Search this site:

 

Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border

ATF Enforcement of U.S. Gun Laws

According to DOJ, ATF is the lead federal agency responsible for stopping the illegal flow of
firearms, or gun trafficking, from the United States to Mexico, given the bureau’s statutory
mission and authority.48 ATF has developed a nationwide strategy to reduce firearms trafficking
and violent crime by preventing convicted felons, drug traffickers, and juvenile gang members
from acquiring firearms from gun traffickers. These criminals often acquire firearms from a
person who otherwise is not prohibited to possess a firearms through straw purchases or by
buying a firearm from a corrupt dealer who sells firearms off-the-books in an attempt to escape
federal regulation.

Although there is no statutory definition for “gun trafficking” in the GCA, it essentially entails
the movement or diversion of firearms from legal to illegal markets.49 Unlike other forms of
contraband, almost all illegal firearms used criminally in the United States were diverted at some
point from legal channels of commerce.50 ATF works to reduce firearms-related crime with two
approaches, industry regulation and criminal investigation.

ATF Compliance Inspections of Licensed Gun Dealers
ATF regulates the U.S. firearms industry by inspecting federal firearms licensees (FFLs), or
licensed gun dealers, to monitor their compliance with the GCA and NFA, and to prevent the
diversion of firearms from legal to illegal channels of commerce. Despite its crime-fighting
mission, ATF’s business relationships with the firearms industry and larger gun-owning
community have been a perennial source of tension, which from time-to-time has been the subject
of congressional oversight.51 Nevertheless, under current law, ATF Special Agents (SAs)52 and
Industry Operations Investigators (IOIs)53 are authorized to inspect or examine the inventory and
records of an FFL without search warrants under three scenarios:54

• in the course of a reasonable inquiry during the course of a criminal investigation
of a person or persons other than the FFL;
• to ensure compliance with the record keeping requirements of the GCA – not
more than once during any twelve-month period, or at any time with respect to
records relating to a firearm involved in a criminal investigation that is traced to
the licensee; or
• when such an inspection or examination is required for determining the
disposition of one or more firearms in the course of a criminal investigation.

By inspecting the firearms transfer records that FFLs are required by law to maintain, ATF SAs
and IOIs are able to trace crime guns from their domestic manufacturer or importer to the first
retail dealer that sold those firearms to persons in the general public, generating vital leads in
homicide and other criminal investigations. In addition, by inspecting those records, ATF
investigators sometimes discover evidence of corrupt FFLs dealing in firearms “off the books,”
straw purchases, and other patterns of illegal behavior.

In July 2004, the DOJ Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported on ATF inspections of FFLs.
Among other things, the OIG reported that ATF inspected the operations of 4.5% of the 104,000
FFLs in FY2002.55 Since then, according to ATF, 10,106 firearms compliance inspections were
conducted in FY2007, covering about 9.3% of the nearly 109,000 FFLs in that fiscal year;56 and
11,169 firearms compliance inspections were conducted in FY2008, covering nearly 10% of the
111,600 FFLs in that fiscal year.57

In its FY2010 budget submission to Congress, ATF has reported that there are about 113,000
FFLs nationwide, but nearly half of them (53,472) are licensed collectors.58 Those collectors are
not authorized to be “engaged in the business” of dealing firearms,59 but they are authorized to
engage in limited interstate firearms transfers of “curios and relics”60 without engaging the
services of an FFL to facilitate such transfers and related background checks.

Straw Purchases and the Ant Run
A “straw purchase” occurs when a person, who is otherwise eligible to purchase a firearm,
purchases a firearm from a federally licensed dealer for another person, who is either prohibited
from possessing a firearm or does not want a paper trail linking him to the purchased firearm.
Routine, small-scale smuggling of guns across the border often involves a series of straw
purchases, during which guns are purchased from FFLs in border states and then sold to a middle
man, who then smuggles the guns across the border. Repeated trips across the border of one to
three guns, referred to in border parlance as the ant (hormiga) run, is a common way firearms are
smuggled into Mexico.61 In the United States, straw purchases are illegal under the GCA.62 When
a person buys a firearm from an FFL, the buyer and the FFL are required to fill out ATF Form
4473. The FFL is required to verify the purchaser’s name, address, date of birth, and other
information by examining a state-issued piece of identification, most often a driver’s license. If
the purchaser or dealer falsifies any information on the Form 4473, it is a federal offense
punishable by no more than 10 years’ imprisonment and/or a fine.63 It is also illegal for the gun
trafficker who sponsored the straw purchase, because it is a federal offense for any person to aid,
abet, counsel, command, or solicit a criminal act;64 or engage in a conspiracy to defraud the
United States. It is also illegal to smuggle firearms out of the United States.65

Multiple Handgun Sales Reports
In 1986, as part of the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act,66 Congress amended the GCA to require
FFLs to report to the Attorney General (AG) whenever they transferred more than one handgun to
any nonlicensee within five consecutive business days.67 In 1993, as part of the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act,68 Congress amended the GCA to require that FFLs also forward this
information to the state police or to the local law enforcement agency that has jurisdiction in the
area where the transfer occurred. However, except for information pertaining to persons
prohibited from possessing firearms, federal law prohibits state or local law enforcement agencies
from disclosing those records to any person or entity, and requires those records be destroyed
within 20 days of receipt so that such records cannot be used as a registry of firearms or firearms
owners. At the end of every six-month period, the state or local law enforcement agency is
required to certify to the AG that the record nondisclosure and destruction requirements were
complied with. These provisions were enacted because when multiple handguns are purchased in
states with less strict firearm laws and then sold in states with stricter firearm laws, this is often
an indicator of interstate firearms trafficking, that is the diversion of firearms from legal to illegal
markets.

Gun Shows and Private Firearm Transfers
Private, intrastate firearm transfers are legal in some states at gun shows and flea markets. A
person who is not “engaged in the business” of dealing firearms may transfer firearms to another
person as long as he does not do so knowingly to a prohibited person, and as long as he does not
knowingly transfer a handgun to a person who is not a resident of the state in which the transfer
occurs.69 It is notable that firearms acquired through private transfers, particularly multiple
private transfers, are much more difficult to trace. Consequently, there is likely to be a premium
for such firearms in illegal markets on both sides of the border, as there would also be for some
stolen firearms, because there are no paper trails for these firearms. Southwest border states in
which private transfers at gun shows are legal include Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and
California, although gun shows and all private firearm transfers are more strictly regulated in
California.70

Semiautomatic Assault Weapons
Certain semiautomatic firearms that are often, but not always, based on military designs are very
popular with Mexican drug traffickers.71 Depending on their configuration, some of these
firearms formerly qualified by definition as “semiautomatic assault weapons” under an expired
provision of federal law. In 1994, Congress banned for 10 years the possession, transfer, or
further domestic manufacture of semiautomatic assault weapons (SAWs) and large capacity
ammunition feeding devices (LCAFDs) that hold more than 10 rounds that were not legally
owned or available prior to the date of enactment (September 13, 1994). The SAW-LCAFD ban
expired on September 13, 2004.

The SAW ban statute classified a semiautomatic rifle as an assault weapon if it was able to accept
a detachable magazine and included two or more of the following five characteristics: (1) a
folding or telescoping stock, (2) a pistol grip, (3) a bayonet mount, (4) a muzzle flash suppressor
or threaded barrel capable of accepting such a suppressor, or (5) a grenade launcher.72 There were
similar definitions for pistols and shotguns that were classified as semiautomatic assault
weapons.73 Semiautomatic assault weapons that were legally owned prior to the ban were not
restricted and remained available for transfer under applicable federal and state laws.

Opponents of the ban argue that the statutorily defined characteristics of a semiautomatic assault
weapon were largely cosmetic, and that these weapons were potentially no more lethal than other
semiautomatic firearms that were designed to accept a detachable magazine and were equal or
superior in terms of ballistics and other performance characteristics. Proponents of the ban argue
that semiautomatic military-style firearms, particularly those capable of accepting large capacity
ammunition feeding devices, have no place in the civilian gun stock.

During and following World War II, assault rifles were developed to provide a lighter infantry
weapon that could fire more rounds, more rapidly. To increase capacity of fire, detachable, self-feeding
magazines were developed. These rifles were usually designed to be fired in fully
automatic mode, meaning that once the trigger is pulled, the weapon continues to fire rapidly
until all the rounds in the magazine are expended, or the trigger is released. Often these rifles
were also designed with a “select fire” feature that allowed them to be fired in short bursts (e.g.,
three rounds per pull of the trigger), or in semiautomatic mode (i.e., one round per pull of the
trigger), as well as in fully automatic mode. Semiautomatic firearms by comparison, including
semiautomatic assault weapons, fire one round per pull of the trigger.

Following the 1994 Semiautomatic Assault Weapons Ban, manufacturers changed the design of
many firearms so that post-ban models did not include the requisite number of characteristics that
would have qualified those firearms as “semiautomatic assault weapons.” These measures
arguably undercut the ban, as post-ban models included the two hallmarks of an “assault rifle,”
the detachable magazine and pistol grip.

Fully Automatic Machineguns
In the United States, fully automatic machine guns are strictly regulated under the NFA, which
levies taxes on all aspects of the manufacture, importation, and distribution of such firearms. It is
a felony to receive, possess, or transfer an unregistered NFA firearm.74 Such offenses are
punishable by a fine of up to $250,000, imprisonment for up to 10 years, and forfeiture of the
firearm and any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft used to conceal or convey the firearm.75 It is a federal
offense to convert a semiautomatic firearm to “full-auto” without proper authorization from the
Attorney General. Parts kits to convert semiautomatic weapons to fully automatic are available on
the U.S. civilian gun market, but these kits are considered machine guns in most instances and are
also strictly regulated. In other instances, however, the individual parts in these kits may not be
regulated. 76

Project Gunrunner: ATF Efforts to Suppress Southwest Border Gun Trafficking
ATF has increased its efforts in recent years to suppress illegal gun trafficking across the
Southwest border. As part of these efforts, ATF inspects FFLs to monitor their compliance with
U.S. gun laws, and to prevent the diversion of firearms from legal to illegal channels of
commerce. ATF reports that there are around 6,700 FFLs in the United States operating in the
Southwest border region of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California.77 ATF also reports that
Mexican DTOs are increasingly sending enforcers across the border to hire surrogates (straw
purchasers) who buy several “military-style” firearms at a time from FFLs. The DTOs also
reportedly favor pistols chambered to accommodate comparatively large cartridges and
magazines that are capable of piercing through armor vests typically worn by law enforcement
officers. Less frequently, but no less troubling to law enforcement, the DTOs have also sought .50
caliber sniper rifles.

Funding for Gunrunner[78]
During FY2006 and FY2007, ATF dedicated approximately 100 special agents and 25 industry
operations investigators to a Southwest border initiative known as “Project Gunrunner” to disrupt
the illegal flow of guns from the United States into Mexico. In FY2007, ATF agents investigated
187 firearms trafficking cases and recommended 465 defendants for prosecution. 79 By the end of
FY2008, ATF had deployed 146 special agents and 68 industry operations investigators to the
Southwest border to bolster that initiative at a conservatively estimated cost of $32.2 million.80

For FY2009, the Administration’s budget request for ATF included a single increase of $948,000
to fund 12 industry operations investigator positions to bolster efforts already underway as part of
Gunrunner.81 In the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Congress has provided
ATF with $10 million to ramp up Gunrunner and $30 million to assist local law enforcement with
counter-narcotics efforts.82 In the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8), Congress has
provided ATF with a FY2009 budget of $1.054 billion, including another $5 million for
Gunrunner.83

In addition, in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32), Congress appropriated
$14 million for ATF. This amount includes (1) $4 million to upgrade and share ballistic imaging
technology with the Government of Mexico, and (2) $6 million for other ongoing efforts focused
on stemming illegal gun trafficking to Mexico under Project Gunrunner.84

The ATF FY2010 budget request85 includes $18 million and 92 permanent positions (including 34
agents) to support Project Gunrunner. 86 The House-passed FY2010 Commerce, Justice, Science,
and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations bill (H.R. 2847) would provide ATF with $1.106
billion, including the requested $18 million increase for Gunrunner. According to House report
language, such an increase would bring total funding for Southwest border firearms trafficking to
$59.9 million, but this amount includes one-time, stimulus funding of $10 million provided in the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 for FY2008.87 The Senate-reported CJS
appropriations bill (also H.R. 2847) would provide ATF with $1.121 billion for ATF, including the
requested amount for Gunrunner. According to Senate report language, the Senate committee
recommendation would bring total funding for Southwest border firearms trafficking to $61
million.88

ATF Firearms Tracing for Mexican Authorities
ATF also maintains a foreign attaché in Mexico City to administer an Electronic Trace
Submission System (ETSS), also known as the eTrace program, for Mexican law enforcement
authorities. Although several sets of trace data have been released by ATF, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has provided the most comprehensive analysis of ATF trace data.
Nevertheless, trace data reported to CRS by ATF is also discussed below, as each set of trace data
provides distinct insights into Southwest border firearms trafficking.

ATF Briefing for CRS, May 18, 2008
From FY2005 through FY2007, ATF traced just over 11,700 firearms recovered by Mexican
authorities. Although only a fraction of recovered firearms were submitted for tracing,
approximately 90% of those firearms were found to have originated in the United States.89 Of
those traced firearms, nearly 75% were reported to be handguns and 25% long guns. At that time
there was no public information about the number of those handguns and long guns that were
possibly “semiautomatic assault weapons.” However, 25 machine guns were reportedly
confiscated, of which six were traced back to U.S. military inventories.90 In addition, reports
indicate that in at least 10 instances, Mexican authorities recovered U.S. manufactured 66
millimeter anti-tank weapons from Mexican DTOs.91

Caution should be exercised when drawing conclusions from ATF crime gun trace data. Although
it is valid to say that 90% of traced firearms originated in the United States, it would be invalid to
conclude that 90% of all guns used in crime in Mexico originated in the United States. Crime gun
trace data are useful measurements of crime gun trends; however, the issues of consistent,
random, and unbiased data collection have not been adequately addressed through comprehensive
tracing and other controls. Hence, it is often not possible to test for statistical significance.
Nevertheless, even though a statistically valid percent estimate of US-sourced firearms cannot be
made based on trace data, criminal investigations have documented that there is great demand for
certain firearms that are available in normal (non-military) commercial channels in the United
States and that those firearms have been illegally trafficked to Mexico in large numbers.

ATF Briefing for CRS, April 16, 2009
In January 2008, ATF announced that e-Trace technology would be deployed to nine additional
U.S. consulates in Mexico (Merida, Juarez, Monterrey, Nogales, Hermosillo, Guadalajara,
Tijuana, Matamoros, and Nueva Laredo).92 The number of traces performed by ATF for Mexican
authorities for FY2008 increased markedly from previous years. During FY2008, ATF reportedly
traced 7,743 firearms recovered by Mexican authorities and, of those firearms:

• 63.5% were made in the United States;
• 29.5% were made outside of the United States, but subsequently imported; and
• 7% were made outside of the United States and there was no indication that they
had been imported into the United States before turning up in Mexico.93

Some of those traces were instrumental in developing investigative leads in homicide and gun
trafficking cases.94 As described below, however, GAO has reported a different number of total
traces for FY2008 (7,200), and for more years, FY2004 through FY2008, than was previously
reported by ATF to CRS.

GAO Report on Firearms Trafficking and Mexico
In June 2009, GAO released a report on firearms trafficking and U.S. efforts to combat the flow
of illegal firearms to Mexico that included an analysis of ATF trace data for FY2004 through
FY2008.95 GAO reported that 23,159 firearms were submitted by Mexican authorities to the ATF
for tracing during those years.96 Of those firearms, 20,060 or 86.6% were successfully traced back
to the United States.97 For the last three years (FY2006 through FY2008), over 90% of firearms
recovered in Mexico and traced by ATF were found to have come from the United States.98 Of
those firearms, 68% were manufactured in the United States and 19% were manufactured abroad
and imported into the United States.99 About 70% of traced firearms were found to have come
from Texas (39%), California (20%), and Arizona (10%).

It is notable, however, that only a fraction of the firearms recovered by Mexican authorities have
been traced. In FY2008, for example, information on about 7,200 of the nearly 30,000 firearms
recovered by the Mexican Attorney General’s office were submitted to ATF for tracing, because
of bureaucratic obstacles and lack of resources.100 Notwithstanding such limitations, about 25%
of firearms recovered in Mexico in FY2008 and traced back to the United States were
semiautomatic variants of the AK-47 and AR-15 rifles according to GAO.101

From FY2004 through FY2008, 70 machine guns were submitted for tracing, or .30% of the total
number of firearms submissions (23,159), and one of these machineguns was traced back to the
Mexican government.102 While GAO did not report how many of these machine guns were traced
back to the U.S. military inventories, it was reported that over these years 160 firearms of all
types, or .70% of the total, had been traced back to those inventories. Nevertheless, according to
U.S. officials interviewed by GAO, “there have not been any indications of significant trafficking
in firearms from U.S. military personnel or U.S. military arsenals.”103

GAO recommended that the U.S. Attorney General direct the ATF Director to regularly update
ATF’s reporting on aggregate firearms trafficking data and trends, and that the U.S. Attorney
General and Secretary of Homeland Security ensure the systematic gathering and reporting of
data related to results of efforts to combat firearms trafficking, including related firearms seizures,
investigations and prosecutions.104

Merida and Appropriations Authorizations for ATF
In the 110th Congress, the House passed H.R. 6028, the Mérida Initiative to Combat Illicit
Narcotics and Reduce Organized Crime Authorization Act of 2008 on June 10, 2008.105 This bill
would have authorized a total of $73.5 million over three years, FY2008-FY2010, to increase the
number of ATF positions dedicated to Project Gunrunner ($45 million) and assign ATF agents to
Mexico ($28.5 million). The Senate, however, took no action on this bill. Senator Jeff Bingaman
introduced the Southwest Border Violence Reduction Act of 2008 (S. 2867), a bill that also
included authorizations for increased ATF resources. Representatives Henry Cuellar and Ciro
Rodriguez introduced similar bills (H.R. 5863 and H.R. 5869).

In the 111th Congress, Senator Bingaman and Representative Rodriguez have reintroduced their
Southwest Border Violence Reduction bills (S. 205/H.R. 495). Representative Rodriguez has also
introduced the Border Reinforcement and Violence Reduction Act of 2009 (H.R. 1448), a bill that
would authorize the appropriations of $15 million for each year, FY2010 and FY2011, for Project
Gunrunner. In addition, Representative Sheila Jackson Lee introduced the Border Security,
Cooperation, and Act Now Drug Prevention Act (H.R. 1900), a bill that would authorize the
Attorney General to deploy additional federal agents, including ATF agents, to states in the event
that a governor should declare an “international border security emergency.”

Endnotes

48 U.S. Department of Justice, Statement of David Ogden, Deputy Attorney General, before the United States Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Southern Border Violence: Homeland Security Threats,
Vulnerabilities, and Responsibilities,” March 25, 2009, p.11.

49 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Project Gunrunner: The
Southwest Border Initiative, ATF P 3317.6, March 2009, available at http://www.atf.gov/pub/fire-explo_pub/p3317_6rev2.pdf.

50 Greg Ridgeway, Glenn L. Pierce, and Anthony A. Braga, et al., Strategies for Disrupting Illegal Firearms Markets:
A Case Study of Los Angeles, RAND Corporation, 2008, p. 1.

51 For example, in the 109th Congress, the House Judiciary Crime subcommittee held two oversight hearings examining
ATF firearms enforcement operations at guns shows in Richmond, Virginia, in 2005. ATF agents reportedly provided
state and local law enforcement officers with confidential information from background check forms (ATF Form
4473s), so that officers could perform residency checks on persons who had otherwise legally purchased firearms at
those gun shows. Questions were also raised as to whether ATF agents had profiled gun purchasers at those gun shows
on the basis of race, ethnicity, and gender. See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Oversight Hearing on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (BATFE) Parts I & II: Gun Show Enforcement, February 15 and 28, 2006. Also see
Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’
Investigative Operations at Gun Shows, I-2007-007, June 2007.

52 For FY2009, Congress has provided ATF with funding for 2,504 SAs.

53 For FY2009, Congress has provided ATF with funding for 789 IOIs.

54 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(B).

55 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Inspections of Firearms Dealers by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Report Number I-2004-005, (July 2004), p. xi.

56 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Congressional Budget
Submission, Fiscal Year 2008, (February 2007), p. 29.

57 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Congressional Budget
Submission, Fiscal Year 2010, May 2009, p. 5.

58 Ibid.

59 A person is “engaged in the business” as a firearms dealer if he devotes time, attention, and labor to dealing in
firearms as a regular course of trade or business with the principal objective of livelihood and profit through repetitive
purchase and resale of firearms. The term does not apply to a person who makes occasional sales, exchanges, or
purchase of firearms for the enhancement of a personal collection or hobby, or who sells all or part of his personal
collection of firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21).

60 See 27 CFR § 478.11 for the definition of “curios and relics,” which generally include firearms that are 50 years old,
of museum interest, or derive a substantial amount of their value from the fact that they are novel, rare, bizarre, or
because they are associated with some historical figure, period, or event. For a list of “curios and relics,” go to
http://www.atf.gov/firearms/curios/index.htm.

61 Ibid.

62 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.

63 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6); 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).

64 18 U.S.C. § 2.

65 18 U.S.C. § 554. Depending on the type of firearm, it is also a violation of either the Arms Export Control Act (AECA; 22 U.S.C. § 2778 et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA; 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420) to
transport a handgun, rifle, or shotgun across the border into Mexico without proper authorization of the U.S.
government.

66 P.L. 99-308, § 103, May 19, 1986, 100 Stat. 453.

67 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(3).

68 P.L. 103-159, § 201, November 30, 1993, 107 Stat. 1544.

69 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5).

70 See Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence website on state gun laws, http://www.stategunlaws.org/.

71 Tobar, “Guns Flow Easily Into Mexico From The U.S.,” Los Angeles Times, January 8, 2006, p. A1.

72 Formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30)(B).

73 Formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30)(C) and (D).

74 26 U.S.C §§ 5861(d) and (j).

75 26 U.S.C § 5872; 49 U.S.C §§ 781-788.

76 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF National Firearms Act
Handbook, ATF E-Publication 5329.8, June 2007, pp. 11-14.

77 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico
Face Planning and Coordination Challenges, GAO-09-709, June 2009, p. 20.

78 For further information, see CRS Report RL34514, The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF): Budget and Operations, by William J. Krouse.

79 Statement of William Hoover, Assistant Director for Field Operations, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives, concerning “U.S. Obligations under the Merida Initiative,” February 7, 2008.

80 CRS conversation with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Office of Legislative Affairs,
February 18, 2009.

81 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Congressional Budget
Submission, Fiscal Year 2009 (Feb. 2008), Exhibit C – Program Increases/Offsets by Decision Unit.

82 P.L. 111-5; 123 Stat 115 (2009).

83 P.L. 111-8; 123 Stat 524 (2009).

84 This supplemental funding brings total enacted FY2009 funding for ATF to $1.068 billion.

85 The ATF FY2010 budget request includes $1.121 billion for ATF, or a proposed 6.4% increase compared to the
FY2008 enacted appropriation.

86 U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Management Division, FY2010 Budget and Performance Summary, (May 2009),
p. 139. Available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2010summary/.

87 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related
Agencies, Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2010, To accompany H.R. 2847,
111th Cong., 1st sess., June 12, 2009, H.Rept. 111-149, p. 66.

88 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related
Agencies Appropriations, Departments of Commerce and Justice, and Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Bill, 2010, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., June 25, 2009, S.Rept. 111-34, p. 68.

89 ATF briefing provided to CRS on May 5, 2008.

90 Statement of William Hoover, Assistant Director for Field Operations, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, February 7, 2008.

91 It is likely, however, that these weapons were acquired from sources in Central America, where they were originally
sold to the Honduran, El Salvadoran, and Nicaraguan militaries and have since entered the black market. CRS
conversation with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Office of Legislative Affairs, on February
19, 2009.

92 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Office of Public Affairs, “ATF Expands Efforts to Combat
Illegal Flow of Firearms to Mexico,” Jan. 16, 2008.

93 ATF briefing provided to CRS on April 16, 2009.

94 Ibid.

95 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico
Face Planning and Coordination Challenges, GAO-09-709, June 2009, 83 pp.

96 Ibid., p. 18.

97 Ibid., p. 15.

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid., p. 16.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid., p. 17.

102 Ibid., pp. 18-19.

103 Ibid., p. 19.

104 Ibid., p. 59.

105 For further information, see CRS Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and
Policy Issues, by Clare Ribando Seelke and June S. Beittel.

Back to Contents