How very interesting it is that Charles Hartshorne's somewhat "phenomenological", *neoclassical-metaphysical* approach to this major "Western" theologian and bane of Orthodox Holy Tradition, St. Anselm of Canterbury, calls for a bracketing off of St. Anselm's "Greek" and "Scholastic" tendencies in order to home in on his real "discovery". (See Charles Hartshorne, _Anselm's Discovery A Re-examination of the Ontological Proof for God's Existence_, La Salle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1965.) Note, furthermore, the *Augustinian* turn which a more recent consideration of the *ontological argument* has taken in the response of Thomas V. Morris to a paper by B. Kane, the invocation of Augustinian rationalistic *lex aeterna* notwithstanding. (See Thomas V. Morris, _Anselmian Explorations Essays in Philosophical Theology_, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987, Chapter 10: _Necessary Beings_, and B. Kane, _The Modal Ontological Argument_, Mind 93:336-350(1984).) The success of the *modal* ontological argument is said by its defenders to depend on the (possibility of the) *necessary existence* of the very "object" it sets out to "prove" (B. Kane, p.341), and therefore, so it seems to me, when the ontological argument is thus made stronger through modalization, it loses the supposed *independence* of its own intrinsic logic, and comes to depend for its validity and truth on the "compulsion" and *necessity* of its ultimate "object". Even the "B-principle" (MLp > p), therefore, so it seems to me, serves to move the Anselmian argument right back into an Augustinian and a Patristic-Orthodox context, and by future anticipation, into the Reformational perspective of High Calvinism. Here, the modality of *(logical) necessity* has been superseded by the modality of *faith- functioning/intentionality*. This makes it possible to engage in the concrete-functional, time-dynamic process of "thinking actual existence, without converting it into necessity" (Thomas F. Torrance, _Theological Science_, Oxford / London / New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, [Paperback 1978], p. 4, and also pp. 1-2, 118, 153-154, 272-273 noting Dr. Torrance's reference to Søren Kierkegaard's very perceptive reflections on the problem of *possibility*, *necessity*, and *actuality*). Then, when St. Anselm tried to move directly from the concept of God as the greatest possible being to the actual existence of God, when he exclaimed, "there is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O Lord, our God", he has actually turned away from all that has been created and has redirected his glance to our Lord Jesus Christ in personal communion. He is making a *personal commitment* and a *confession of faith*, not concluding a magical series of simple steps in metaphysical logic, no matter that he himself may have actually tried to *logicize* an act transcending logic. The parallel situation in the Dooyeweerdian-Orthodox frame of reference is clearly set forth in Dooyeweerd's statement, in line with St. Augustine, that "we then direct our glance to the transcendent meaning-totality and the Origin, in which at last our thought finds rest *in its religious root* (_New Critique_ II, p. 284). This is definitely a *religious* act, as I think also Norman Malcolm would have readily allowed. (See pages 60-62 of Norman Malcolm, _Anselm's Ontological Arguments_, The Philosophical Review 49:41-62(1960).) Certainly *logic* has its place in this process, but the ultimate step, that is, the movement from mere idea or concept or definition, or from mere possibility, to *actual existence* is a *religious step*, not a "logical conclusion". This is the powerful, erotic *intentio* of St. Anselm to the Origin. Even "the Good, the True, and the Beautiful" and *the Greatest Possible Being* must be "left behind" at this stage as our glance is turned into the Other Direction. This is Sublimation at its Best, whatever its immanent temporal beginnings here below.

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