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Intelligence Issues for Congress

International Terrorism

Although intelligence agencies were focused on international terrorism from at least the mid-
1980s, the events of September 11, 2001, made counterterrorism a primary mission of the
Intelligence Community. In response to a widespread perception that statutory barriers restricted
the flow of information between the CIA and the FBI, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act
(P.L. 107-56) which removed impediments to sharing foreign intelligence and law enforcement
information (including grand jury information). The PATRIOT Act was designed to facilitate an
all-source intelligence effort against terrorist groups that work both inside and outside U.S.
borders. Nevertheless, problems of coordination and institutional rivalries persist. Some
provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act relating to the sharing of law enforcement and foreign
intelligence information were to have expired in early 2006, but new legislation (P.L. 109-177
and P.L. 109-178) extended expiring provisions with modifications.

The Department of Homeland Security, established in 2003, contains an analytical office
responsible for integrating information from foreign intelligence and law enforcement sources. In
addition, the Bush Administration announced the establishment of the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center (TTIC) in January 2003 under the DCI. In accordance with EO13354 of August 27, 2004,
and the Intelligence Reform Act, TTIC was transferred to the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC) and constitutes the focal point for assessing information on potential terrorist threats
from all sources.

As an intelligence mission, counterterrorism has several unique characteristics. Although it
usually requires input from all the various intelligence disciplines, most observers believe that it
is especially dependent upon humint. Technical systems are good at providing information about
numbers of airplanes, ships, and tanks but the most important information on small groups of
terrorist plotters often is provided by humint sources. Furthermore, the type of humint required
for counterterrorism depends on contacts with sources far removed from embassy gatherings and
requires expertise in languages that are possessed by few in this country. This is a distinct
difference from humint collection during the Cold War when Soviet diplomats and military
officers were often the principal targets.

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