Intelligence Issues for Congress
The “INTs”: Intelligence Disciplines
The Intelligence Community has been built around major agencies
responsible for specific
intelligence collection systems known as disciplines. Three major
intelligence disciplines or
“INTs”—signals intelligence (sigint), imagery intelligence (imint),
and human intelligence
(humint)—provide the most important information for analysts and
absorb the bulk of the
intelligence budget. Sigint collection is the responsibility of NSA
at Fort Meade, Maryland. Sigint
operations are classified, but there is little doubt that the need
for intelligence on a growing
variety of nations and groups that are increasingly using
sophisticated and rapidly changing
encryption systems requires a far different sigint effort than the
one prevailing during the Cold
War. Since the late 1990s a process of change in NSA’s culture and
methods of operations has
been initiated, a change required by the need to target terrorist
groups and affected by the
proliferation of communications technologies and inexpensive
encryption systems. Observers
credit the then-Director of NSA, Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden, who later
became Director of the CIA
in May 2006, with launching a long-overdue reorganization of the
Agency, and adapting it to
changed conditions. Part of his initiative has involved early
retirements for some NSA personnel
and greater reliance on outsourcing many functions previously done
by career personnel. Some of
the initiatives relating to acquisition did not, however, meet their
objectives.
A second major intelligence discipline, imagery or imint, is also
facing profound changes.
Imagery is collected in essentially three ways, satellites, manned
aircraft, and unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs). The satellite program that covered the Soviet Union
and acquired highly
accurate intelligence concerning submarines, missiles, bombers, and
other military targets is
perhaps the greatest achievement of the U.S. Intelligence
Community—it served as a foundation
for defense planning and strategic planning that led to the end of
the Cold War. In today’s
environment, there is a greater number of collection targets than
existed during the Cold War and
more satellites are required, especially those that can be
maneuvered to collect information about
a variety of targets. At the same time, the availability of
high-quality commercial satellite imagery
and its widespread use by federal agencies has raised questions
about the extent to which
coverage from the private sector can meet the requirements of
intelligence agencies. High altitude
UAVs such as the Global Hawk may also provide surveillance
capabilities that overlap those of
satellites.
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) was established in
1996 to manage imagery
processing and dissemination previously undertaken by a number of
separate agencies. NIMA
was renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) by the
FY2004 Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136). The goal of NGA is, according to
the agency, to use imagery
and other geospatial information “to describe, assess, and visually
depict physical features and
geographically referenced activities on the Earth.”
Intelligence from human contacts—humint—is the oldest intelligence
discipline and the one that
is most often written about in the media. The CIA is the primary
collector of humint, but the
Defense Department also has responsibilities filled by defense
attachés at embassies around the
world and by other agents working on behalf of theater commanders.
Many observers have
argued that inadequate humint has been a systemic problem and
contributed to the inability to
gain prior knowledge of the 9/11 plots. In part, these criticisms
reflect the changing nature of the
international environment. During the Cold War, targets of U.S.
humint collection were foreign
government officials and military leaders. Intelligence agency
officials working under cover as
diplomats could approach potential contacts at receptions or in the
context of routine embassy
business. Today, however, the need is to seek information from
clandestine terrorist groups or
narcotics traffickers who do not appear at embassy social
gatherings. Humint from such sources
can be especially important as there may be little evidence of
activities or intentions that can be
gathered from imagery, and their communications may be carefully
limited.
Placing U.S. intelligence officials in foreign countries under
“nonofficial cover” (NOC) in
businesses or other private capacities is possible, but it presents
significant challenges to U.S.
agencies. Administrative mechanisms are vastly more complicated than
they are for officials
formally attached to an embassy; special arrangements have to be
made for pay, allowances,
retirement, and healthcare. The responsibilities of operatives under
nonofficial cover to the parent
intelligence agency have to be reconciled with those to private
employers, and there is an
unavoidable potential for many conflicts of interest or even
corruption. Any involvement with
terrorist groups or smugglers has a potential for major
embarrassment to the U.S. government
and, of course, physical danger to those immediately involved.
Responding to allegations that CIA agents may have been involved too
closely with narcotics
smugglers and human rights violators in Central America, the
then-Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI), John Deutch, established guidelines in 1995
(which remain classified) to
govern the recruitment of informants with unsavory backgrounds.
Although CIA officials
maintain that no proposal for contacts with persons having
potentially valuable information was
disapproved, there was a widespread belief that the guidelines
served to encourage a “risk averse”
atmosphere at a time when information on terrorist plans, from
whatever source, was urgently
sought. The FY2002 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 107-108)
directed the DCI to rescind
and replace the guidelines, and July 2002 press reports indicated
that they had been replaced.
A major constraint on humint collection is the availability of
personnel trained in appropriate
languages. Cold War efforts required a supply of linguists in a
relatively finite set of foreign
languages, but the Intelligence Community now needs experts in a
wider range of more obscure
languages and dialects. Various approaches have been considered: use
of civilian contract
personnel, military reservists with language qualifications, and
substantial bonuses for agency
personnel who maintain their proficiency. The National Security
Education Program, established
in 1991, provides scholarships and career training for individuals
in or planning to enter careers in
agencies dealing with national security issues.
Other “INTs”
A fourth INT, measurement and signatures analysis—masint—has
received greater emphasis in
recent years. A highly technical discipline, masint involves the
application of complicated
analytical refinements to information collected by sigint and imint
sensors. It also includes
spectral imaging by which the identities and characteristics of
objects can be identified on the
basis of their reflection and absorption of light. Masint is
undertaken by DIA and other DOD
agencies. A key problem has been retaining personnel with expertise
in masint systems who are
offered more remunerative positions in private industry.
Another category of information, open source information—osint
(newspapers, periodicals,
pamphlets, books, radio, television, and Internet websites)—is
increasingly important given
requirements for information about many regions and topics (instead
of the former concentration
on political and military issues affecting a few countries). At the
same time, requirements for
translation, dissemination, and systematic analysis have increased,
given the multitude of
different areas and the volume of materials. Many observers believe
that intelligence agencies
should be more aggressive in using osint; some believe that the
availability of osint may even
reduce the need for certain collection efforts. The availability of
osint also raises questions
regarding the need for intelligence agencies to undertake
collection, analysis, and dissemination
of information that could be directly obtained by user agencies.
Section 1052 of the Intelligence
Reform Act expressed the sense of Congress that there should be an
open source intelligence
center to coordinate the collection, analysis, production, and
dissemination of open source
intelligence to other intelligence agencies. An Open Source Center
was subsequently established
and annual conferences are held to acquaint the public with the
Intelligence Community’s osint
efforts.
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