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(161)     POITRAS v. A.-G. ALTA.     143

 

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    POITRAS ET AL. v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR ALBERTA

 

 

      (1969), 7 D.L.R. (3d) 161 (also reported: 68 W.W.R. 224)

 

      Alberta Supreme Court, Riley J., 24 March 1969

 

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144     POITRAS v. A.-G. ALTA.     (161)

 

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/Practice -Action for a declaration that Crown revenues be paid into

Metis Trust Account -Attorney-General of Alberta named as defendant --

Proper Alberta practice where proceedings really attacking Minister of

Government Department -Metis Betterment Act, R.S.A. 1955, c.

202--Judicature Act (Alta.), s. 14./

 

/Crown -Actions against Crown -Action for declaratory judgment

amounting to attack against Minister of Crown -Propriety of naming

Attorney-General as defendant -Judicature Act (Alta.), s. 14./

 

    The plaintiffs sought a declaration that revenues received by the

    Crown from any disposal of the mines and minerals on lands set aside

    for the settlement of members of the Metis Settlement Association

    should be paid into the Metis Population Betterment Trust Account

    rather than into the General Revenue Fund of the Province. The

    defendant sought to strike out the statement of claim on the grounds

    that the AttorneyGeneral was improperly named as defendant, that

    the plaintiffs had no capacity to bring the action and that the

    Minister of Public Welfare had never been called upon to exercise

    his discretion regarding the proceedings.

 

    /Held/, the statement of claim should be struck out. The proceedings

    were for a declaratory action and really constituted an attack

    against the Minister of Public Welfare. The proper practice in

    Alberta is to name the Minister as defendant and to obtain the

    permission of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council pursuant to s. 24

    of the /Judicature Act/, R.S.A. 1955, c. 164, which provides that

    such permission must be obtained before any action can be

    maintained against any member of the Executive Council of the

    Province, The naming of the Attorney-General as defendant was

    therefore improper. Had the defendant brought an action under the

    /Proceedings Against the Crown Act/, 1959 (Alta.), c. 63, having

    first obtained the permission of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council,

    then the defendant would have been Her Majesty the Queen in the

    right of Alberta.

 

    The final control of the Metis Association was designed to rest with

    the Department of Public Welfare and final discretion in all

    important matters lies with the Minister of the Department. There

    was no evidence to show that the Associations made any

    representations to the Minister in respect to the matters in this

    action and had they done so they might well have received permission

    to sue or obtain satisfaction in other ways.

 

MOTION by the defendants to strike out a statement of claim in an action

for a declaratory judgment.

 

/T. R. Maccagno/, for plaintiffs.

 

/W. F. McLean/, for defendant.

 

RILEY, J.:--The plaintiffs, who seek the authoritative guidance of the

Court, have commenced a representative action against the

Attorney-General, as defendant representing the

 

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(162)     POITRAS v. A.-G. ALTA.     145

 

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Crown, for a declaratory judgment that upon a true construction of the

/Metis Population Betterment Act/ (now the /Metis Betterment Act/,

R.S.A. 1955, c. 202) and the pertinent Regulations thereunder the

revenues received by the Crown from any disposal of the mines and

minerals located on the lands set aside and withdrawn for the settlement

of members of the Metis Settlement Associations should be paid into the

Metis Population Betterment Trust Account, on behalf of and for the

benefit of the said associations and their members only, instead of into

the General Revenue Fund.

 

Representations in this regard to the provincial Cabinet have been

unsuccessful. A request for a Reference to the Courts to determine the

true intent of the legislation and Regulations in question was rejected.

 

The present application by the defendant is to strike out the

plaintiffs' statement of claim on the following main grounds:

 

(a) That the Attorney-General of Alberta is improperly named therein as

defendant.

 

(b) That the plaintiffs' named therein have no capacity at law to bring

this action and if any right to bring action exists in respect to the

matters alleged in the statement of claim, then such right to bring

action lies with the Metis Settlement Associations and not with the

individual members thereof.

 

(c) That the Metis Settlement Associations have not at any time

indicated to the Minister of Public Welfare or to any of his

predecessors or to anyone in his Department or to anyone in the Metis

Rehabilitation Branch any desire to bring action in respect to the

matters referred to in the statement of claim and the Minister of Public

Welfare has therefore never been called upon to exercise his discretion

as to whether or not he should permit or forbid the commencement and

carrying on of such proceedings.

 

The statement of claim asks for no direct relief against the Crown but

merely for a declaration to resolve a question of statutory

interpretation where the revenues of the Crown as well as the rights of

a large number of people are involved and it is plain that the draftsman

was relying on the form of the action in the case of /Dyson v.

Att'y-Gen'l/, [1911] 1 K.B. 410, and cases following it such as: /Tuxedo

Holding Co. et al. v. University of Manitoba/, [1930] 3 D.L.R. 250, 38

Man. L.R. 506, [1930] 1 W.W.R. 464; /Smith v. A.-G. Ont./,

 

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146     POITRAS v. A.-G. ALTA.     (163)

 

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[1923] 4 D.L.R. 1071, 53 O.L.R. 572 [affd [1924] 3 D.L.R. 189, [1924]

S.C.R. 331, 42 C.C.C. 215]; /Wigg et al. v. A.-G. Irish Free State/

(1927), 96 L.J.P.C. 88, and particularly Viscount Cave, L.C., at p.

102, wherein it was stated:

 

Upon the first point, therefore, their Lordships are of opinion that the

appellants have a legal right which may be asserted in the Courts of the

Irish Free State; and they see no objection to the form of the action,

which is brought against the AttorneyGeneral for a declaration of

rights and is in accordance with the well known decisions in /Att.-Gen.

v. Dyson/ and other cases.

 

/Spooner Oils Ltd. et al. v. Turner Valley Gas Conservation Bd./, [1932]

4 D.L.R. 750, [1932] 3 W.W.R. 477 [revd [1933] 4 D.L.R. 545, [1933]

S.C.R. 629]; /A.-G. Alta. v. Majestic Mines Ltd./, [1942] 4 D.L.R. 593,

[1942] S.C.R. 402; /A.-G. Alta. et al. v. Huggard Assets Ltd./, [1953] 3

D.L.R. 225, 8 W.W.R. (N.S.) 561.

 

A brief examination of the statement of claim issued on July 29, 1968,

contains allegations as follows:

 

(a) That there are five of these associations formed pursuant to the

provisions of the /Metis Population Betterment Act/, 1938 (Alta. 2nd

Sess.), c. 6 (now the /Metis Betterment Act/, R.S.A. 1955, c. 202) and

that unoccupied provincial lands were, by certain Orders in Council set

aside for these associations.

 

(b) That by various Orders in Council made under the said Act the

Minister charged with administering the Act was empowered to make

Regulations or Orders covering the administration and constitution of

the associations.

 

(c) That the Metis Population Betterment Trust Account was first

established on November 20, 1943, by O.C. 1785-43 and is presently

provided for by Alta. Reg. 112/60.

 

(d) That by virtue of the provisions of the said Act and the pertinent

Regulations thereunder, all moneys received from the sale or lease of

petroleum and natural gas rights and fees and royalties therefrom on all

of the said lands are required to be credited to the said Trust Account.

 

(e) That to date, the Government of the Province of Alberta has received

in excess of $6,000,000 from dealing with the petroleum and natural gas

rights in the said lands, and these moneys have been paid into the

General Revenue Fund of the Province and not into the said Metis Popu-

lation Betterment Trust Account.

 

(f) That the Metis Settlement Associations have presented a submission

to the Government in support of the con-

 

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(164)     POITRAS v. A.-G. ALTA.     147

 

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tention that they are entitled to the said moneys and the benefits

thereof, but this submission was wholly rejected.

 

(g) That the Department of the Attorney-General has since indicated it

is not prepared to consent to any legal proceedings of any nature or

kind being commenced in this matter.

 

In the statement of claim the plaintiffs seek declarations that mines

and minerals were included in the provincial lands set aside for the

associations, and that all moneys accrued or hereafter accruing from the

sale, lease or rental of the petroleum and natural gas rights in the

said lands should be held on behalf and for the benefit of the

respective associations.

 

In his said affidavit, Tilley Maurice Johnston deposes to the effect

that he is the Director of the Metis Rehabilitation Branch of the

Department of Public Welfare and as such is responsible for the

supervision of the said Metis Settlement Associations. He states that

Alta. Reg. 56/66 provides that the affairs and business of each

association shall be transacted by a board consisting of three members

of the association and that it shall be the duty of the board to

submit to the Minister of Public Welfare proposals for the purpose of

the betterment of the members of the association. He states further that

no representations have been made by any of the associations or by any

member or members thereof to the said Minister or to himself or to any

member of the Metis Rehabilitation Branch respecting the bringing of

this action or respecting the claims therein contained.

 

Aside entirely from the Rules of Court there is, I think, inherent

jurisdiction vested in the Court to strike out a statement of claim as

being plainly an abuse of the process of the Court: /Hollinger Bus Lines

Ltd. v. Ontario Labour Relations Bd./, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 47, [1951] O.R.

562, where Spence, J., at p. 52 D.L.R., p. 568 O.R., states:

 

I am of the opinion that Riddell, J. (as he was then) when he stated in

/Orpen v. A.-G. Ont./, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 366 at p. 369, 56 O.L.R. 327

[affd [1925] 3 D.L.R. 301, 56 O.L.R. 530]: "The power left in the Court

by the Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1914, c. 56, s. 16(/f/), and asserted by

C.R. 124 (Ont.), of staying or dismissing any action which is plainly

frivolous or vexatious or which discloses no reasonable cause of

action, is simply that inherently possessed by the Court to prevent

abuse of its process", cannot be taken as having decided that R. 124 had

the effect of excluding any part of the inherent jurisdiction exercised

by the Court up to the time of the enactment of the Rules and not

included in the wording of the said Rule 124.

 

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It does appear that the Attorney-General is improperly named as the

defendant -that the Alberta practice is to name as defendant the

Minister of the Department concerned and before such proceedings can be

launched, permission of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council must be obtained.

 

Reference is made to /Great West Life Ass'ce Co. v. Baptiste/; /Canada

Life Ass'ce Co. v. Mills/, [1924] 3 D.L.R. 1061, 20 Alta. L.R. 513,

[1924] 2 W.W.R. 920, which was an appeal from the judgment of Ives, J.,

wherein he had directed that certain seed-grain liens filed under the

/Seed Grain Act/, 1921 (Alta.), c. 44, be foreclosed out in favour of

the mortgages held by the plaintiffs. Relevant to this application are

the following remarks of Beck, J.A., at pp. 1064-5:

 

Then comes the question of the "foreclosure" of the liens on the land.

Counsel for the Crown contends that the claims under the seed grain

liens are debts owing to the Crown . . . and that sale or foreclosure

cannot be taken against the Crown.

 

The older cases apparently held that where the legal estate was in the

Crown this was so. That is not at all events the case here. And the

recent cases of /Dyson v. Attorney-General/, [1911] 1 K.B. 410 . . . and

/Burghes v. Attorney-General/, [1911] 2 Ch. 139, make it quite clear

that the Court has power to make a declaration of right with consequent

relief in an action against the AttorneyGeneral although the immediate

and sole object of the action is to effect the rights of the Crown in

favour of the plaintiff.

 

In England the Attorney-General always represents the Crown, /but under

our system of Government/, where by statute, both Dominion and

Provincial, the several Departments of Government are constituted under

different Ministers of the Crown and the authority and duties of the

designated Ministers are defined, /the Crown is represented by such

designated Minister/, although the Attorney-General has a general

authority over proceedings by or against the Crown or by or against a

Minister as representing the Crown.

 

Here the particular Minister who represented the Crown in the right of

the Province was notified in accordance with the practice of the Court

of the jeopardy in which the lien of the Crown would be placed, unless

the provincial treasurer should see fit to redeem the plaintiff and the

provincial treasurer appears by the AttorneyGeneral. . . .

 

The above case was referred to in /Royal Trust Co. v. A.-G. Alta./,

[1936] 4 D.L.R. 98, [1936] 2 W.W.R. 337, where Ford, J., stated at p. 106:

 

The case of /G. W. Life Ass'ce Co. v. Baptiste/, [1924] 3 D.L.R. 1061,

20 A.L.R. 513, is another interesting example of the application of

the rule laid down in /Dyson v. Attorney General/ to the effect that

where the interests of the Crown are only indirectly concerned the

Crown's rights may be affected in favour of a plaintiff in an

 

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(166)     POITRAS v. A.-G. ALTA.     149

 

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action against the Attorney-General or /in this Province against a

specified minister of the Crown/....

 

[Italics added.]

 

Previously, Ford, J., had dealt with the situation where the Crown's

interest was directly concerned. At p. 101 he observed:

 

Whatever jurisdiction the Court might have to make the declarations

asked if there was non-existent in this Province any provision for a

proceeding by way of petition of right, I am clearly of the opinion that

there is no remedy available to the plaintiff herein except by petition

of right which cannot be tried by the Court unless and until the

Lieutenant-Governor in Council grants a /fiat/ that right be done. (The

Alberta Petition of Right Act, R.S.A. 1922, c. 94, s. 4 ( 1 ) ) . Except

in cases specially provided for by Statute, as for instance is provided

in England under the Finance Act, 1894 (Imp.), c. 30, s. 10 for the

recovery back of estate duty . . . the only way by which subjects of His

Majesty are enabled to obtain back out of the hands of the Crown either

land, money or goods, upon which the Crown has, rightfully or

wrongfully, laid its hands, is by the proceeding known as a petition of

right, and where, as in the present instance, the declarations are

sought as foundations upon which to base a claim that the Crown is

wrongfully holding money which of right belongs to the plaintiff the

Court has no jurisdiction to make the declarations asked or any of them....

 

This 1936 decision served in part to clarify the law in Alberta at that

time in that it dealt with two different types of proceedings. One was

under the /Alberta Petition of Right Act/ where it was necessary to

obtain a fiat to sue Her Majesty. Proceedings were by way of petition in

a form set out in a schedule to the Act. In that type of proceeding the

petition was addressed to Her Majesty and not to the Minister of the

Department involved. The other kind of proceedings were of the nature

contemplated by /Dyson v. Atty'-Gen'l, supra/, where an action could be

brought seeking declarations. In this latter type the Minister of the

Department concerned was to be named as defendant and it was not

necessary to obtain permission before commencing action.

 

With great haste and indeed later in the same year, the Legislature

acted. In an amendment to the /Judicature Act/, R.S.A. 1922, c. 72, it

provided that in certain circumstances permission of the

Lieutenant-Governor in Council would be necessary before any action

could be commenced against a Minister. It seems obvious that, since the

/Alberta Petition of Right Act/ was still in effect with its protection

of the Crown, the Legislature was, at least in part, aiming at the

aforesaid second type of proceedings. By 1936 (Alta. 2nd Sess.), c. 16,

the following new section was added:

 

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150     POITRAS v. A.-G. ALTA.     (167)

 

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27/a/. No action shall be brought or maintained against any member of

the Executive Council of the Province whereby relief of any kind is

claimed on account of anything done or omitted to be done by him in the

execution of his office unless permission to bring or maintain such

action has first been given by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.

 

Proceedings by way of petition of right have of course been abolished by

the /Proceedings Against the Crown Act/, 1959 (Alta.), c. 63.

Nevertheless, the Act provides as follows:

 

3(1) This Act is subject to /The Workmen's Compensation Act/, . . .

section 24 of /The Judicature Act/ and such other enactments as may be

designated by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.

 

Section 24 of the /Judicature Act/, R.S.A. 1955, c. 164, is in

substantially the same form and has the same meaning as s. 27/a/ in the

1936 amendment, /supra/.

 

The /Proceedings Against the Crown Act/ has been made subject to s. 24

of the /Judicature Act/ to prevent proceedings of the nature of the

present action being brought. In the statement of claim the plaintiff's

really are attacking the Minister of Public Welfare.

 

In paras. 10 and 11 the plaintiffs are alleging that the Government of

Alberta has paid money into the General Revenue Fund instead of the

Metis Population Betterment Trust Fund. The declaration asked for in

para. (b), the prayer, really is the means by which these and

subsequently acquired moneys are to be placed in the said trust account.

 

Although the plaintiffs make reference to the Government of the Province

of Alberta in these paragraphs the Minister of Public Welfare is

responsible for the administration of the Metis Population Betterment

Trust Account. This is clearly provided in Alberta Reg. 112/60 which

reads in part as follows:

 

The Lieutenant Governor in Council, upon the recommendation of the

Minister of Public Welfare, pursuant to section 8 of The Metis

Betterment Act, is pleased to approve regulations relating to the

Administration of the Funds of the Metis Settlement Associations in

accordance with the Schedule hereto.

 

3. The Minister shall provide for the general management and

administration of such trust funds and may direct and authorize

expenditure therefrom for any purpose which has for its objective the

advancement and betterment of the members of Settlement Associations.

 

Since the Minister of Public Welfare is responsible for the

administration of the said trust fund it is his obligation to see that

moneys are properly allocated thereto. Any failure on his part to

properly allocate the moneys would come within

 

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the meaning of the words "/on account of anything . . . omitted to be

done by him/" in s. 24 of the /Judicature Act/. The plaintiffs in

seeking the declarations asked for should first have obtained the

consent referred to in s. 24 and, provided that this consent was given,

should have named the Minister of Public Welfare and not the

Attorney-General as defendant. The plaintiffs might well, subject to

their first obtaining the permission of the Minister of Public Welfare,

have brought action under the /Proceedings Against the Crown Act/ and in

that event the defendant would, I think, have been Her Majesty the Queen

in the right of Alberta. (Note: All italics in this judgment are mine.)

 

Grounds (b) and (c) of the defendant's notice of motion can, I think, be

conveniently, judgment wise, treated together and on discussing the said

two grounds it is necessary to examine the /Metis Betterment Act/ and

certain of the Regulations, ministerial orders, etc., passed

thereunder and it is noted in passing that the plaintiff's are relying

on it and in no sense attacking it.

 

The earliest predecessors of the /Metis Betterment Act/ was the /Metis

Population Betterment Act/, 1938 (Alta. 2nd Sess.), c. 6. The preamble

to this Act reads as follows:

 

WHEREAS by the report, dated the 15th day of February, 1936, of a

commission appointed pursuant to /The Public Inquiries Act/, on the 27th

day of February, 1933, certain recommendations were made for the

betterment of the general welfare of the metis population of the Province;

 

And whereas it is convenient and in the public interest that the ways

and means of giving effect to such recommendations should be arrived at

by means of conferences and negotiations between the Government of the

Province and representatives of the metis population of the Province;

 

In the /Metis Population Betterment Act/, 1940 (Alta.), c. 6, provision

was first made under s. 4 for the formation of what were to be known as

the Metis Settlement Associations. This section is very similar in

wording to s. 4 of the /Metis Betterment Act/, which provides in part

as follows:

 

(2) The constitution and by-laws of a settlement association shall

prescribe:

 

(/a/) the qualifications for membership in the settlement association, and

 

(/b/) the conditions of membership in the settlement association.

 

(3) A settlement association shall have a local board consisting of a

chairman who shall be the local supervisor of the area appointed by

the Metis Rehabilitation Branch of the Department of Public Welfare . . .

 

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152     POITRAS v. A.-G. ALTA.     (169)

 

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(4) The Minister shall appoint two members of the local board. . .

 

(5) The aims and objects of a settlement association are to cooperate

with the Minister in preparing and formulating schemes:

 

(/a/) for the betterment of the members of the settlement association, and

 

(/b/) for the settlement of members of the settlement association on

lands of the Province set aside for that purpose.

 

(6) The constitution of a settlement association is subject to the

approval of the Minister, and when the constitution is approved it is

binding on all the members of the settlement association.

 

(7) A board of a settlement association may alter or amend the

constitution of the settlement association only with the approval of the

Minister

 

To be noted is s-s. (6) which is very similar to s. 28 of the /Companies

Act/, R.S.A. 1955, c. 53.

 

The constitution of these Settlement Associations was approved by

ministerial order upon the advice of the LieutenantGovernor in

Council. This order appears under O.C. 285-40 (36 Alta. Gaz., p. 186).

Of importance are the following excerpts of this order at p. 187:

 

The affairs and business of the Association shall be transacted by a

Board consisting of not more than five members, who shall be elected in

the manner hereinafter mentioned, and it shall be the duty of the Board

to submit to the Minister the proposals for the purpose of the

betterment of the members of the Settlement Association and for their

settlement on any lands in the Province set aside for occupation by the

Settlement Association under The Metis Population Betterment Act, and to

co-operate with the Minister in the formation of schemes for such purpose.

 

at p. 189:

 

The Board may make rules and regulations for calling meetings, governing

its proceedings for the conduct of its meetings, and generally for the

transaction of its business. Any question dealt with by the Board upon

which there is an equality of votes shall be deemed to be in the

negative, but may be submitted to the Minister and his decision thereon

shall be final.

 

at p. 189:

 

/Duties of the Chairman of the Board /-He shall be the chief executive

officer of the Settlement Association and shall

 

(a) cause the laws, rules and regulations governing the Settlement

Association to be duly executed;

 

(b) cause correct records to be kept of all proceedings at all meetings

of the Settlement Association and of the Board;

 

(e) report and certify all by-laws and other acts and proceedings of

the Board to the Minister;

 

(f) to communicate from time to time to the Board all such information

and recommend such measures as may tend to better the welfare of the

Settlement Association;

 

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and at p. 190:

 

The Board of a Settlement Association may pass by-laws and regulations,

not inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution of the

Settlement Association, pertaining to the management and governing of

the Settlement Association and the reserved area occupied by their

Settlement Association. Any such by-law and regulation passed by the

Board shall become effective when approved by the Minister.

 

The constitution and by-laws of Settlement Associations and the

qualifications for membership in such Settlement Association and the

conditions of membership therein and the regulations set forth in the

foregoing having been adopted as the constitution of the following Metis

Settlement Associations at the organization meetings . . .

 

Various Regulations since this ministerial order have been passed

respecting the constitution of the associations and the number of

directors in each board has been reduced to three, all being elected by

the association members. The present Regulation appears as Alta. Reg.

56/66. Worthy of note is the first paragraph of s. 3 at p. 106,

Regulations, reading in part as follows:

 

3. The affairs and business of an association shall be transacted by a

Board consisting of 3 members which shall be formulated in the matter

hereinafter mentioned. It shall be the duty of the Board to submit to

the Minister proposals for the purpose of the betterment of the members

of the Settlement Association . . .

 

Also worthy of note is the following, at p. 108:

 

Such payments shall be made on the receipt of the signed, original copy

of the minutes of the meeting by the:

 

Supervisor of Metis Rehabilitation,

 

Department of Public Welfare . . .

 

Turning specifically to the second ground of this application, the

Metis Settlement Associations have existed since O.C. 285-40. They are

creatures of statute and their constitution and by-laws are provided

for by s. 4 of the present Act, /supra/. From their beginning, the

Regulations have provided that the board of each association should

submit proposals or by-laws for the betterment of the respective

association to the Minister. In the case of a by-law, the by-law upon

being approved by the Minister becomes part of that particular

association's constitution (O.C. 285-40 at p. 190).

 

By s. 4 (6) of the present Act, /supra/, the members of each association

are bound by its constitution. Surely this must mean that they, through

their board of directors, should submit a proposal or by-law to the

Minister respecting the feasibility of bringing action respecting the

matters referred

 

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to in the statement of claim. Should the Minister approve of the

proposal or by-law, the association would have the capacity to sue Her

Majesty in its own name.

 

It is abundantly plain that final control of the Metis Association was

designed to rest with the Department of Public Welfare and final

discretion in all important matters lies with the Minister of Public

Welfare.

 

There is no allegation or evidence to indicate that the associations or

any one of them or any member thereof has sought or been refused to

bring the present or any other form of action respecting the matters

referred to in the statement of claim had they, through their respective

boards, made proper and adequate presentation to the Minister of Public

Welfare, they might well have received permission to sue or obtained

satisfaction in other ways.

 

In the statement of claim it is alleged that the Department of the

Attorney-General has indicated that it is not prepared to consent to any

legal proceedings of any nature or kind being commenced in this matter.

If I be correct then it is apparent that the Attorney-General has

absolutely no jurisdiction to grant the necessary consent.

 

I am not unmindful of the plaintiffs' further arguments that

 

(i) the section of the /Judicature Act/ is inapplicable where the

Attorney-General is named as representative of the Crown -the action

not being concerned with the performance or non-performance of his

official duties but seeks the Court's interpretation of the /Metis

Population Betterment Act/ (now the /Metis Betterment Act/) and certain

Regulations thereunder and that the Crown always acts through its

representatives. See /Great West Life Ass'ce Co. v. Baptiste/, [1924] 3

D.L.R. 1061, 20 Alta. L.R. 513, [1924] 2 W.W.R. 920.

 

(ii) the members of the Metis Settlement Associations have a real and

common interest in the subject-matter of the declaration sought in this

action -and that the rights of the plaintiffs who are all members of

the various Metis Settlement Associations are in issue and that the

plaintiffs are merely applying for the determination of the true

construction of the pertinent statute and Regulations, and for a

declaration of their rights thereunder. See /Interlake Tissue Mills

Ltd. v. George Everall Co. Ltd./ (1921), 64 D.L.R. 206 at p. 207, 50

O.L.R. 165 at pp. 165-6:

 

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The case of /Ellis v. Duke of Bedford/, [1899] 1 Ch. 494, /Duke of

Bedford v. Ellis/, [1901] A.C. 1, is authority for the general proposi-

tion that where a statute confers certain rights upon a class an action

will lie by any member of the class on behalf of all for a declaratory

judgment in assertion of these rights.

 

In the /Ellis/ case, a number of market gardeners who were claiming

certain preferential rights, sued on behalf of themselves and all

other such gardeners within the meaning of a certain Act for a

declaration as to the true construction of the Act in question.

 

(iii) the permission of the Minister of Public Welfare is not required

to commence and carry on this action-it being /not a proposal by a

Board "for the purpose of the betterment of the members of the

Settlement Associations/ and for their settlement on any lands in the

Province set aside for occupation by a Settlement Association . . ."

that plainer words would be required if it were necessary for the

members of the Settlement Associations to obtain ministerial approval

prior to proceeding with this action. /This action is not concerned

with the internal management of the Settlement Associations, the

subject-matter of the aforesaid Regulation relied upon by the defendant./

 

(iv) the matters of status which are raised in (b) and (c) of the

defendant's notice of motion are questions of substance to be raised

in the defendant's pleadings and cannot be the subject of the summary

application. See /Sykes v. One Big Union/, [1936] 1 D.L.R. 662, 43 Man.

R. 542, [1936] 1 W.W.R. 237.

 

(v) striking out a pleading should be exercised with extreme caution and

only in obvious cases and where a question of general importance or a

serious question of law arises on the pleadings, the Court will not

strike out the pleadings unless it is clear and obvious that the

action will not lie. The Court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable

doubt that no cause of action is disclosed: /Security Trust Co. v.

National Trust/, [1928] 2 D.L.R. 393, 24 Alta. L.R. 11, [1928] 1 W.W.R.

687; /Racine v. C.N.R./, [1923] 2 D.L.R. 572, 19 Alta. L.R. 529, [1923]

1 W.W.R. 1439; /Minnes v. Minnes/ (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 497 at pp. 503

/et seq/.; /Electrical Development Co. of Ont. v. A.-G. Ont./, 47 D.L.R.

10 at p. 15, [1919] A.C. 687; /Smith v. A.-G. Ont./ (1922), 52 O.L.R.

469 at p. 473; /Demers v. Desrosier/, [1928] 3 D.L.R. 100, [1928] 2

W.W.R. 60.

 

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156     POITRAS v. A.-G. ALTA.     (173)

 

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(vi) generally speaking, the Courts have taken a very liberal attitude

in considering whether a declaratory judgment or order will be granted

in a particular case. In /Kloepfer Wholesale Hardware & Automotive Co.

v. Roy/, [1952] 3 D.L.R. 705, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 465, Locke, J., stated as

follows at p. 711 D.L.R., pp. 475-6 S.C.R.:

 

To make such a declaration of right is expressly authorized by s-s.

(/b/) of s. 15 of the /Judicature Act/, [R.S.O. 1950, c. 190; s. 32(/p/)

of our /Judicature Act/] whether any consequential relief is or could be

claimed or not. The section of the Ontario Act reproduces verbatim

Rule 5 of Order XXV of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1883, under which

it has been held that the making of such a declaration is not confined

to cases where the plaintiff has a cause of action against the

defendant: /Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Hannay & Co./, [1915] 2 K.B.

536; /Russian Commercial & Industrial Bk. v. British Bk. for Foreign

Trade/, [1921] 2 A.C. 438 at p. 452, /per/ Lord Sumner. In /Hanson v.

Radcliffe Urban Dist. Council/, [1922] 2 Ch. 490 at p. 507, Lord

Sterndale M.R. expressed the opinion that the power of the Court to make

a declaration under this Rule where it is a question of defining the

rights of two parties is only limited by its own discretion.

 

Reluctantly I grant the motion applied for by the defendant. I say

reluctantly because I am reminded of the words of Sir George Farwell who

delivered the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in

the case of /Eastern Trust Co. v. Mackenzie, Mann & Co. Ltd./, 22 D.L.R.

410 at pp. 417-8, [1915] A.C. 750 at pp. 759-60:

 

The non-existence of any right to bring the Crown into Court, such as

exists in England by petition of right, and in many of the colonies by

the appointment of an officer to sue and be sued on behalf of the Crown,

does not give the Crown immunity from all law, or authorize the

interference by the Crown with private rights at its own mere will.

There is a well-established practice in England in certain cases where

no petition of right will lie, under which the Crown can be sued by the

Attorney-General, and a declaratory order obtained, as has been recently

explained by the Court of Appeal in England in /Attorney-General v.

Dyson/ (1911), 1 K.B. 410, and in /Attorney-General v. Burghes/ (1912),

1 Ch. 173. It is the duty of the Crown and of every branch of the

executive to abide by and obey the law. If there is any difficulty in

ascertaining it the Courts are open to the Crown to sue, and it is the

duty of the executive in cases of doubt to ascertain the law, in order

to obey it, not to disregard it. The proper course in the present case

would have been either to apply to the Court to determine the question

of construction of the contract, and to pay accordingly, or to pay the

whole amount over to the receiver and to obtain from the Court an order

on the receiver to pay the sums properly payable for labour and

supplies, as to the construction of which their Lordships agree with

the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia.

 

The duty of the Crown in such a case is well stated by Lord Abinger in

/Deare v. Attorney-General/, 1 Y. & C. Exch. at p. 208,

 

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(174)     POITRAS v. A.-G. ALTA.     157

 

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160 E.R. 80. After pointing out that the Crown always appears (in

England) by the Attorney-General in a Court of justice -especially in

a Court of Equity -where the interest of the Crown is concerned, even

perhaps in a bill for discovery, he goes on to say:--

 

"It has been the practice, which I hope never will be discontinued, for

the officers of the Crown to throw no difficulty in the way of any

proceeding for the purpose of bringing matters before a Court of Justice

where any real point of difficulty that requires judicial decision has

occurred."

 

The case at bar graphically illustrates rule by the executive branch

of Government; the administrative branch; and the bureaucrats; the

defiance of those branches of "The rule of law"; all principles of

"equity" and "fairness" resulting in subjugation of the Courts.

 

It goes without saying that if the plaintiffs can find some method of

properly bringing the matter before the Courts this decision does not

fetter them in any way and is without prejudice to their rights so to do.

 

I quite agree that the procedure laid down by Government somewhat

unilateral and almost prohibitory by Government denies the prophesy

"that government should be of the people, for the people and by the people".

 

I do not think that Courts are mere interpreters of the law; I quite

agree that the Courts are in no sense legislators but I do think

judicial pronouncements may be helpful in shaping the law.

 

I express my appreciation of the counsel concerned for very thorough and

able arguments.

 

Costs if demanded may be spoken to.

 

/Motion granted/.