDP 2005: Tables 14 and 15].

 

 

Heaton, Tim; Hirschl, Tom A. (1999) "The trajectory of family change in Nigeria " Journal of Comparative Family Studies  30(1)  35–55.

Using Demographic & Health Survey (DHS) data on 9 000 Nigerian women that were collected in 1990 by the Federal Office for Statistics and analysing differences among four age groups (<20; 20-29; 30-39; 40-49) they concluded from that "[a]mong all groups except the Hausa, older women married at earlier ages." "Age differences suggest an increasing tendency to use contraceptives among each group except the Hausa  and the trend is greatest among the Ibo." And: "Indeed, the lack of age difference on factors that are not altered across the life cycles of these women such as age at first union and education support our interpretation that the Hausa have experienced minimal social change in several aspects of their family lives. In contrast  despite the numerous and substantial differences between Yoruba and Ibo families  these differences appear to be converging in response to structural and socioeconomic change."

 

Some interesting comparison tables, here just for the 20-29 age groups:

 

 

Hausa

Yoruba

Ibo

All others

% Urban

14.4%

74.5%

28.7%

15.1%

Mean education level (0=none; 3=post-secondary)

0.12

1.49

1.19

0.76

% Not working

50.2%

28.8%

40.9%

48.9%

Standard of living index (composite of water supply, hygiene, electricity, flooring material, etc.)

2.35

4.01

2.90

2.33

Median age at first marriage (years)

14.4

21.1

20.9

17.9

% ever used contraception

2.2%

20.2%

10.8%

12.1%

Ideal number of children: % responding "up to God"

83.8%

36.2%

38.8%

43.5%

Age group 40-49 only

 

 

 

 

Fertility: Children ever born if ever in union

5.63

6.16

6.85

6.55

Source: Tim Heaton and Tom A. Hirschl (1999). The trajectory of family change in Nigeria,” Journal of Comparative Family Studies 30(1):35-36.

 

           

In 1993, UNDP Nigeria commissioned a comparative study of life expectancy, adult literacy and income per capita across the country’s then 19 states, and found considerable variation.  When these three variables were aggregated into state-level “Human Development Indices” (HDI), they ranged from a low of 0.042 in Borno State, in the country’s far northeast, up to 0.631 in the south-central Bendel State.  Two other states, Cross River and Rivers, both achieved HDI values above 0.5 that year, ranking them effectively as “Medium human development” regions by the UNDP definition, however Nigeria’s overall HDI value was only 0.246 [Adamu 1993, cited in UNDP 1997].

SURVEY METHODOLOGIES

 

In the 1940s, the anthropologist Cora DuBois developed the concept of the “modal personality”, which she defined as central tendencies in the personalities of a group of peoples.  Various psychological tests were employed, including Rorschach test interpretations, children’s drawings, responses to the Porteus Maze Test, word association and life biographies.  George Devereux subsequently has argued that this concept needs to be divided into two, psychological, or subjective personality, and sociocultural, or collective personality [Encyclopedia of anthropology / H. James Birx, editor., 2006].

 

Given that Nigerians comprise about one-fifth of the African continent’s populace, they have been the subject of interest of a number of international surveys since the 1970s.  Since the work of the Dutch sociologist Geert Hoftsede in the 1960s and 1970s, a number of academic, non-governmental and for-profit organisations have undertaken cross-national attitudinal surveys that have captured a wide variety of norms (cultural rules or standards that guide one’s conduct in a particular society), mores (non-enforced societal requirements for behaviour) helping us to develop an understanding of national personality, social character, ethos, temperament and psychological culture patterns.   These surveys effectively represent aggregated perspectives on a culture, the share values of a people.  In this report, four surveys from academic sociologists, and one each from a not-for-profit non-governmental organisation and commercial polling firm are examined in detail for the sake of comparing Nigerian and Canadian responses:

 

Survey Title

Date Survey Per-formed

Total Coun-tries or Socie-ties

Number of Persons Surveyed

Total Survey Items (Scales)

Nigeria & Canada Survey Response Pairs in this Report (2)

Survey Team

Comments

Total

Cana-dians

Nige-rians

World Values Survey 1990  (Principle Investigator: Ronald Inglehart, University of Michigan)

1990

43

56,056

780

1001

338

224

Nigeria: RMS (Gallup Nigeria), Kareem Tejumola & R. Inglehart (face-to-face interviews).  Canada: Gallup Canada .

http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org  The web version of the database permits users to stratify the individual country data according to the following respondent characteristics: gender, income, education, social class, population of community.

World Values Survey 2000  (Principle Investigator: Ronald Inglehart, University of Michigan)

2000

81

118,519

1151

2022

302

123

Nigeria: 2000: Research and Marketing Services: Bukola Bandele; Canada: Canadian Facts: Neil Nevitte - Univ. Toronto.

Nigeria also participated in the 1995 WVS "third wave" survey.

James T. Gire & D.W.Carment, Dept. of Psychology, McMaster University

1992 (?)

2 (Canada & Nigeria only)

230

110  students at McMaster University

120 students at University of Jos

12

12

James T. Gire & D.W.Carment,  (1).

Written survey, university students at the University of Jos (Nigeria) and McMaster University (Canada).  Carment is now at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University.

GLOBE Study of 62 Societies (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness research program)  (Robert J. House, University of Pennsylvania, Principle Investigator)

1997

62

17,370 middle-level managers

?  Range of 27 to 1,790 per country, average size 251.  25.2% female respondents (p.96)

735 items, reduced to nine dimensions, each scored by Practices and Values

Nigeria: The Center for Sustainable Development and Gender Issues: Bolanle Elizabeth Akande; Appropriate Development Associates: Babajide Samuel Adetoun

http://www.sagepub.com/book.aspx?pid=9927

Pew Global Attitudes Project   (Pew Research Center for The People & The Press)

2002 (Canada: July; Nigeria: September)

44

38,263

500

1000

156

105

Nigeria: Research International (face-to-face interviews).  Canada: Environics (via telephone).

"Margin of Error: Canada, 4.4%; Nigeria: 3.1%".    http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/185.pdf  (pg. 119-125)

Social Axioms Survey http://personal.cityu.edu.hk/~mgkleung/sa.htm
Principle Investigators: Michael Harris Bond & Kwok Leung, City University of Hong Kong. 

2002 (?)

41

9,924

?  Range of 52 (Italy) up to 710 (India).  N.B.  Only Yoruba-Nigerians were surveyed.

60 items, reduced by factor analysis to five dimensions (Social cynicism; Social complexity; Reward for application; Religiosity; Fate control), then to two (Social Cynicism; Dynamic Externality)

Nigeria: Andrew Mogaji, University of Lagos.  Canada: Richard H.G. Field, University of Alberta.

"Gender-balanced".   7,672 university students sample: Under 20 years: 56%; 21-30 years: 42%.   2,252 Adults sample: Age distribution: Under 20: 5%; 21-30: 28%; 31-40: 20%; 41-50: 26%; 51-60: 15%; 60 and older: 6%

Voice of the People 2006 / Gallup International

2005 (June)

68

53,749

1,001, via telephone, "national"

500, face-to-face, "main cities"

Published survey contains 18 questions (1)

18

Nigeria:  Research & Marketing Services Ltd.   Canada: Léger Marketing

Eight sub-Saharan countries were included: Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, S.Africa, Togo.  Survey samples ranged from 488 (Togo) up to 2,219 (Kenya).  Gallup also provided corruption perceptions data to Transparency International’s Global Corruptions Monitor 2005 (vide supra).

 

Notes

(1) James T. Gire & D.W.Carment, "Dealing with Disputes: The Influence of Individualism-Collectivism," Journal of Social Psychology 133(1):81-95.

(2)  Léger Marketing / Gallup International (2006).  Voice of the People 2006, Montreal: Transcontinental Books.                                                                                                

(3)  Not all published Nigerian-Canadian data pairs in the individual surveys are included in this report.                                                                                                             

 

 

Total Pew2002 Scales (individual questions):

Q2-Q87: 59 - 5 "summary" = 54

Q16-60: 102 (not including "Summary")

TOTAL Scales: 156

Q2-Q87: 67 occurrences of "Nigeria" -4 (Nga only)- 6 (Q61-dominant country) - 5 "summary" = 52 Can-Nga pairs

Q16-60: 103 occurrences of "Nigeria" -34 (Nga only)- 4 "summary" = 64 Can-Nga pairs

Therefore total Pew2002 Can-Nga data pairs = 106

Note: Pew has about additional Nigerian responses in the "21 Population Survey (2003)" which follows in the same PDF document as the "44-Nation Major Survey (2002)" that begins with Q16 (T-1) and ends at Q60 (p. T-103). The "21 Population Survey" begins on T-127 (mentioning Nigerian N=1000  May1-11  2003; Canada N=500  April 29-May 4  2003) ending on T-160 and there are 40 Can-Nga response pairs. Most relate to perceptions of post-911 geopolitics  and not to general life perceptions. In the 44-Nation survey  Q49-Q55 were asked only in Muslim populations of M.East  Asia  Africa.

 

 

 

 

http://pewglobal.org/datasets/signup.php?DocID=168

Release Date

Report Title

Description

12.04.02

What the World Thinks in 2002

Summer 2002 44-Nation Survey (large file, 3.7MB)

 

Country: Canada

Company: Environics

Sample design: Probability

Mode: Telephone adults 18 plus

Languages: English and French

Fieldwork dates: July 16-24, 2002

Sample size: 500

Margin of Error: 4.4%

Representative: 100% of telephone households

 

Country: Nigeria

Company: Research International

Sample design: Probability

Mode: Face-to-face adults 18 plus

Languages: Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba

Fieldwork dates: September 11-30, 2002

Sample size: 1000

Margin of Error: 3.1%

Representative: 100% adult population

 

Sample Representation of Raw Data (global sample, 1990)

 

http://nds.umdl.umich.edu/w/wevs/wevs0015.htm#v177

 

v177

 

think meaning of life

Text of this Question or Item

How often, if at all, do you think about the meaning and purpose of life?

(READ OUT IN REVERSE ORDER FOR ALTERNATE CONTACTS)

  #        1   Often

            2   Sometimes

            3   Rarely

            4   Never

            9 Don't know [DO NOT READ OUT]

Percent

 

N

 

Value

 

Label

39.4

 

62,911

 

1

 

often

38.5

 

61,469

 

2

 

some

15.5

 

24,774

 

3

 

rarely

5.8

 

9,248

 

4

 

never

0.7

 

1,117

 

9

 

dk

 

 

8,963

 

.

 

(No Data)

100.0

 

168,482

 

 

 

Total

Summary Statistics

Min =

1

 

Mean =

1.926

Max =

9

 

Std. Dev. =

1.058

Median =

2

 

Variance =

1.119

(Based on 159,519 valid cases)

 


The Survey Results

 

For each survey, results are provided for both Canada and Nigeria.  The availability of other comparator nations varies from one survey to another, however, India and the United States are provided in each case, as well as other sub-Saharan nations.  In the World Values Survey, the response data were stratified by income and education, and so only low-income (essentially black African) South African responses are presented.  In addition to reporting raw response percentages, the Nigerian and Canadian responses are normalised as their proportion across the range (minimum to maximum) of all responding countries.  This will help to identify where the two nations are most disparate in their attitudes.  The basic equation for normalisation for Canadians (or Nigerians) is:

 

% range of response =

[(raw % Canadian response) – (raw % minimum country response)] / [(raw % maximum country response) – (raw % minimum country response)]

 

This approach overcomes some of the differences in country sampling sizes across the major surveys (Pew and WVS); the raw response data may be more useful where global variance in raw response rates is particularly narrow.

Gallup 2005: All 18 Published Responses

 

These data represent only a subset of the complete Gallup poll results, however the table presents responses for all 18 questions with country-level data that were published in April, 2006 by Canada’s Gallup representative, Léger Marketing.  A total of 7,720 persons in eight sub-Saharan Africa countries were included among the global sample of 53,749 persons in 65 countries.

 

 

Sorted in descending order of difference between Canadian and Nigerian responses.

 

Gallup 2005: Page from Source (1)

Question

Cameroon

Canada

Ghana

India

Nigeria

United States

Maximum

Minimum

Mean

Nigeria % of range

Canada % of range

Comments      (Maximum from highest to lowest;   Minimum from highest to lowest)

Difference in % range, Canada - Nigeria

p.111

"There were times in the last 12 months when I did not have enough to eat." (% "Often" or "Sometimes")

52%

5%

32%

n/a

56%

18%

56%

0%

18%

100%

9%

Max: Nigeria Min: Japan (1%), Austria (0%)

91%

p.46

"Federal elections in your country are free and fair" (% "Agree")

31%

66%

67%

32%

9%

54%

90%

9%

47%

0%

70%

Max: Denmark Min: Nigeria

70%

p.29-30.f

"The most important problems facing the world today?" (% "Environ-mental issues")

0%

10%

1%

1%

0%

4%

22%

0%

6%

0%

45%

Max: Japan (22%); S.Korea (20%)  Min: Cameroon / Kenya / Nigeria / Panama (0%)

45%

p.71-72

"Irrespective of whether you attend a place of worship - would you say you are a religious person? Not a religious person?  Or a convinced atheist?" (% "A religious person")

86%

58%

96%

84%

94%

73%

96%

14%

66%

98%

54%

Max: Ghana  Min: Japan (17%), Hong Kong (14%)

44%

p.29-30.k

"The most important problems facing the world today?" (% "Corruption")

7%

5%

1%

14%

13%

3%

21%

0%

4%

62%

24%

Max: Costa Rica (21%), Ecuador / India (14%),  Thailand (13%)  Min: Finland / Netherlands / Norway (0%), Ghana / Hong Kong / Japan / Senegal (1%)

38%

p.29-30.c

"The most important problems facing the world today?" (% "Unemployment")

12%

1%

14%

34%

12%

3%

34%

1%

9%

33%

0%

Max: India (34%), Greece (28%)  Min: Canada / Iceland / Norway / Thailand (1%)

33%

p.29-30.g

"The most important problems facing the world today?" (% "Drugs and drug abuse")

0%

5%

1%

1%

0%

9%

16%

0%

5%

0%

31%

Max: Taiwan (16%), Ireland (14%)  Min: Cameroon / Nigeria / Togo (0%)

31%

p.49

"Your country is governed by the will of the people" (% "Yes")

33%

36%

69%

22%

18%

37%

71%

11%

30%

12%

42%

Max: Malaysia  Min: Macedonia

30%

p.29-30.h

"The most important problems facing the world today?" (% "Globalization / fairer world trade")

3%

3%

0%

1%

0%

11%

11%

0%

4%

0%

27%

Max: Germany (11%), Ethiopia (7%)  Min: Bolivia / Japan / Kenya / Nigeria / S.Africa / Thailand / Togo

27%

p.29-30.a

"The most important problems facing the world today?" (% "Poverty: the gap between rich and poor")

34%

26%

39%

9%

39%

19%

57%

4%

26%

66%

42%

Max: Romania (57%), Venezuela (54%)  Min: Malaysia (7%), Thailand (4%)

25%

p.29-30.d

"The most important problems facing the world today?" (% "Wars & conflicts")

6%

8%

5%

0%

4%

10%

19%

0%

8%

21%

42%

Max: Japan  Min: Nicaragua

21%

p.29-30.e

"The most important problems facing the world today?" (% "Economic problems")

3%

4%

8%

14%

12%

6%

44%

0%

7%

27%

9%

Max: Thailand (44%), Indonesia (34%)  Min: Denmark / Finland / Iceland / Ireland / Norway (0%)

18%

p.29-30.b

"The most important problems facing the world today?" (% "Terrorism")

6%

6%

2%

12%

3%

19%

19%

1%

12%

11%

28%

Max: Italy (31%), Israel (26%)  Min: Ghana (2%), Greece/South Africa (1%)

17%

p.123

"During the last 12 months did you do any volunteer work… devoting time to a not--for-profit organisation without receiving any wage or salary?" (% "Yes")

36%

57%

35%

28%

47%

44%

67%

4%

28%

68%

84%

Max: Norway (67%), Canada (57%),  Paraguay (53%)  Min: Turkey (9%), Bulgaria (6%), Poland (4%)

16%

p.43

"Democracy may have problems, but it is the best system of government".  % "Agree"

85%

85%

93%

69%

88%

97%

93%

61%

79%

84%

75%

Max: Denmark  Min: Serbia

9%

p.29-30.i

"The most important problems facing the world today?" (% "HIV/AIDS and other health issues")

23%

5%

13%

3%

7%

3%

28%

0%

4%

25%

18%

Max: Ethiopia (28%), Vietnam (27%), South Africa / Togo (25%), Cameroon (23%)  Min: Bosnia / Philippines (0%)

7%

p.86-87

"Do you think immigration is a good thing or a bad thing for this country" (% "A good thing")

41%

74%

68%

58%

76%

51%

87%

7%

43%

86%

84%

Max: Israel/Philippines  Min: Bosnia (12%), Turkey (7%)

3%

p.29-30.j

"The most important problems facing the world today?" (% "Crime")

1%

4%

1%

6%

4%

1%

18%

0%

4%

22%

22%

Max: Guatemala (18%), Malaysia (14%), S.Africa (13%)  Min: Germany / Senegal / Togo (0%)

0%

 

(1) Source: Léger Marketing / Gallup International (2006).  Voice of the People 2006, Montreal: Transcontinental Books.

 

Pew and World Values Survey Data Rankings

Pew 2002: Nigeria Highest in the Range of Country Responses (80-100%)

Pew Global Attitudes Project: 44-Nation Major Survey (2002) 

http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/165topline.pdf  (Q.2-15,35,55-78,87) 

http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/185topline.pdf  (Q.16-60) 

Canada: N=500 adults, Environics, telephone, 16-24.VII.2002, Margin of error 4.4%

Nigeria: N=1000 adults, Research Intl., face-to-face, 11-30.IX.2002, Margin of error 3.1%

 

Pew 2002: Nigeria highest responses

Instances primarily where Nigeria ranked 80% or higher of the sample response range (descending order)

Vari-able

Definition

Can-ada

India

Nig-eria

South Africa (all)

Tan-zania

Ug-anda

U.S.A.

Max.

Min.

Nigeria % of range

Canada % of range

Maximum country (highest to lowest);   Minimum country (highest to lowest)

Difference in % range, Canada - Nigeria

Comments

Q.33

Do you think that globalization is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing? (% "Very" or "Somewhat good")

69%

45%

90%

70%

47%

73%

63%

90%

25%

100%

68%

Max: Nigeria, S.Korea, Kenya, Vietnam, Venezuela   Min: Argentina, Pakistan, Russia, Jordan, Uzbekistan

32%

 

Q.19

Which of the following comes closer to your view? I like the pace of modern life, OR I do not like the pace of modern life..  (% "Like")

55%

51%

85%

42%

58%

67%

48%

85%

35%

100%

40%

Max: Indonesia/Nigeria, Vietnam/Uzbekistan, Angola, Bangladesh  Min: Egypt, S.Korea, Italy/Poland/Russia

60%

Q19 & Q20 suggest Nigerians are quite willing to forfeit their traditional culture for "modernity".

Q.27

And what about the different products that are now available from different parts of the world?  (% "Very" or "Somewhat good")

93%

67%

94%

88%

83%

84%

81%

95%

53%

98%

95%

Max: Honduras, Britain/Nigeria/Vietnam, Canada/Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana/Venezuela   Min: India, Egypt/Jordan, Pakistan, Argentina, Bolivia

2%

Both Canadians and Nigerians show very strong support for international trade.

Q.35.d

News organizations: please tell me what kind of influence the group is having on the way things are going in (survey country). (% "Very" or "Somewhat good")

69%

80%

91%

85%

86%

93%

65%

93%

47%

96%

48%

Max: Uganda, Nigeria, China/Honduras/Indonesia, Ghana/Uzbekistan   Min: France, Argentina, Jordan, Japan, Turkey

48%

Nigerians' very strong support for their journalists corroborates the relatively high ranking of 38% of range of 195 nations for Nigeria's "Voice & Accountability" measure in the World Bank Governance Indicators. http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002

Q.40

Homosexuality is a way of life that should not be accepted by society. (% "Agree")

26%

63%

95%

63%

n/a

95%

42%

99%

15%

95%

13%

Max: Kenya, Senegal, Mali, Nigeria/Uganda, Ghana/Indonesia  Min: Argentina/Canada, Britain, France, Italy, Germany

82%

Large Cdn-Ngn difference.

Q.28

All in all, how do you feel about the world becoming more connected through greater economic trade and faster communication?  (% "Very" or "Somewhat good")

92%

69%

94%

86%

44%

94%

88%

97%

44%

94%

91%

Max: Vietnam, Côte d'Ivoire/Senegal/Slovak R./Uzbekistan, France/Kenya/Nigeria/Slovak R./Uganda,  Canada/Britain/Germany/Honduras/S.Korea/Venezuela   Min: India, Egypt, Pakistan, Tanzania

4%

Both Canadians and Nigerians show very strong support for international trade.

Q.29

Now thinking about you and your family – do you think the growing trade and business ties between our country and other
countries are...? 
(% "Very" or "Somewhat good")

77%

87%

93%

82%

78%

93%

79%

97%

33%

94%

69%

Max: Vietnam, Côte d'Ivoire, Honduras, Nigeria/Uganda, Senegal   Min: France, Russia, Bulgaria, Argentina/Egypt, Kenya

25%

 

Q.15.c

Corrupt political leaders: how much of a problem is it in your country? (% "Very big problem")

32%

80%

88%

75%

65%

81%

46%

92%

21%

94%

15%

Max:  Bangladesh, Argentina, Nigeria, Japan, Guatamela/Honduras/Kenya/Indonesia   Min:  Germany, Uzbekistan, Canada, Jordan, Britain

79%

Large Canadian-Nigerian difference, but compare this to WVS2000:F117, "Justified to accept a bribe in one's duties?"  Canada: Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index for 2002 ranked these 7 nations as the most corrupt (ascending order): Indonesia, Kenya, Angola, Madagascar, Paraguay, Nigeria, Bangladesh.  TPI measures "official corruption", i.e. the need to bribe senior public officials.   TPI also measured domestic perceptions of corruption in its 2003 "Global Corruption Barometer", where only 50.6% of Nigerians considered corruption to "affect their personal and family life very significantly", while the highest responses were 76.5%, 69.7% and 66.4% for Bulgaria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Turkey, respectively.  http://www.transparency.org/policy_and_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2003__1  (Appendix 1).   Compare to Q.48 (frequency of bribing government officials), Nigeria ranks highest.

Q.25

And what about the faster communication and greater travel between the people of (survey country) and people in other countries?  (% "Very" or "Somewhat good")

93%

73%

96%

92%

86%

96%

84%

99%

54%

93%

87%

Max: Vietnam, France, Senegal, Kenya/Nigeria/Uganda  Min: , Bolivia, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan

7%

 

Q.24

What do you think about the growing trade and business ties between (survey country) and other countries?  (% "Very" or "Somewhat good")

86%

69%

95%

88%

82%

95%

78%

98%

52%

93%

74%

Max: Senegal/Vietnam, Uzbekistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali/Nigeria/Uganda, Honduras/Germany/Ukraine   Min: India, Egypt, Argentina, Jordan

20%

 

Q.71

And which comes closer to describing your view? I admire the United States for its technological and scientific advances, OR I
do not admire the United States for its technological and scientific advances.  (% "I admire")

76%

67%

93%

79%

70%

82%

94%

97%

41%

93%

63%

Max: Côte d'Ivoire, U.S.A., Nigeria, Indonesia/Kenya, Japan, Senegal/Vietnam     Min:  Jordan, Czech R., Egypt, Pakistan, Russia

30%

Americans asked "I am proud (or not) of our country's technological and scientific advances."  Cf. WVS technology response: strong support by Nigerians for American scientific progress.

Q.30

Do you think that the opportunity to watch movies and TV and listen to music from different parts of the world is very good, somewhat good,, somewhat bad, or very bad for your family? (% "Very" or "Somewhat good")

95%

56%

91%

84%

73%

79%

86%

95%

37%

93%

100%

Max:  Japan/Canada, Vietnam, Britain/France, Czech R./Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria/Venezuela  Min: Bolivia/India, Egypt, Jordan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Kenya

7%

Both Canada and Nigeria rank highest in supporting access to global culture.  Islamic countries appear to have the lowest support.   Corroborates Q.28.

Q.26

What about the way movies, TV and music from different parts of the world are now available in (survey country)?  (% "Very" or "Somewhat good")

90%

60%

90%

83%

72%

78%

78%

95%

26%

93%

93%

Max: Côte d'Ivoire, France/Japan, China/Czech R./Nigeria/Canada, Vietnam, Venezuela  Min: Peru, India, Egypt, Russia, Bangladesh/Jordan, Pakistan

0%

Rare instance of high consensus between Nigeria & Canadian: perhaps a sign that each are "global citizens"? Corroborates Q.30.

Q.37.e

Religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government policy. (% "Completely" or "Mostly agree")

90%

79%

86%

79%

83%

81%

80%

90%

33%

93%

100%

Max:  Czech R., Britain/Côte d'Ivoire, Russia, France, Brazil/Germany, Canada/Honduras/Lebanon/Mexico/Ukraine   Min:  Uzbekistan, Angola/Bolivia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Jordan/Pakistan

7%

 

Q.16.c

Movies, TV and music: % "happening a lot more, somewhat more these days"

73%

78%

89%

79%

58%

75%

62%

92%

53%

92%

51%

Max: Vietnam/Lebanon, Indonesia, Nigeria/Poland   Min: France/Czech Rep., Tanzania, Argentina

41%

 

Q.16.b

Comm and travel: % "happening a lot more, somewhat more these days"

69%

69%

87%

75%

55%

81%

67%

93%

35%

90%

59%

Max: Vietnam, Nigeria/Lebanon, Poland, G.Britain, Ukraine  Min: Tanzania/Venezuela, Turkey, Argentina, Bangladesh

31%

 

Q.2&4

PERSONAL OPTIMISM: Rating of current situation relative to five years from now.  (% Optimistic)

54%

57%

86%

59%

41%

59%

61%

92%

34%

90%

34%

Max:  Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana/Mali, Angola, Brazil, Indonesia/Uzbekistan, Vietnam   Min:  Jordan, Tanzania, Lebanon, Argentina/Poland, Bulgaria/Germany, Czech R./Japan

55%

West Africans rank among the most optimistic in their 5-year outlook while AIDS-ravaged southern Africans rank mid-way.   "Hope beyond hope" (Russian female dissident, Nadezhda Mandelstam);  "An optimism of the will" (Italian sociologist, Antonio Gramsci)

Q.35.f

Religious leaders: please tell me what kind of influence the group is having on the way things are going in (survey country). (% "Very" or "Somewhat good")

54%

47%

84%

74%

84%

89%

62%

92%

13%

90%

52%

Max: Kenya, Indonesia, Senega/Uganda, Ghana, Nigeria/Tanzania  Min: Germany, Argentina, Czech R., Bulgaria, Japan

38%

Surprisingly, Middle Eastern states (Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey) rank about midway across the 42 countries with responses, rather than ranking very high.

Q.35.e

The trade unions: please tell me what kind of influence the group is having on the way things are going in (survey country). (% "Very" or "Somewhat good")

54%

58%

82%

60%

54%

67%

63%

92%

12%

88%

53%

Max: Vietnam, Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, Philippines  Min: Pakistan/Turkey, Poland, Russia, Jordan/Ukraine, Argentina

35%

 

Q.22.b

Internet: Please tell me if you think each one has been a change for the better,
a change for the worse, or hasn’t it made much difference. 
(% "Better")

69%

45%

84%

52%

45%

38%

63%

95%

21%

85%

65%

Max: Côte d'Ivoire, Czech R., Slovak R., Nigeria/Vietnam    Min: India/Tanzania, Jordan, Pakistan

20%

Nigeria's 84% seems falsely high for 2002, with perhaps 5% of the population using the Internet

Q.35.k

The United Nations: please tell me what kind of influence the group is having on the
way things are going in (survey country).
  (% "Very" or "Somewhat good")

81%

50%

83%

70%

63%

79%

72%

93%

25%

85%

82%

Max: Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire/Philippines, Vietnam, Uzbekistan, Ghana/Nigeria/Senegal   Min:  Brazil/Russia, Jordan/Turkey, Pakistan, Argentina

3%

 

Q.39

[I]t is necessary to believe in God to be moral and have good values. (% "Agree")

30%

88%

85%

80%

83%

84%

58%

99%

13%

84%

20%

Max: Indonesia, Senegal, Kenya/Philippines, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nigeria   Min: Canada, Japan, Italy, Russia, Britain, Czech R./France

64%

Large Cdn-Ngn difference.

Q.15.a

Crime: how much of a problem is it in your country? (% "Very big problem")

26%

86%

84%

96%

71%

67%

48%

96%

22%

84%

5%

Max: Bangladesh/S.Africa, Guatemala/Honduras, Argentina, India, Japan, Nigeria  Min:   Germany, China, S.Korea, Canada, Jordan

78%

Large Canadian-Nigerian difference

Q.16.a

Trade and business: % "happening a lot more" or "somewhat more these days"

69%

65%

82%

74%

52%

69%

67%

92%

28%

84%

64%

Max: Vietnam (92%), Uzbekistan (84%), Nigeria (82%), Philippines (78%)   Min: Bulgari (42%), Bangladesh (31%), Argentina (28%)

20%

 

Q.20

And which of these comes closer to your view? Our traditional way of life is getting lost, OR our traditional way of life remains
strong.. 
(% "… is getting lost")

62%

77%

83%

87%

87%

82%

67%

92%

38%

83%

44%

Max: Bangladesh, Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Mali/S.Africa/Tanzania/Honduras, Nigeria  Min: Canada, Vietnam, Jordan, Egypt, Uzbekistan

39%

Large Cdn-Ngn difference.  And sub-Saharan Africa has the highest rates of lost tradition - high stress, therefore empathy needed by expatriates??  Compare to Harpers Sep.2005, p.14: letters to Daily Times of Nigeria in 2004, on cell phone deaths by "killer numbers"

Q.22.a

Television: Please tell me if you think each one has been a change for the better,
a change for the worse, or hasn’t it made much difference. 
(% "Better")

47%

70%

85%

66%

73%

76%

36%

99%

22%

82%

32%

Max: Vietnam, Angola/Mali, Côte d'Ivoire/Nigeria, Indonesia/Kenya    Min: Argentina, Germany, Peru

49%

 

Q.15.g

Spread of HIV/AIDS: how much of a problem is it in your country? (% "Very big problem")

31%

72%

83%

96%

88%

91%

42%

96%

23%

82%

11%

Max: S.Africa, Kenya, Honduras, Uganda, Ghana  Min: Germany, Canada, Britain/Bulgaria/S.Korea, Slovak R., Jordan

71%

 

Q.38

What kind of marriage do you think is the more satisfying way of life, one where husband provides for the family and wife takes care of house and children, or where the husband and wife both have jobs and both take care of the house and children?  (% "both have jobs...")

66%

63%

80%

80%

72%

79%

58%

91%

34%

81%

56%

Maz:  Vietnam, Côte d'Ivoire, Angola/China, France/Peru, Ghana    Min:  Russia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Egypt/Pakistan

25%

 

Q.31.c

Has each of the following gotten better or worse over the last five years in our country?  the spread of diseases:  % "Worse"

55%

81%

82%

85%

70%

80%

68%

95%

31%

80%

38%

Max: Kenya, Honduras, Guatemala, S.Africa, Argentina  Min:  Canada, Germany, Egypt, China, Pakistan

42%

 

Q.17.c

Children need to learn English to succeed in the world today.  (% "Completely" or "Mostly agree")

76%

93%

91%

95%

81%

91%

70%

98%

65%

79%

33%

Max: Vietnam, Uzbekistan/Slovak R., Czech R./Indonesia, Germany/S.Africa   Min: Ghana, G.Britain, U.S., Jordan

45%

US: "a foreign language";  Canada: "French"

Q.22.c

Cellular phones: Please tell me if you think each one has been a change for the better,
a change for the worse, or hasn’t it made much difference. 
(% "Better")

49%

63%

86%

83%

89%

84%

62%

96%

49%

79%

0%

Max: Bangladesh/Côte d'Ivoire, Vietnam, Senegal, Tanzania    Min: G.Britain/France, Canada, Pakistan

79%

Compare to Q.66.b, cell phone ownership.

Q.35.n

NGO’s, that is non-governmental organizations such as...: please tell me what kind of influence the group is having on the
way things are going in (survey country).
  (% "Very" or "Somewhat good")

94%

45%

81%

76%

62%

92%

89%

96%

23%

79%

97%

Max:  Senegal, Kenya, Canada/France, Britain/Czech R./Slovak R., Côte d'Ivoire/Uganda  Min: Tanzania, Indonesia, Japan, India, Pakistan

18%

NGOs mentioned - Nigeria: Civil Liberties
Organisation (CLO), Society For Family Health (SFFH), Campaign For
Democracy (CD), Planned Parenthood Federation of Nigeria (PPFN), National
Council For Societies (NCWS), Women in Nigeria (WIN) and Centre for
Rehabilitation and Training (CERAT);  Canada: such as the Red Cross or the United Way.  % "Don't know" Nigeria: 11%; Canada: 2%.

Q.17.a

Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor. (% "Completely" or "Mostly agree")

61%

71%

80%

73%

56%

73%

72%

95%

26%

78%

51%

Max: Vietnam, S.Korea, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire   Min: Bulgaria, Bangladesh, Argentina

28%

Compare to support for Q.65 & Q.66 (US foreign aid) and also to:  ODA data: cric.ca, Earnescliffe (CIDA, 2000), Angus Reid (1998), Opoku-Dapnah 2002, WVS 2000:E129-E139, etc.

Q.37.b

It is the responsibility of the (state or government) to take care of very poor people who can't take care of themselves. (% "Completely" or "Mostly agree")

87%

89%

88%

90%

88%

85%

73%

97%

61%

75%

72%

Max: Bulgaria, Lebanan, Britain/Russia/Uzbekistan, Kenya/Poland, Bangladesh/Indonesia   Min: Venezuela, U.S.A., Argentina, Japan, Jordan

3%

Canada & Nigeria are "on the same page" here.

 

World Values Survey Data

WVS 2000: Nigeria Highest in the Range of Country Responses (80-100%)

 

 

Nigeria Highest: WVS 2000

Instances primarily where Nigeria ranked 80%  or higher of the sample response range (descending order)

2000 Vari-able

1990 Vari-able

Definition

Canada

India

Nigeria

South Africa (Low Income seg-ment)

Tanza-nia

United States

Zimba-bwe

Max.

Min.

Mean

Nigeria % of range

Canada % of range

Topic 1990 (p.ix - xiii)

Comments     
(Maximum from highest to lowest;   Minimum from highest to lowest)

F050

V166

Do you believe in… God (% "yes")

89

95

100

99

99

96

99

100

19

86

100%

86%

Religion

Max: Moroc., Pak., Egy., Alger., Jord., Nigeria, Bangl., Indon.  Min: Swe., Jap., Eston., Cze., Viet.

A001

V5

Importance in your life: Family important (% "very impt.)

94

93

99

93

93

95

97

99

61

89

100%

87%

Family

Max: Nigeria, Bosnia/Herz., Indon., Philipp.    Min: Russia, Latvia, Eston., Lith., China

F054

V171

Do you believe in… Heaven (% "yes")

74

72

99

88

93

88

93

100

17

64

99%

69%

Religion

Max:Pak., Egy., Alger., Moro.  Min: Den., Serb., Viet., Nigeria

D054

nil

''One of my main goals in life is to make my parents happy''

81

89

98

95

88

83

97

99

38

85

98%

70%

Family

Max: Jord., Egyp., Nigeria, Moro.  Min: China, N.Zeal., Norw., Swit., Swed.

F064

V177

Do you find you get comfort and strength from religion? (% "yes")

63

85

98

90

96

80

93

100

26

71

97%

50%

Religion

Max: Egy., Jord., Moro., Indon., Alger., Bangl., Nigeria, Iran, Tanz.  Min:  Jap. Fra., Swe., Den., Viet., Cze.

C011

V99

Important job aspect?  Good pay (% "mentioned")

76

92

97

94

89

89

88

98

54

82

98%

50%

Work

Max: Moroc., Jord., Nigeria   Min Swe., Tai., Braz., Den.

F034

V151

Would you say you are a religious person? (% "yes")

74

79

97

74

94

83

89

99

15

72

98%

70%

Religion

Max: Egy., Nigeria, Bang., Iran, Moro., Pol., Tanz., Ugan.   Min:  G.B., Swe., Viet., S.Kor., Bela., Jap., China

F063

V176

"How important is God in your life?" (% "very important")

67