Intelligence Issues for Congress
Analytical Quality
The ultimate goal of intelligence is accurate analysis. Analysis is
not, however, an exact science
and there have been, and undoubtedly will continue to be, failures
by analysts to prepare accurate
and timely assessments and estimates. The performance of the
Intelligence Community’s
analytical offices during the past decade is a matter of debate;
some argue that overall the quality
of analysis has been high while others point to the failure to
provide advance warning of the 9/11
attacks and a flawed estimate of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
as reflecting systemic
problems. Congressional intelligence committees have for some time
noted weaknesses in
analysis and lack of language skills, and a predominant focus on
current intelligence at the
expense of strategic analysis.
Analytical shortcomings are not readily addressed by legislation,
but Congress has increased
funding for analytical offices since 9/11 and the Intelligence
Reform Act of 2004 contains a
number of provisions designed to improve analysis—an
institutionalized mechanism for alternate
or “red team” analyses to be undertaken (Section 1017), the
designation of an individual or entity
to ensure that intelligence products are timely, objective, and
independent of political
considerations (Section 1019), and the designation of an official in
the office of the DNI to whom
analysts can turn for counsel, arbitration on “real or perceived
problems of analytical tradecraft or
politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objectivity” (Section
1020).
These efforts will, however, be affected by the long lead-times
needed to prepare and train
analysts, especially in such fields as counterterrorism and
counterproliferation. Improving
analysis depends, among other things, upon the talents of analysts
brought into government
service, encouraging their contributions and calculated
risk-takings, and a willingness to tolerate
the tentative nature of analytical judgments. These factors are
sometimes difficult to achieve in
government organizations. Another significant impediment to
comprehensive analysis has been a
shortage of trained linguists especially in languages of current
interest. As noted above, the
National Security Education Program and related efforts are designed
to meet this need, but most
observers believe the need for linguists will remain a pressing
concern for some years.
An enduring concern is the existence of “stovepipes.” Agencies that
obtain highly sensitive
information are reluctant to share it throughout the Intelligence
Community out of a
determination to protect their sources. In addition, information not
available to analysts with
relevant responsibilities is many times wasted. In recent years
there have been calls for greater
information sharing in order to improve the quality of analysis, but
it is expected that dealing with
this complex dilemma will require continuing attention by
intelligence managers.
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